the writ as filed

 JOHN DE HERRERA

PO Box 5888

Santa Barbara, California, 93150

805-708-1965

john@cc2.org

Petitioner In Pro Per

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

JOHN DE HERRERA, Petitioner vs. INTERINSURANCE EXCHANGE OF THE AUTOMOBILE CLUB Respondent.

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Case No. 26STCP00952 Judge: Hon. Curtis A. Kin Department: 836 VERIFIED FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDATE AND COMPLAINT (CCP § 1085)

 

INTRODUCTION

    “For every wrong there is a remedy.” (Cal. Civ. Code § 3523.)

    

    Petitioner invokes this foundational Maxim of Jurisprudence as anchor to this proceeding where the alleged wrong—a negligent operator point reported in error to the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV)—would otherwise have no remedy at all. Only this Court can reach the wrong Respondent has caused.

    Petitioner brings this Verified First Amended Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandate and Complaint to compel the Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (Respondent), to furnish a “complete response” under 10 CCR § 2695.5(b) associated with Claim No. 017439398 (Claim).

    This Petition is filed pursuant to leave granted by this Court after the June 16, 2026 hearing on Respondent’s Demurrer to the writ petition filed March 10, 2026. As to the claimant-status question raised at that hearing, statutory definitions governing it are resolved by regulatory text itself: 10 CCR § 2695.2(c) defines “Claimant” to mean a first or third party claimant, and 10 CCR § 2695.2(f) defines “First party claimant” as any person asserting a right as a named insured. Petitioner is the policyholder to whom the Claim was attached and therefore, as a matter of regulatory definition, entitled to the interdependent protections of 10 CCR § 2695.7(d) and 10 CCR § 2695.5(b).

    No published California decision has addressed whether a first party claimant may enforce by mandamus an insurer’s ministerial duties under the Fair Claims Settlement Practices Regulations to furnish a “complete response” regarding an insurer reporting a bodily injury point to the DMV, resulting in invasions and irreparable harms to a policyholder’s driving record and license, insurance premiums, or as in this case here, professional opportunity and output, nor whether enforcement may extend to compelling correction of an erroneous report if/when failure to investigate is established. The absence of governing authority does not diminish the clarity of the mandatory/ministerial duties at issue here, but confirms that this Court is the first court asked to hold an insurer to these duties under these circumstances.

           Petitioner: John De Herrera.

           Respondent: Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club.

           Venue: Incident occurred in Los Angeles County where Petitioner resides.

Statement of Facts

1.    October 14th, 2025: Petitioner entered parking space at business mall located near northwest corner of Agoura and Kanan Roads, City of Agoura Hills, County of Los Angeles. In doing so there was no vehicle parked on Petitioner’s driver’s side. Upon returning to vehicle from business there was then another vehicle, the third party, parked on Petitioner’s driver’s side with front passenger wheel on line separating the two parking spaces. Petitioner put vehicle in reverse and upon vacating space Petitioner’s driver side front bumper made slight and subtle contact with third party’s passenger door. Not sure if contact had been made, Petitioner pulled back into space and looked left to find third party angrily glaring from their driver’s seat. Petitioner and third party both immediately exited vehicles with Petitioner vocally and profusely apologetic. Petitioner inspected where contact had occurred to find a parallel paint transfer. It was raining and Petitioner brushed fingers over point of contact, assuring third party of no structural damage, that damage was cosmetic in nature. Petitioner and third party then stood under mall overhang directly in front of third party’s vehicle while third party took photos of Petitioner’s driver’s license and insurance card. Petitioner looked into third party’s vehicle during this time and witnessed no one else in vehicle, nor did third party indicate at any time in any way there was another occupant. Petitioner thought to note third party’s front passenger wheel on line between parking spaces, but not wanting to make an unfortunate situation worse, apologized again and vacated parking lot believing third party would report the paint transfer.

2.    October 15th, 2025: Petitioner receives call from Respondent’s agent informing Petitioner the third party from day before was claiming bodily injury for themself and also a four-year old daughter. Petitioner declared to agent there was no other individual in third party’s vehicle at time of incident and nature of contact between vehicles was physically impossible to have caused bodily injury. Petitioner was distressed though assured by agent, who stated an investigation of the allegations would commence and Petitioner would be updated in near future.

3.    October 22, 2025: Petitioner receives what Respondent characterizes as a status update call from an injury adjuster, though at no time during this call was Petitioner informed of any specific elements of an investigation, a possible Special Investigative Unit (SIU) launch, the critical 30-day window to obtain security camera content, nor mention Petitioner could personally identify cameras for Petitioner’s benefit and exoneration.

4.    October 22, 2025: This same day Respondent’s agents complete and mail Petitioner hard copy letter stating they determined Petitioner was at fault for bodily injury; though as Petitioner’s PO Box is far from residence, Petitioner was not yet aware of this letter, and still awaiting update from October 15 call. (Exhibit A). 

5.    November 24, 2025: Petitioner calls initial agent to inquire about update on investigation and is informed the Claim was settled and Petitioner was to receive bodily injury point on DMV record. The call lasted 30 minutes where discussion centered on validity of the Claim. The agent expressed doubts and agrees to have a Supervisor contact Petitioner. (Exhibit B).

6.    November 26, 2025: Petitioner calls initial agent asking about Supervisor call-back and is texted that Supervisor is out of office and will contact Petitioner December 1. (Exhibit C).

7.    December 3, 2025: Petitioner again calls initial agent asking about Supervisor call-back and is texted back that Supervisor has been notified and will contact Petitioner upon return to office. (Exhibit D).

8.    December 5, 2025: Petitioner again texts initial agent asking about Supervisor call-back and is texted back Supervisor will return December 8. (Exhibit E).

9.    December 8, 2025: Supervisor No. 1 calls Petitioner for conversation lasting 10 minutes where Petitioner expressed dismay over third party’s claims that another occupant was in vehicle at time of incident and bodily injury resulted from a sub-5mph parallel paint transfer. (Exhibit F). Petitioner requests to speak with supervisor above Supervisor No. 1, and later this day Supervisor No. 2 calls Petitioner for 18 minute discussion, where Petitioner is then informed the Respondent’s Unit Manager will be in contact soon. (Exhibit G).

10.    December 9, 2025: Petitioner establishes a true and correct email exchange with Unit Manager who sends photo via email showing third party’s passenger door and parallel paint transfer. Door is photographed uncleaned since day of incident and rain, showing marks where Petitioner had brushed fingers over paint transfer while assuring third party damage was cosmetic, making paint transfer appear more substantial. (Exhibit H). Petitioner subsequently sought out and took photos of same door type to note contour of door which does not read well in photo. (Exhibit I). Petitioner also took photo from in front of same type of vehicle approximating where Petitioner was standing while third party obtained Petitioner’s ID and insurance information on date of incident, showing view to inside of vehicle (Exhibit J).

11.    December 16, 2025: Petitioner receives voicemail from initial agent of October 15, stating they were “going to close out the claim.” (Exhibit K).

12.    December 17, 2025: Petitioner returns to site of incident and discovers two separately owned and operated security cameras with equidistant and unobstructed views to site where incident occurred: Camera 1 owned and operated by Kanan Properties and Camera 2 by a local jewelry store (Exhibit L). This Exhibit shows 1) the actual site, 2) Cameras, 3) Camera locations and sight-lines. Petitioner also searches for and obtains phone number of property manager for Kanan Properties and calls to inquire about security camera content from October 14.

13.    December 18, 2025: Property manager of Kanan Properties texts Petitioner stating security camera content is overwritten after 30 days and no longer available, to which Petitioner replies: “Do you have recollection of any insurance investigators contacting you between 10/14 and 11/15 this year?” To which property manager responds: “No, they did not contact me. I would have absolutely responded had I received a telephone call or something in writing.” (Exhibit M). Petitioner subsequently requests and receives email confirmation from both owners of security cameras, confirming neither were contacted by any insurance agent between October 15 and November 15. (Exhibits N).

14.    December 19, 2025: Petitioner receives email from Unit Manager stating they are reviewing Claim and for Petitioner to please allow them more time. (Exhibit O).

15.    December 26, 2025: Unit Manager calls Petitioner for 14 minute discussion where Petitioner pleads for Respondent to recognize third party is the bad actor, and to work with Petitioner to make situation whole. (Exhibit P). Later this day Unit Manager emails Petitioner a PDF of Respondent’s disposition on Claim. (Exhibit Q).

16.    December 31, 2025: Petitioner notifies Unit Manager via email Petitioner has sent a formal inquiry via certified mail through the United States Postal Service regarding the investigatory basis for Respondent’s settlement of the Claim. This letter is styled as a request for the Claim file, but constituting in substance and regulatory effect, the request for a “complete response” under 10 CCR § 2695.5(b). (Exhibit R).

17.    January 5, 2026: Petitioner files Consumer Insurance Fraud Reporting Form with California Department of Insurance (CDI) and receives Case Number 8695364. (Exhibit S).

18.    January 9, 2026: Petitioner sends another certified letter via United States Postal Service for information on investigation and settlement, this time addressed to Automobile Club of Southern California rather than AAA, and subsequently receives confirmation of its delivery. (Exhibit T).

19.    January 12, 2026: Petitioner receives PDF email from Senior Insurance Compliance Officer of CDI stating they would forward case to Respondent, ask for detailed response, review information obtained for compliance with statutes, regulations, and policy provisions, determine if Respondent handled claim appropriately, and notify Petitioner upon completion of review. (Exhibit U).

20.    January 13, 2026: Petitioner visits local American Automobile Association office and requests complete copy of Petitioner’s auto policy CAA202768907. (Exhibit V).

21.    January 21, 2026: Respondent’s Unit Manager replies via email, stating “I have now located your formal request. We will review your request and respond to you at our earliest opportunity.” (Exhibit W).

22.   January 28, 2026: Petitioner retrieves hard copy letter via United States Postal Service from Respondent’s Group Manager, dated January 26, 2026, in part stating: 1) “We explained the investigation process to you.” 2) “You have also made a demand for compensation due to our handling of this claim.” 3) “You also mentioned that on several occasions you recorded conversations with our representatives that they were not aware of and did not consent.” All three of these statements are untrue: the investigation process was never explained, demands for compensation were never made, and conversations were never recorded. The same letter, while declining to produce investigative notes on privacy grounds, disclosed that the third party was employed as a professional stunt performer. (Exhibit X).

 

23.    February 4, 2026: Petitioner emails Unit Manager requesting confirmation Group Manager’s January 26 letter is Respondent’s final and complete response regarding the Claim.

24.    February 5, 2026: Unit Manager replies to email from day before: “We have reviewed the claim, and [the Group Manager] has issued our response.” (Exhibit Y).

25.    March 10, 2026: Petitioner files Peremptory Writ of Mandate. By way of background relevant to the harms described herein: Petitioner maintained an art studio and gallery for almost fifteen years and has been accepted to numerous open calls for art and has hundreds of works in homes around the world. Petitioner is also a literary artist with poems published by college journals and on-line literary establishments; as playwright Petitioner has one play produced to date and recently had a staged reading of another; as an author Petitioner has published three books (two novels and a translation) and was steadfastly working to complete fourth book up until October 15, 2025 and notification of Claim. (Exhibit Z). Note: this multi-paged exhibit contains acceptance for teaching credential for the State, acceptance letters to various open calls for literary and visual arts, poems, and photos of Petitioner’s art in homes.

26.     April 15, 2026: CDI Senior Insurance Compliance Officer issues formal written response stating the Department is unable to resolve the dispute; that the ultimate decision is left to a court of law, and only a court of law has the authority to weigh the evidence and merits of each party’s position to arrive at a formal binding decision on the dispute. (Exhibit AA).

27.    April 24, 2026: Petitioner contacts Respondent’s Thousand Oaks, California office by telephone to inquire and confirm resultant premium hikes post-settlement. Petitioner’s call log shows seventeen-minute outgoing call where Respondent’s representative informed Petitioner the Claim in question was not closed. Petitioner verified the Claim’s open status via Respondent’s internet portal, where previously was shown as closed on January 16, 2026. The link to the reopened Claim on Respondent’s portal remained inaccessible to Petitioner as of April 27, 2026. (Exhibit BB [1-4]).

28.    April 27, 2026: After foregoing telephone communication Petitioner emails Unit Manager seeking confirmation of Claim’s status. Unit Manager responded on May 15, 2026 — eighteen days later — and did not deny Claim was re-opened, nor provide any statement of Claim’s status, nor affirm January 26, 2026 letter/response constituted a final or complete response. Instead, Petitioner was directed to communicate exclusively through Respondent’s litigation counsel. (Exhibit CC).

29.    Petitioner’s DMV driver record reflects the October 14, 2025 accident and a Financial Responsibility Case No. 25-14-24873, with the “Report No.” field showing “DMV” rather than any law enforcement agency designation, confirming no police or CHP report exists for this incident. The record reflects this FR Case was updated December 26, 2025 — the identical date on which Respondent’s Unit Manager transmitted Respondent’s PDF disposition of the Claim to Petitioner. (Exhibit DD).

30.    July 17, 2026: Petitioner submits to the DMV, via certified mail, a completed Financial Responsibility Information Request (Form SR-19C) seeking a copy of the SR-1 report underlying FR Case No. 25-14-24873. (Exhibit EE-1). That same day, Petitioner telephones the Department’s Financial Responsibility Unit and, during an eleven-minute call, speaks with a representative who confirms that the SR-1 was filed by AAA. Petitioner is informed the requested certified copy of the SR-1 will require approximately 30-60 days to produce. (Exhibit EE-2).

31.    July 21, 2026: Petitioner again checked Respondent’s claims portal and found Claim No. 017439398 still open, but now accessible and reflecting a newly assigned Claims Service Representative not previously identified in this record. As of the date of this filing, Petitioner has received no communication of any kind from this newly assigned representative. (Exhibit FF).

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

(Violation of Ministerial Duty – CCP § 1085)

(Against Respondent)

1. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 31 of the Statement of Facts as though fully set forth herein.

2. Respondent is an insurer licensed to transact automobile insurance business in California and is a “licensee” within the meaning of 10 CCR § 2695.2 et seq., the Fair Claims Settlement Practices Regulations.

3. Petitioner is, and at all relevant times has been, the named insured under automobile insurance policy number CAA202768907 issued by Respondent and covering the vehicle Petitioner operated on October 14, 2025, under which Claim No. 017439398 was opened.

4. 10 CCR § 2695.2(f) defines a “First party claimant” as “any person asserting a right under an insurance policy as a named insured, other insured or beneficiary under the terms of that insurance policy.” Petitioner, as the named insured under Respondent’s policy, is a first party claimant as a matter of regulatory definition.

5. 10 CCR § 2695.2(c) defines “Claimant” to mean “a first or third party claimant as defined in these regulations,” together with certain attorneys and designated representatives. The term “claimant” as used throughout the Fair Claims Settlement Practices Regulations, including 10 CCR § 2695.5(b), therefore expressly includes a first party claimant such as Petitioner. No language in 10 CCR § 2695.2 or § 2695.5 excludes a named insured from the protections owed to a “claimant.”

6. Here, under 10 CCR § 2695.5(b), Petitioner does not seek adjudication of the third party’s entitlement to benefits, nor ask Respondent or this Court to reweigh third party’s claim. Rather, this proceeding concerns Respondent’s own investigation and factual basis for a determination which adversely affected Petitioner’s interests as a first party claimant — namely, the negligent operator point placed on Petitioner’s driving record as a direct result of Respondent’s settlement of the underlying Claim. A first party claimant’s inquiry into the sufficiency of the licensee’s own investigatory process, and the factual basis for a determination causing direct harm to that first party, is squarely within the scope of the duties imposed by 10 CCR §§ 2695.7(d) and 2695.5(b), regardless of whether a third party’s liability claim served as administrative trigger for Respondent’s conduct. Petitioner’s independent regulatory rights exist wholly separate from any third party determinations.

7. Petitioner’s status as “first party claimant” under 10 CCR § 2695.2(f) does not depend on whether the underlying claim was a first party or third party liability claim. The regulatory definition asks only whether Petitioner is a named insured asserting a right under the policy — which Petitioner plainly is. The rights Petitioner asserts here are not third party’s right to payment, which Respondent has resolved, but rights as named insured to a thorough, fair, and objective investigation under 10 CCR § 2695.7(d) before an adverse determination harmful to Petitioner’s interests is reported to a public record. These rights are created by the Fair Claims Settlement Practices Regulations and tied directly to Petitioner’s status as the named insured under the policy — not derivative of the third party’s claim — but existing independently of it. A named insured asserting these rights is, by the plain text of 10 CCR § 2695.2(f), a first party claimant entitled to the protections of 10 CCR § 2695.5(b). No language in the Fair Claims Settlement Practices Regulations limits these protections to insureds asserting first-party property or collision claims, to the exclusion of regulatory rights arising from an insurer’s handling of a third-party liability claim.

8. Respondent has a clear, present, and ministerial duty under 10 CCR § 2695.5(b) to furnish a “complete response based on the facts as then known” to a claimant — including a first party claimant such as Petitioner — within fifteen (15) calendar days of receiving any communication that reasonably suggests a response is expected. This duty is mandatory, non-discretionary, and owed directly to a first party claimant such as Petitioner.

9. Respondent additionally has a clear, present, and ministerial duty under 10 CCR § 2695.7(d) to “conduct and diligently pursue a thorough, fair and objective investigation” of all claims, including Claim No. 017439398. This mandate is non-discretionary and strictly requires that an insurer’s liability determinations be rooted in verified factual evidence, rather than selective reliance on unsworn, self-serving third-party allegations.

10. Petitioner made formal, certified written inquiries to Respondent beginning in December 2025 regarding the basis for Respondent’s settlement of third party bodily injury allegations resulting in a negligent operator point placed on Petitioner’s driving record. These inquiries reasonably suggested a response was expected within the meaning of 10 CCR § 2695.5(b).

11. Respondent did not furnish any substantive response until January 26, 2026 — well beyond fifteen calendar days from Petitioner’s certified inquiries — and the response then furnished was not “complete” within the meaning of the regulation, because on information and belief as alleged on the face of the verified Petition, it contained multiple material misstatements of fact that Respondent had explained its investigation process to Petitioner, that Petitioner had demanded compensation, and that Petitioner had made unconsented recordings of Respondent’s representatives — none of which occurred.

12. A response containing material misstatements of fact cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a “complete response based on the facts as then known” under 10 CCR § 2695.5(b). Under Civil Code § 3528, the law respects form less than substance, and the form of a response does not satisfy the substance of the duty where, as here, the response contains material misstatements of fact while withholding the factual basis the regulation requires.

13. Respondent breached its ministerial duty under 10 CCR § 2695.7(d) by failing to identify, preserve, or obtain readily available security camera evidence from two independently owned and operated cameras with unobstructed sight-lines to incident, despite Petitioner’s immediate report of fraud on October 15, 2025, and a known 30-day retention window before such evidence is routinely overwritten.

14. Petitioner is informed, believes, and alleges, that subsequent to filing of this action Respondent reopened the Claim in dispute. This is corroborated by: (1) A seventeen-minute telephone call with Respondent’s representative on April 24, 2026 confirming Claim not closed; (2) Petitioner’s own inquiry to Respondent’s portal confirming Claim shown open on April 27, 2026 after having been previously shown as closed; and (3) Respondent’s Unit Manager’s May 15, 2026 response to Petitioner’s inquiry regarding Claim status, in which the status was neither denied nor affirmed, nor finality of January 26, 2026 letter/response, but instead Petitioner was redirected to litigation counsel. Collectively and individually this conduct is consistent with, and corroborative of, Petitioner’s allegation that Respondent’s January 26, 2026 letter/response did not constitute a “complete response” under 10 CCR § 2695.5(b) at that time and still does not now. Petitioner does not contend that mandamus requires the underlying investigation to be closed before relief may issue; to the contrary, Respondent’s fifteen-day and thorough-investigation duties under 10 CCR §§ 2695.7(d) and 2695.5(b) matured, and were breached, well before any reopening. The reopening is offered here only as corroboration of a breach that had already occurred, not as its source.

15. That Respondent has in this proceeding characterized reopening of Claim as routine does not address, and cannot explain, Unit Manager’s failure to affirm or deny the finality of the January 26 letter/response. That failure is itself further evidence the January 26 letter/response was never a complete or final statement of Respondent’s position.

16. Petitioner has no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The California Department of Insurance (CDI), the State agency charged with regulatory oversight of Respondent, has confirmed in writing it cannot adjudicate or compel resolution of this dispute and that only a court of law has authority to do so, establishing that Petitioner has exhausted available administrative remedies. A civil action for damages, even if otherwise available, cannot compel performance of the ministerial duties described herein and would not address the ongoing existence of an erroneous and adverse negligent operator point on Petitioner’s DMV record.

17. Petitioner is a beneficially interested party with a clear, present, and beneficial right to Respondent’s performance of ministerial duties described herein, as named insured and first party claimant directly affected by Respondent’s settlement of Claim and resultant adverse point on Petitioner’s DMV record. In the alternative, and independent of Petitioner’s status as a first party claimant, Petitioner has standing to compel Respondent’s compliance with the mandatory duties described herein under the public interest exception to the beneficial interest requirement, as this proceeding seeks to enforce a public duty affecting Respondent’s California policyholders, and not merely a private interest personal to Petitioner. Petitioner’s beneficial interest is further evidenced by a present, non-speculative increase in insurance premiums directly attributable to the erroneous bodily injury designation — a concrete financial harm already sustained, not a prospective or conjectural one.

18. On July 17, 2026, Petitioner spoke by telephone with a representative of the DMV Financial Responsibility Unit, who confirmed that the Report of Traffic Accident (SR-1) associated with FR Case No. 25-14-24873 was filed by American Automobile Association (AAA). (Exhibit EE-2). Petitioner is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the filing party was Respondent or an entity within Respondent’s affiliated corporate family responsible for administering Claim No. 017439398, and that Respondent therefore reported, or caused to be reported, information to the DMV resulting in the negligent operator determination reflected on Petitioner’s driving record in connection with the Claim. Petitioner has requested a certified copy of the underlying SR-1 report, which that Department has indicated will require 30-60 days to produce, and will supplement this pleading upon receipt to confirm the precise corporate identity of the reporting party. Regardless of which entity within the AAA corporate family reported it, Respondent — as the party responsible for investigating and settling the Claim giving rise to the negligent operator determination — possesses the administrative relationship to that report necessary to correct or request correction of the resulting entry.

19. Petitioner’s primary and independently sufficient request is that this Court issue a Peremptory Writ of Mandate commanding Respondent to: (a) furnish a complete response under 10 CCR § 2695.5(b) based on the facts as then known, free of material misstatement, including production of the Special Investigative Unit fraud referral documentation and adjuster notes comprising the factual basis for Respondent’s determination; and (b) demonstrate compliance with its investigative duties under 10 CCR § 2695.7(d) with respect to Claim No. 017439398. Petitioner requests subparts (a) and (b) independently of, and without regard to the availability of, any further relief. The further, conditional relief Petitioner requests regarding correction of the DMV record, and the fallback relief requested in the further alternative, are set forth in full in the Prayer for Relief below and are incorporated here by reference.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

(Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing)

(Pled to State a Legally Sufficient Claim; Adjudication of the Merits Reserved for Trial in Whatever Forum This Court Directs)

(Against Respondent)

20. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 31 of the Statement of Facts as though fully set forth herein.

21. Petitioner is mindful of this Court’s indication that this Second Cause of Action may be better suited to resolution in a civil department, given its nature as a damages claim distinct from the equitable, documentary mandamus proceeding set forth in the First Cause of Action. Petitioner pleads it here to preserve the Claim and its relationship to the common nucleus of operative fact, and respectfully submits to this Court’s discretion as to severance, bifurcation, or transfer of this cause of action. Nothing in this cause of action is intended to affect, delay, or condition the First Cause of Action, which Petitioner submits is ripe for resolution on its own record regardless of how this Second Cause of Action is ultimately handled. Petitioner includes legal argument in this cause of action solely to demonstrate its sufficiency against any renewed demurrer, and not as an invitation for this Court to adjudicate its merits at this stage; that adjudication, Petitioner submits, is properly reserved for trial following whatever severance, bifurcation, or transfer this Court orders.

22. In every insurance policy, including policy CAA202768907 issued by Respondent to Petitioner (Exhibit V), there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that neither party do anything to injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement. Substantively, this covenant binds Respondent to handle its claims administration in a manner that protects policyholders, including the fundamental right to an objective investigation before an adverse report is made to a government record-keeping system.

23. A core benefit owed to Petitioner under the policy and the implied covenant is Respondent’s diligent, fair, and objective investigation of any claim affecting Petitioner’s interests before Respondent reaches and finalizes a determination — including one which results in a report adversely affecting Petitioner’s driving record, and invading Petitioner’s vested right in a driving license. California law is explicit that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists specifically to secure the insured’s peace of mind and to protect the benefits of the contractual relationship. Among those benefits, the duty of diligent and objective investigation is not a procedural formality but a substantive protection: an insurer that fails to reasonably and thoroughly investigate before reaching an adverse determination has denied its insured a core benefit of the policy regardless of whether monetary benefits were paid or withheld. (Cates Construction, Inc. v. Talbot Partners (1999) 21 Cal.4th 28, 44; Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 809, 818-819.) This benefit exists independently of, and is not satisfied merely by, Respondent’s payment of third party’s claim for monetary benefits. Here, Respondent’s inadequate investigation produced an adverse determination that was then reported to a government record-keeping system, corrupting Petitioner’s public driving record, causing Petitioner direct, concrete, and ongoing harms that no civil damages action can remedy.

24. Respondent breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by, among other things: 1) crediting the third party’s unverified allegations of bodily injury to two people while disregarding the physical implausibility of those allegations given the nature of the contact; 2) failing to identify or preserve readily available, independent security camera evidence during the 30-day window before it was overwritten, despite Petitioner’s immediate report of suspected fraud; and 3) allowing Respondent’s Supervisor to remain unreachable for 47 days during the most critical phase of the Claim. Each favored the interests of a third party over Respondent’s own insured.

25. An insurer may not selectively rely on facts that support its position while ignoring facts that support its insured. (Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 713, 720–721; Mazik v. Geico General Ins. Co. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 455, 462.) Respondent bears the primary duty of inquiry and may not shift that burden onto Petitioner. (Mariscal v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1617, 1625.) That Egan, Wilson, Mazik, and Mariscal each arose from an insurer’s denial of its own insured’s first-party benefits claim does not limit their governing principle — that an insurer must conduct an unbiased, complete investigation before reaching an adverse determination — which applies with equal force where, as here, the adverse determination affects the insured’s own driving record rather than a first-party payout.

26. Respondent’s anticipated reliance on Baldwin v. AAA Northern California, Nevada & Utah Ins. Exchange (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 545 and Love v. Fire Ins. Exchange (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1136 for the proposition that an act specifically authorized by policy cannot as a matter of law constitute bad faith, is misplaced. Baldwin addressed a narrow dispute over whether a policy exclusion barred a specific monetary valuation method for vehicle depreciation; Love addressed whether an insured could state a bad faith claim where no policy benefits were due at all. Neither case involved a first party claimant seeking to compel compliance with independent, non-discretionary ministerial duties under the Fair Claims Settlement Practices Regulations, and neither forecloses a bad faith claim premised on denial of the investigation itself as a policy benefit. Indeed, Love holds that the implied covenant exists so that “neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement.” A core benefit of Petitioner’s policy is Respondent’s diligent and objective investigation before an adverse determination is finalized and reported to a government record-keeping system — a benefit wholly independent of, and not discharged by, Respondent’s exercise of discretion to settle the third party’s monetary claim.

27. As a direct and proximate result of Respondent’s breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Petitioner has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial. Petitioner reserves the right to plead these damages with further specificity and to seek leave to amend this cause of action as appropriate.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

    WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for judgment against Respondent as follows:

1. For a Peremptory Writ of Mandate: That this Court exercise its original jurisdiction and issue a Peremptory Writ of Mandate under CCP § 1085 commanding Respondent to (a) furnish a “complete response” under 10 CCR § 2695.5(b) based on the facts as then known, free of material misstatement, including production of the Special Investigative Unit (SIU) fraud referral documentation and adjuster notes comprising the factual basis for Respondent’s determination; (b) demonstrate compliance with its investigative duties under 10 CCR § 2695.7(d) with respect to Claim No. 017439398; and (c) to the extent, and only to the extent, the Court deems it warranted based on the results of Respondent’s compliance with subparts (a) and (b), notify the DMV of a corrected determination through Respondent’s existing reporting channel. Petitioner requests each subpart of this relief independently and severally; the Court’s granting of subparts (a) and (b) is not contingent upon, nor does it require, a grant of subpart (c). In the alternative, and only to the extent this Court determines that correction of a public record exceeds the scope of relief available through mandamus, Petitioner requests the Court at minimum compel production of the investigatory materials described in subpart (a);

2. For Declaratory Relief: For a judicial declaration under CCP § 1060 that Petitioner is a “claimant” and “first party claimant” within the meaning of 10 CCR § 2695.2(c) and (f), that Petitioner has a beneficial interest and vested right to a “complete response” under 10 CCR § 2695.5(b) with respect to Claim No. 017439398, and that Respondent breached its ministerial duty under 10 CCR § 2695.7(d) to diligently pursue a thorough, fair, and objective investigation of the Claim;

3. For Damages: On the Second Cause of Action — which Petitioner pleads solely to preserve and submits entirely to this Court’s discretion for severance, bifurcation, or transfer to a civil department — for compensatory and consequential damages in an amount to be proven at trial in whatever forum this Court directs;

4. For a Future Order: Petitioner reserves the right, should this Court grant the Peremptory Writ of Mandate requested herein, to seek by separate, timely, post-judgment motion an order under Code of Civil Procedure § 1110b that an appeal of the Judgment not stay operation of the writ;

5. For Costs: For costs of suit incurred herein; and

6. For General Relief: For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

VERIFICATION

I, John De Herrera, declare as follows:

1) I am the Petitioner in the above-entitled action.

2) I have read the foregoing First Amended Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandate and know the contents thereof.

3) The matters stated in the foregoing document are true of my own personal knowledge, except as to those matters which are stated upon information and belief, and as to those matters, I reasonably believe them to be true. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed this _____ day of July, 2026, at Agoura Hills, California.

________________________________

John De Herrera

Petitioner, in Pro Per

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Allen v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters (1959) 51 Cal.2d 805

Baldwin v. AAA Northern California, Nevada & Utah Ins. Exchange (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 545

Berlinghieri v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1983) 33 Cal.3d 392

Betty v. Superior Court (1941) 18 Cal.2d 619

Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employment Com. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 321

Bosetti v. United States Life Ins. Co. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1208

California School Employees Assn. v. Governing Board (1994) 8 Cal.4th 333

Cates Construction, Inc. v. Talbot Partners (1999) 21 Cal.4th 28

Chateau Chamberay Homeowners Assn. v. Associated International Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 335

Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 809

Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536

Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1062

Loeber v. Lakeside Joint School Dist. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 552

Love v. Fire Ins. Exchange (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1136

Marin County Board of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson (1976) 16 Cal.3d 920

Mariscal v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1617

Mazik v. Geico General Ins. Co. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 455

Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287

Neto v. Conselho Amor da Sociedade No. 41 (1912) 18 Cal.App. 234

Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266

People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1

Rappaport-Scott v. Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto. Club (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 831

Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1325

Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 713

Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364

STATUTES

California Civil Code § 3512
California Civil Code § 3517
California Civil Code § 3523
California Civil Code § 3528
California Civil Code § 3535

Code of Civil Procedure § 1060
Code of Civil Procedure § 1069
Code of Civil Procedure § 1085
Code of Civil Procedure § 1086
Code of Civil Procedure § 1110b

California Insurance Code § 790.03
California Insurance Code § 1875.20

California Vehicle Code § 14101
California Vehicle Code § 16000
California Vehicle Code § 20008

Penal Code § 11115
Penal Code § 11126
Penal Code § 13150
Penal Code § 13151

REGULATIONS

10 Cal. Code Regs. § 2695.1
10 Cal. Code Regs. § 2695.2
10 Cal. Code Regs. § 2695.5
10 Cal. Code Regs. § 2695.7

Memorandum and Points of Authorities’ Table of Contents

Introduction - Page 21

A. Standards for Issuance of a Writ - Page  21

B. Legal Duty to Investigate - Page 23

C. Interdependent Duties of 10 CCR § 2695.7(d) and 10 CCR § 2695.5(b) - Page 24

D. Respondent’s January 26 Letter/Response - Page 24

E. The Textual Distinction Between 10 CCR § 2695.5(a) and (b) & Failure of Respondent’s “Complete Response” as a Matter of Law - Page 26

F. The Public Record Timeline & Failure to Investigate - Page 27

G. The CDI Admission & No Plain, Speedy, and Adequate Remedy at Law - Page 28

H. Ripeness, Mootness, and Respondent’s Post-Filing Conduct Confirm Incomplete Investigation and Cannot Defeat Mandamus Jurisdiction - Page 30

I. Available Writ Relief Includes Correction of Reporting Error & The Doctrine of Absurdity - Page 32

Conclusion - Page 34

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION

   As set forth below, Respondent’s ministerial duties under 10 CCR §§ 2695.5(b) and 2695.7(d) matured and were breached well before the events discussed in Section H, and that breach does not depend on the Claim’s subsequent, post-filing status. Exhibit CC reveals that when Petitioner inquired about the Claim’s current status on April 27, 2026 — having been informed by Respondent’s representative that the Claim remained open, while attempting to verify a resulting premium increase — Respondent’s Unit Manager replied eighteen days later without addressing the Claim’s status, without affirming finality of the January 26 letter/response, and without denying the Claim had been reopened. Instead, Petitioner was directed to communicate exclusively through litigation counsel. This conduct is discussed in Section H below as corroboration of the pre-existing breach, and separately as a response to any suggestion that this proceeding is premature, while also addressing and distinguishing 10 CCR § 2695.5(b)’s carve-out for post-litigation communication.

A. STANDARDS FOR ISSUANCE OF A WRIT

    A writ of mandate must be issued where: (1) there is a clear, present, and ministerial duty on the part of respondent; (2) petitioner has a clear, present, and beneficial right to the performance of that duty; and (3) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. (CCP §§ 1085, 1086.) These thresholds are relaxed where, as here, a matter of public interest is at issue. (Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266). Independent of Petitioner’s status as a first party claimant under 10 CCR § 2695.2(f), a citizen possesses standing to compel enforcement of a public duty even absent a personal beneficial interest where the object is to vindicate a right in which the public has a material interest (Loeber v. Lakeside Joint School Dist. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 552, 567-568), and this writ petition seeks to enforce the structural integrity of regulated insurance claims practices and the accuracy of DMV records — a duty owed to the public at large. The writ proceeding is equitable, and, as the beneficially interested party under CCP § 1069, Petitioner seeks this Court’s “wide discretion” (Allen v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters (1959) 51 Cal.2d 805) to “do substantial justice and prevent substantial injury” (Neto v. Conselho Amor da Sociedade No. 41 (1912) 18 Cal.App. 234) and to “promote justice” (Betty v. Superior Court (1941) 18 Cal.2d 619). A showing that Respondent’s conduct was “objectively unreasonable” is itself sufficient grounds to exercise that discretion. (Bosetti v. United States Life Ins. Co. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1208, 1236). An auto insurer’s investigative methods and administrative discretion are not shielded from review merely because it operates as a state-regulated private corporation; a writ will lie where such an entity has abused that discretion, acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or failed to comply with explicit, mandatory statutory and regulatory provisions. (Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employment Com. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 321, 328-330).

    Nor does Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287 bar this proceeding, holding that Insurance Code § 790.03, part of the Unfair Insurance Practices Act (UIPA), creates no private right of action for damages, out of concern that private suits — particularly by third parties — would proliferate litigation and encourage inflated settlement demands. Petitioner brings no damages action under § 790.03 here; the First Cause of Action seeks a Peremptory Writ to compel Respondent’s performance of a ministerial duty, relief that is equitable rather than compensatory and not implicating the concerns Moradi-Shalal addressed. The Supreme Court has since confirmed Moradi-Shalal’s bar does not extend to every claim touching UIPA-related conduct, distinguishing first party claims from the third party damages action there at issue, and limiting its holding to relief that, like the Unfair Competition Law’s equitable remedies, does not carry Moradi-Shalal’s proliferating-litigation concern. (Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364). Mandamus does not adjudicate liability for a violation of § 790.03; it compels performance of ministerial duties independently set forth in 10 CCR §§ 2695.7(d) and 2695.5(b)—duties Respondent must perform regardless of whether any private damages remedy exists for their breach.

B. LEGAL DUTY TO INVESTIGATE

Petitioner’s auto insurance policy (Exhibit V) instructs policyholders to take photos if involved in a collision; Petitioner, uninvolved in one for over forty years, did not do so — but that same policy does not state that failing to do so forfeits a policyholder’s right to a thorough investigation. Respondent’s right to settle is not absolute but directly linked to the duty to investigate using available independent sources.

    Petitioner alerted Respondent to fraud on October 15, 2025, declaring the allegations false, yet Respondent failed to perform basic investigative tasks such as determining whether security cameras captured the incident — a primary fraud-identification tool that businesses typically retain for only 7-30 days. Respondent’s Group Manager admitted (Exhibit X) Respondent “did not have proof” a minor was in the vehicle while ignoring two separately owned security cameras Petitioner pleads would have supplied that proof. (Exhibit L).

    Insurance Code § 1875.20 requires every insurer to maintain an Special Investigative Unit (SIU), and 10 CCR § 2698.36(c) requires that unit to investigate each credible fraud referral and document any decision not to do so — which is why Petitioner has twice served Notice to Prepare and Transmit those notes.

    An insurer that fails to conduct a full, fair, and thorough investigation acts “unreasonably and without proper cause” (Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1066), bears the “primary duty of inquiry” and cannot shift that duty to insured (Mariscal v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1617, 1625), and may not selectively rely on facts supporting its own position while ignoring those supporting its insured (Mazik v. Geico General Ins. Co. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 455, 462; Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 713, 720-21). Under Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 809, 818, Respondent’s failure to investigate its own insured’s immediate fraud alert can be the sole basis for bad faith. Petitioner subsequently and personally identified and contacted two camera owner/operators who confirmed no insurance investigators contacted them from October 15 to November 15, 2025. (Exhibit L). Respondent withheld this vital investigative step, which could have exonerated Petitioner, protected his license, and prevented premium hikes.

C. INTERDEPENDENT DUTIES OF 10 CCR § 2695.7(d) & 10 CCR § 2695.5(b)

    

    Respondent’s Demurrer used “claim file” and “complete response” interchangeably, treating the latter as a disembodied formality rather than what it is: a factual response tied to the duty to conduct a thorough investigation. Under the Fair Claims Settlement Practices Regulations (10 CCR § 2695.1 et seq.), a response is only complete if it provides a comprehensive explanation based on facts as then known — a protection linked directly to all policyholders’ interests in a DMV record free of erroneous points — not a formality.

    An administrative or corporate entity cannot use “discretion” to breach statutory mandates (Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California Employment Com. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 321), and where a mandatory investigation ignores physical and behavioral realities, mandamus is the proper instrument to correct that abuse.

    Respondent’s Demurrer further assumes an equal-power contract dispute, but California law recognizes the insurer-insured relationship as inherently unbalanced (Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 809, 819-20) — here, Respondent held Petitioner in an information vacuum while exculpatory security camera evidence advanced toward being overwritten, exactly what the implied covenant’s peace-of-mind protection is designed to check. (Cates Construction, Inc. v. Talbot Partners (1999) 21 Cal.4th 28, 44). That discretion is bounded by the mandatory requirements of 10 CCR §§ 2695.7(d) and 2695.5(b): when a dominant party remains silent about information, the policyholder becomes powerless to defend their public record (Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 713), and a regulatory scheme meant to shield policyholders provides no shield at all if an insurer’s unreviewed discretion can place unsupported penalties on a public record.

D. RESPONDENT’S JANUARY 26 LETTER/RESPONSE

    Respondent’s letter/response of January 26, 2026 (Exhibit X) fails law for the following reasons:

    1. A professional trained in high-impact physical stunts suffering “discomfort” and “pain” from a sub-5mph parallel paint transfer — with Respondent’s own photo showing cosmetic damage — fails logically, as does accepting that an injured four-year-old remained crouched, silent, and motionless behind a seat for over three minutes without Petitioner noticing while standing before the vehicle with an unobstructed view through the windshield. Respondent ignored this, favoring third party’s unverified allegations over Petitioner’s interests.

    2. Respondent’s claim the impact “had force” because an estimate called for a door replacement is a paper-only investigation that ignores Respondent’s own contradicting photo evidence. (Exhibit H). Respondent’s Unit Manager and Group Manager letters (Exhibits Q, X) both claim the October 22, 2025 call “updated” or “contacted” Petitioner about the investigation — but that call conveyed no elements of an investigation, no mention of an SIU launch, and no mention of the 30-day security camera window, making it indistinguishable from no contact at all. Respondent’s Supervisor was then unreachable for 47 days (October 22–December 8, 2025), the most critical phase of the Claim, allowing the exonerating camera evidence to expire.

    3. The January 26 letter/response falsely alleged that Petitioner made illegal recordings and demanded compensation, and falsely claimed that Respondent had explained the investigation process — none of which occurred.

    4. Respondent’s stated excuse for withholding investigation information — Personally Identifiable Information — is undermined by the same letter’s disclosure of third party’s profession as a stunt performer, exposing the excuse as pretextual. (Exhibit X).

    5. Respondent also used vague language when Petitioner sought confirmation the January 26 letter/response was complete — “…we have reviewed the claim, and [the Group Manager] has issued our response” (Exhibit Y) — rather than confirming finality. California Civil Code § 3535 directly applies: particular expressions qualify those which are general. Petitioner’s inquiry was particular, Respondent’s reply general, and a generality cannot suffice for the particular confirmation sought. The substance — an active electronic portal and Respondent’s explicit refusal to disclose Claim status (Exhibit CC) — shows Respondent’s internal record remained fluid even as it characterized the January 26 letter/response as complete.

    Nor does the Genuine Dispute Doctrine (Rappaport-Scott v. Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto. Club (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 831) shield Respondent’s determination, since that doctrine affords no protection where a position rests on a deficient investigation — as here — rather than a good-faith weighing of evidence. (Chateau Chamberay Homeowners Assn. v. Associated International Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 335, 348-349.)

    Civil Code § 3528 declares that the law respects form less than substance; what something is matters more than what it is called. Respondent’s January 26 letter/response bears the superficial appearance of a regulatory response while containing material misstatements, no investigative basis, and conclusions that fail on their face — form without substance — which § 3528 forbids treating as complete.

   

E. THE TEXTUAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN 10 CCR § 2695.5(a) and (b) & FAILURE OF RESPONDENT’S “COMPLETE RESPONSE” AS A MATTER OF LAW

    Respondent’s defense rests on a restrictive reading of an unremarkable drafting distinction. 10 CCR § 2695.5(a), governing responses to the Department of Insurance, explicitly requires that a complete response “includes copies of any documentation and claim files requested.” That phrase is conspicuously absent from § 2695.5(b), governing responses to a claimant. Respondent appears to treat this omission as license to discharge its obligation to Petitioner through the bare form of a letter, without any substantive investigative disclosure. This reading fails on the plain text of subsection (b) itself. While (b) does not require “copies of documentation,” it imposes its own independent, non-discretionary standard: a “complete response based on the facts as then known by the licensee.” A response cannot be “based on the facts as then known” if, as established in Section H below, Respondent’s own post-filing conduct confirms those facts remained fluid, unresolved, and subject to revision months after the January 26 letter/response issued. A letter purporting to summarize a closed, static investigation cannot constitute a complete response based on known facts when the investigation it purports to summarize was neither closed nor static. Respondent’s parsing of subsection (a)’s language against subsection (b)’s silence does not excuse it from subsection (b)’s own affirmative requirement — it merely confirms Respondent has focused on what the regulation does not say, rather than what it does.

F. THE PUBLIC RECORD TIMELINE & FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE

    Under California Vehicle Code § 20008, any motor vehicle accident resulting in bodily injury shall be reported to the Department of the California Highway Patrol or local police department within 24 hours. Petitioner’s own DMV record confirms no such report exists: the record’s “Report No.” field for this incident reflects “DMV” rather than any law enforcement agency designation. (Exhibit DD). Under California Vehicle Code § 16000, a driver involved in an accident resulting in bodily injury and/or damage over $1,000 must file a Report of Traffic Accident Occurring in California (Form SR-1) with the DMV within 10 days of the accident — here, by approximately October 24, 2025. Petitioner’s DMV record reflects an associated Financial Responsibility (FR) Case No. 25-14-24873, updated December 26, 2025 — the same date Respondent’s Unit Manager emailed Respondent’s PDF disposition of the Claim to Petitioner. (Exhibit DD; Exhibit Q). Because an FR case can only be established upon the filing of an SR-1, and where the DMV’s own Financial Responsibility Information Request (Form SR-19C) states that “[l]aw enforcement reports are unacceptable” as a substitute for an SR-1, the existence of FR Case No. 25-14-24873 on Petitioner’s record confirms an SR-1 was filed for this incident.

    In preparing this Petition, on July 17, 2026, Petitioner submitted an SR-19C to the DMV seeking a copy of the underlying SR-1 report. (Exhibit EE-1). That same day, Petitioner telephoned the DMV Financial Responsibility Unit and was informed by a representative that the SR-1 associated with FR Case No. 25-14-24873 was filed by AAA. (Exhibit EE-2). This directly ties the filing to Respondent’s corporate family rather than to an unrelated third party. A certified copy of the SR-1 itself has been requested, remains pending, and the Financial Responsibility Unit has indicated it may take 30-60 days to produce; Petitioner will supplement the record upon its receipt to establish with precision the filing’s exact date and which entity within that corporate family made it. Petitioner is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that this filing occurred substantially later than the statutory 10-day window, based on the December 26, 2025 update reflected on Petitioner’s FR Case record. If confirmed, this timing would mean Respondent, having already represented in its October 22, 2025 letter (Exhibit A) that it had determined Petitioner was at fault for bodily injury, did not ensure the corresponding regulatory filing occurred until more than two months later — and only in apparent step with Respondent’s own internal resolution of the Claim, rather than with any regulatory deadline. Regardless of the precise date ultimately confirmed, the correlation between the FR Case update date and Respondent’s own Claim disposition on the identical date is, at minimum, probative of a connection between Respondent’s claims-handling conduct and the entry on Petitioner’s public driving record that this proceeding seeks to address. This absence of any law enforcement report, combined with the unresolved SR-1 timing, constitutes an evidentiary void that, taken as true, demonstrates Respondent’s January 26 letter/response was not grounded in a complete and objective investigation of the public record surrounding this Claim.

G. THE CDI ADMISSION & NO PLAIN, SPEEDY, AND ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW

    January 5, 2026, Petitioner alerted the California Department of Insurance (CDI) to the underlying third-party claim by submitting a formal Consumer Insurance Fraud Reporting Form—CDI File No. 8695364. (Exhibit S). Three months later, on April 15, 2026, the CDI Senior Insurance Compliance Officer issued a formal response (Exhibit AA), and in that official writing the CDI states: “We are unable to resolve this particular dispute...the ultimate decision is left to a court of law…. Only a court of law has the authority to weigh the evidence and the merits of each party’s position and arrive at a formal binding decision.” Here, the State regulatory body tasked with overseeing insurance mandates has explicitly conceded it lacks the mechanism to compel Respondent’s compliance. This confirms Petitioner has exhausted administrative remedies and possesses no adequate remedy at law, rendering a writ proper. While the “ordinary course of law” might suggest a civil lawsuit for bad faith, as Respondent has argued, such a remedy is inadequate here for these reasons:

    1. Imminent Threat to a Vested Fundamental Right: Petitioner is presently forced to drive with zero margin for error for the next 30 months, operating just one minor incident away from a “negligent operator” suspension. California law explicitly recognizes a driver’s license as a vested, fundamental right (Berlinghieri v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1983) 33 Cal.3d 392). Here, the invasion of this right is not hypothetical and occurred and commenced the moment Respondent reported an unfounded bodily injury point to the DMV, creating an active, present precursor to the suspension of Petitioner’s license, and cannot be remedied by a civil lawsuit.

    2. Present Barrier to Due Process Rights: Without a “complete response,” Petitioner’s right to due process under Vehicle Code § 14101 — a hearing where the burden falls on Petitioner to provide “credible evidence” — is unobtainable; withholding that response under 10 CCR § 2695.5(b) ensures Petitioner enters that hearing empty-handed and defenseless, a deficiency no subsequent damages award could cure.

    3. Present Barrier to Professional Opportunity: The erroneous bodily injury point functions as an active administrative barrier to international teaching opportunities where strict character and conduct regulations govern visa issuance — an ongoing, irreparable injury to Petitioner’s livelihood that cannot be remedied by a civil lawsuit.

    4. Public Importance: This case questions whether an insurer can ignore the facts surrounding an allegation, including silence of public records, settle anyway, then withhold information preventing a policyholder from challenging that settlement. Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266 held that this Court can bypass the adequate remedy rule in a case involving an issue of public importance deserving an immediate answer. The issues tendered here are of widespread public interest and importance, affecting a broad class of citizens who purchase auto insurance in this State, and cannot be addressed in a civil suit.

    5. Present and Ongoing Injury to Health: As a professional artist Petitioner maintains that the creative process is a disciplined application of the mind; the production of art of aesthetic value is not a passive act, but one that requires focus and a stable cognitive state to maintain professional output. This matter has occupied a majority of Petitioner’s waking attention since October 15, 2025 — hours otherwise devoted to writing and visual composition have instead been consumed tracking, ruminating, composing, and filing against the same unresolved question — the specific, continuing consequence of Respondent’s unwillingness to state plainly whether its investigation and response were ever complete. What was stated in the original Petition is still true today: Petitioner continues to experience a 90% decrease in output of poetry, a 30-40% decrease in output of visual art, and the book Petitioner was diligently pursuing completion of as of October 14, 2025 — a personal albatross of sorts — remains sidelined. This ongoing harm to Petitioner’s professional focus and output is not the kind of injury a civil damages action, proceeding on its own timeline, can arrest or reverse, but continues for as long as the underlying record remains uncorrected.

H. RIPENESS, MOOTNESS, AND RESPONDENT’S POST-FILING CONDUCT CONFIRM INCOMPLETE INVESTIGATION AND CANNOT DEFEAT MANDAMUS JURISDICTION

    To the extent Respondent argues this proceeding is premature because the Claim remains under internal review, that argument does not withstand scrutiny. Respondent’s ministerial duties under 10 CCR §§ 2695.5(b) and 2695.7(d) — to furnish a “complete response” within fifteen calendar days and to conduct a thorough, fair, and objective investigation — matured, and were breached, when Respondent issued the January 26, 2026 letter/response containing material misstatements while withholding its investigative basis, months before this action was filed. Whether the Claim remains open today does not un-breach that earlier, completed failure to comply; a licensee cannot cure a stale, deficient response by later reopening its file, and Petitioner does not ask this Court to wait for a fully closed investigation before enforcing a duty that already came due and was not met.

    While Respondent may characterize reopening of the Claim as routine administrative maintenance, that characterization does not explain why confirming or denying its status took eighteen days and redirection to litigation counsel. Petitioner — through happenstance, without notification from Respondent — learned by telephone that the Claim was not closed, then verified through Respondent’s portal that it showed open. (Exhibit BB). When Petitioner asked Unit Manager directly to confirm or deny the Claim’s status, the reply was neither confirmation nor denial, and Petitioner was redirected exclusively to litigation counsel. (Exhibit CC). If the reopening were truly routine and the January 26 letter/response truly complete, a single sentence would have sufficed; the choice to say nothing substantive instead is conduct consistent with an investigation Respondent knew remained unresolved. This post-filing conduct constitutes an explicit administrative admission that the investigation was not final, nor was the January 26 letter/response complete under 10 CCR § 2695.5(b), and an entity cannot defeat mandamus or strip a reviewing court of jurisdiction by engaging in partial, unverified post-filing conduct while leaving underlying injuries uncorrected.

    To the extent Respondent invokes 10 CCR § 2695.5(b)’s carve-out excusing communication “subsequent to receipt... of a notice of legal action,” that provision is inapposite here for two independent reasons. First, it cannot retroactively cure the January 26, 2026 letter/response, which issued more than six weeks before this action was filed and is the operative deficiency this Petition challenges; a carve-out excusing post-litigation communication has no application to a response already furnished before any litigation existed. Second, the carve-out excuses only an ongoing duty to communicate — it does not strip Respondent’s own contemporaneous records of their evidentiary value. Petitioner does not contend Respondent violated a duty to keep speaking with him after March 10, 2026; Petitioner contends that Respondent’s own portal status and internal conduct during that period are proof of the state of its investigation, bearing directly on whether the January 26 letter/response was ever complete when made. A regulation excusing an insurer from further communication with a litigant does not convert that insurer’s own business records into evidence unavailable to the litigant in the very proceeding the regulation contemplates.

    Under California Civil Code § 3512: One must not change purpose to the injury of another. Respondent’s own conduct illustrates the tension this maxim forbids: Respondent’s operative pleading in this action rests on the premise that its investigation and January 26 letter/response were final and complete, while Respondent’s own contemporaneous records and personnel, within days of that filing, establish a Claim status inconsistent with that premise. Nine days after the demurrer was filed, Respondent’s own representative, through happenstance, informed Petitioner the Claim was not closed, a status Petitioner immediately confirmed through Respondent’s own portal. Respondent cannot maintain that its process was complete while its own contemporaneous records and personnel establish otherwise. That inconsistency between Respondent’s litigation position and its own claims-handling records is the change of purpose § 3512 forbids, bearing directly on whether the January 26 letter/response was ever complete in substance. As recently as July 21, 2026 — more than five months after the January 26 letter/response and well into this litigation — Respondent’s portal continued to reflect the Claim as open, now under a newly assigned representative from whom Petitioner has received no communication whatsoever. A representative assigned to a matter Respondent maintains is fully and completely resolved would ordinarily have no occasion to contact Petitioner at all; but a representative assigned to a matter still under active, unresolved review — and never informing the policyholder of that assignment — is further corroboration that the investigation Respondent maintains was complete remains, months later, neither closed nor static.

    This is not the only instance in this record of Respondent’s conduct tracking its own internal claims administration rather than any neutral or regulatory trigger; the same pattern appears in the timing of the SR-1 filing addressed in Section F above, filed — if the record’s own dates are credited — in apparent step with Respondent’s December 26, 2025 claim disposition (Exhibit Q) rather than with the regulatory window that filing was meant to satisfy. The California Supreme Court has explicitly established that a mandate proceeding is not rendered moot by subsequent actions where a material portion of the requested relief remains unfulfilled, or where the public interest demands a resolution of the controversy. (Marin County Board of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson (1976) 16 Cal.3d 920, 929 [holding that a case is not mooted by a respondent’s voluntary cessation of challenged conduct where the public interest is involved and the effects of the past conduct persist]; Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541–542 [holding the general rule against deciding moot questions is subject to the qualification that a case will not be dismissed as moot where material questions remain for the court’s determination and the controversy is one of continuing and public interest].) This Court sitting in mandate retains absolute jurisdiction to adjudicate this dispute, as neither ripeness nor mootness principles bar resolution of an already-matured and already-breached ministerial duty, and as the public interest is involved and the wrong likely to recur.

I. AVAILABLE WRIT RELIEF INCLUDES CORRECTION OF REPORTING ERROR & THE DOCTRINE OF ABSURDITY

    At the hearing on Respondent’s original Demurrer, counsel for Respondent seemed to imply that once a negligent operator point has been reported to the DMV, no remedy exists to correct it — even where the reporting insurer later determines its own investigation was incomplete or unsupported. Petitioner’s primary request does not require this Court to accept or reject that premise: subparts (a) and (b) of the requested writ relief are complete and independently grantable relief regardless of whether the Court ultimately has occasion to reach the question of DMV correction addressed in subpart (c). To the extent the Court does reach that question, that suggestion is incorrect: California law has long recognized that an entity reporting information to a government record-keeping system retains both the capacity and obligation to correct it once later found erroneous. The Department of Justice’s maintenance of criminal history records provides an instructive analogy and basis: under Penal Code §§ 11115, 13150, and 13151, law enforcement agencies and courts are required to transmit disposition information to the Department of Justice, and those same reporting entities — not the subject of the record, and not the reviewing court — bear primary responsibility for ensuring that information is corrected when proven inaccurate. (See Penal Code § 11126). Here, the structure is the same: Petitioner is informed and believes, as alleged above, that Respondent reported or caused to be reported the negligent operator point to the DMV and Petitioner’s record, and that Respondent is accordingly the party positioned to correct it through the channel by which it was made. Petitioner’s sought relief does not ask the Court to direct the DMV — a non-party — to take any action, nor to substitute its judgment for Respondent’s on the Claim. It asks only that Respondent, having been compelled to perform the ministerial duties of investigation and “complete response” the law requires under 10 CCR §§ 2695.7(d) and 2695.5(b), apply the results of that compelled performance consistently to all records affected by its original incomplete performance. Ministerial duties to investigate and report accurately do not evaporate once an erroneous report has been made — the obligation to correct the record is the necessary completion of that same duty. Nothing in statute, regulation, or case law compels the contrary result Respondent implicitly urges: that an insurer’s reporting error becomes permanently unreviewable the moment it reaches a government database, and sound public policy weighs decisively against it. California Civil Code § 3517 supplies an independent and equally fundamental principle: No one can take advantage of his own wrong. If Respondent’s own incomplete investigation produced the negligent operator determination now on Petitioner’s record, and if that same incompleteness is then invoked to argue the resulting entry is beyond correction, Respondent’s wrong becomes not merely unremedied but affirmatively rewarded — insulated from review by the very deficiency that produced it. Section 3517 forbids exactly this outcome, and it operates independently of, and in addition to, the Doctrine of Absurdity.

    The Doctrine of Absurdity is a principle of statutory and legal interpretation holding that a court should not adopt an interpretation of a law, contract, or legal instrument that produces an absurd, unreasonable, or unjust result, even if that interpretation might appear to be supported by text. The underlying logic is that legislatures and contracting parties do not intend absurd outcomes, and courts should interpret language in a way that avoids them. The Doctrine appears most commonly in statutory construction, where California courts strictly reject interpretations that lead to absurd, unjust consequences defeating the core intent of the law. (Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1325, 1334). The California Supreme Court has articulated this most definitively in California School Employees Assn. v. Governing Board (1994) 8 Cal.4th 333, 340, and People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 15, both holding that the literal language of a regulation must be cast aside to avoid results that are “absurd, harsh, or unreasonable,” and that a statute’s literal language may be disregarded to avoid absurd results and to give effect to the manifest purposes of the legislation. How it applies here: Respondent’s position, stripped to its essence, is that Respondent can settle a bodily injury claim based on an uninvestigated, unverified, self-serving third party allegation; report an adverse negligent operator point to the DMV, corrupting a public record; withhold its investigative basis from the insured and face no judicial remedy where an insured’s only avenue is a civil lawsuit which cannot correct the public record. That is on its face an absurd result: an insurer’s error, once reported to a government database, becomes permanently unreviewable at the insurer’s sole discretion, rendering the thorough investigation and “complete response” requirements of 10 CCR §§ 2695.7(d) and 2695.5(b) meaningless against the one category of harm — DMV record corruption — where they matter most to policyholders. To hold that the State Legislature and CDI intended to safeguard third-party strangers while leaving the actual policyholder defenseless against database corruption creates an absurd legal paradox: that the State of California designed a consumer protection framework granting an unverified third-party more right to data integrity and a “complete response” than the actual policyholder. This Court should not tolerate such an interpretation. The Doctrine forecloses any interpretation of 10 CCR § 2695.2(f) that would strip a named insured of first party claimant status — and with it, all regulatory protections — simply because a claim was initiated by a third party. Such an interpretation would leave insureds exposed when their insurer’s conduct most directly threatens their interests, producing the absurd result of a consumer protection framework that protects consumers least where they need protection most.

CONCLUSION

    The result here is not close and is compelled by the plain text of 10 CCR §§ 2695.2(f), 2695.5(b), and 2695.7(d); by five maxims of jurisprudence codified in Civil Code §§ 3512, 3517, 3523, 3528, 3535; and by the Doctrine of Absurdity the court has long applied to prevent absurd results: Civil Code § 3528 declares the law respects form less than substance, where here Respondent’s January 26 letter/response is form without substance; Civil Code § 3512 declares one must not change purpose to the injury of another, where here Respondent’s litigation position is irreconcilable with its own contemporaneous records; Civil Code § 3517 declares no one can take advantage of his own wrong, where here Respondent’s deficiency cannot both produce the harm and insulate it from correction; Civil Code § 3535 declares particular expressions qualify general ones, where here Petitioner’s particular inquiry cannot be answered by Respondent’s general evasion; the Doctrine of Absurdity forbids any interpretation that leaves policyholders least protected when protection matters most; and the fifth maxim, Civil Code § 3523, closes this brief as it opened it.

    Petitioner is unlikely to be the first California policyholder to suffer these invasions and harms, and, absent this Court’s intervention, will not be the last. The absence of governing authority is not reason to deny relief, but reason this Court’s resolution will matter well beyond the parties before it. Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court overrule any demurrer to this Petition and allow this matter to proceed to the merits.

    For every wrong there is a remedy. Petitioner submits this Court is that remedy.

DECLARATION OF JOHN DE HERRERA

I, John De Herrera, declare as follows: I am the Petitioner in this action. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein and, if called as a witness, I could and would testify competently thereto.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Respondent’s fault determination letter dated October 22, 2025.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of my cellular call logs from November 24, 2025, documenting a 30-minute discussion with a Respondent’s agent.

Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct screenshot of a Respondent’s agent’s text message dated November 26, 2025.

Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct screenshot of a Respondent’s agent’s text message dated December 3, 2025.

Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a true and correct screenshot of a Respondent’s agent’s text message dated December 5, 2025.

Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of my cellular call logs from December 8, 2025, documenting a 10-minute call with Respondent’s Supervisor No. 1.

Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of my cellular call logs from December 8, 2025, documenting an 18-minute call with Respondent’s Supervisor No. 2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit H is a true and correct copy of the photo provided by the Respondent’s Unit Manager on December 9, 2025, showing uncleaned door and paint transfer.

Attached hereto as Exhibit I is a true and correct exhibit showing photos of a comparative door contour.

Attached hereto as Exhibit J is a true and correct photo re-enacting my perspective at the mall overhang at the time of incident.

Attached hereto as Exhibit K is a true and correct transcript/record of the Respondent’s voicemail dated December 16, 2025.

Attached hereto as Exhibit L (1-4) is a true and correct multi-page exhibit containing site photos and map showing security camera locations and sight lines.

Attached hereto as Exhibit M is a true and correct screenshot of the text exchange with the property manager of Kanan Properties dated December 18, 2025.

Attached hereto as Exhibit N is a true and correct copy of email confirmations from mall business owners regarding the lack of Respondent’s inquiry to incident.

Attached hereto as Exhibit O is a true and correct copy of the email from the Respondent’s Unit Manager dated December 19, 2025, requesting more time.

Attached hereto as Exhibit P is a true and correct copy of my cellular call logs from December 26, 2025, documenting a 14-minute call with the Unit Manager.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Q is a true and correct copy of the Respondent’s Unit Manager’s PDF disposition and claim summary dated December 26, 2025.

Attached hereto as Exhibit R is a true and correct copy of the email sent to the Unit Manager on December 31, 2025, regarding the certified mail request.

Attached hereto as Exhibit S is a true and correct copy of the CDI Consumer Insurance Fraud Reporting confirmation for Case #8695364.

Attached hereto as Exhibit T is a true and correct multi-page exhibit containing USPS Certified Mail receipts and delivery confirmations for the Claim file requests.

Attached hereto as Exhibit U is a true and correct copy of the correspondence from the CDI Senior Insurance Compliance Officer dated January 12, 2026.

Attached hereto as Exhibit V is a true and correct copy of my complete auto policy provided by AAA on January 13, 2026.

Attached hereto as Exhibit W is a true and correct copy of the email from the Unit Manager acknowledging the formal request on January 21, 2026.

Attached hereto as Exhibit X is a true and correct copy of the letter from the Respondent’s

Group Manager dated January 26, 2026.

Attached hereto as Exhibit Y is a true and correct copy of the email from Unit Manager dated February 5, 2026, stating that the Group Manager has “issued our response.”

Attached hereto as Exhibit Z is a true and correct multi-page exhibit containing professional credential, emails of acceptance to literary and visual arts calls, poems, and Petitioner’s art in homes.

Attached hereto as Exhibit AA is a true and correct copy of the correspondence from the California Department of Insurance Senior Insurance Compliance Officer, dated April 15, 2026, confirming the Department cannot resolve this dispute.

Attached hereto as Exhibit BB (1-4) are true and correct copies of screenshots showing 1) Claim closed January 16, 2026, 2) Petitioner’s call log showing a seventeen-minute outgoing call to 805-497-0911 where Respondent’s representative informed Petitioner the Claim was not closed, on April 24, 2026, 3) the Claim status via Respondent’s internet portal as open, 4) the Claim status showing link to re-opened Claim unavailable for review.

Attached hereto as Exhibit CC is a true and correct copy of the email exchange between Petitioner and Unit Manager, in which Petitioner inquired whether Claim No. 017439398 had been reopened, and reply where Unit Manager did not deny the inquiry’s premise but directed Petitioner to communicate exclusively through Respondent’s litigation counsel going forward.

Attached hereto as Exhibit DD is a true and correct copy of Petitioner’s California Department of Motor Vehicles driver record, reflecting the October 14, 2025 accident and Financial Responsibility Case No. 25-14-24873, with the “Report No.” field showing “DMV” rather than a law enforcement agency designation, and reflecting said Financial Responsibility Case as updated December 26, 2025.

Attached hereto as Exhibit EE-1 is a true and correct photograph of the certified mail receipt of the USPS delivery of the completed Financial Responsibility Information Request (Form SR-19C) submitted by Petitioner to the Department of Motor Vehicles on July 17, 2026.

Attached hereto as Exhibit EE-2 is a true and correct screenshot of an eleven-minute telephone call that same day with a representative of the Department of Motor Vehicles Financial Responsibility Unit, at telephone number (916) 657-6677, in which representative confirmed that the Report of Traffic Accident (SR-1) associated with FR Case No. 25-14-24873 was filed by AAA.

Attached hereto as Exhibit FF is a true and correct screenshot of Respondents claims portal, taken by Petitioner on July 21, 2026, reflecting Claim No. 017439398 as open and identifying a newly assigned Claims Service Representative.

MASTER INDEX OF EXHIBITS (A–FF)

A Respondent’s Fault Determination Letter (Dated Oct 22, 2025)

B Petitioner’s Cellular Call Logs: 30-Minute Dispute with Respondent’s Agent (Nov 24, 2025)

C Respondent’s agent’s Text Message: “Supervisor out of office until Dec 1” (Nov 26, 2025)

D Respondent’s agent’s Text Message: Supervisor notification regarding return (Dec 3, 2025)

E Respondent’s agent’s Text Message: Delay of Supervisor return to Dec 8 (Dec 5, 2025)

F Petitioner’s Cellular Call Logs: 10-Minute Call with Supervisor No. 1 (Dec 8, 2025)

G Petitioner’s Cellular Call Logs: 18-Minute Call with Supervisor No. 2 (Dec 8, 2025)

H Respondent’s Photo: Uncleaned Door/Paint Transfer showing Petitioner’s fingerprints (Dec 9, 2025)

I Petitioner’s Photos: Comparative Door Contour (Physical Evidence)

J Petitioner’s Photo: Witness Perspective Re-enactment at Mall Overhang

K Transcript/Record of IEAC Voicemail: “Closing out the claim” (Dec 16, 2025)

L (1-4) Site/Camera Map: Photos of Site, Security Cameras, and Sight Lines.

M Text Exchange with Property Manager: Confirmation of No Contact by Respondent (Dec 18, 2025)

N Email Confirmations from Mall Business Owners regarding No Inquiry by Respondent.

O Email from Unit Manager: Request for “More Time” for Review (Dec 19, 2025)

P Petitioner’s Cellular Call Logs: 14-Minute “Make Whole” Plea (Dec 26, 2025)

Q Respondent’s PDF Disposition and Formal Claim Summary (Dec 26, 2025)

R Email to Unit Manager regarding First Certified Mail Request (Dec 31, 2025)

S CDI Fraud Reporting Confirmation: Case #8695364 (Jan 5, 2026)

T USPS Certified Mail Receipts and Delivery Confirmations (Claim File Requests)

U Correspondence from CDI Senior Insurance Compliance Officer (Jan 12, 2026)

V Petitioner’s Complete Auto Policy as provided by AAA (Jan 13, 2026)

W Email from Unit Manager acknowledging “located” formal request (Jan 21, 2026)

X Respondent’s Group Manager’s Denial Letter containing verified falsehoods (Jan 26, 2026)

Y Email from Unit Manager regarding Group Manager’s Issued Response (Feb 5, 2026)

Z Valid teaching credential, literary and visual Art Pedigrees, and examples.

AA      CDI Senior Compliance Officer Letter Confirming Exhaustion of Remedies (Apr. 15, 2026)

BB (1-4) 1) Call Log Screenshot with Respondent’s agent, 2) Claim Status Portal Screenshot showing closed, 3) Claim status portal screenshot showing open, 4) Claim status portal screenshot showing Claim information unavailable.

CC      Email Exchange with Unit Manager showing Petitioner’s inquiry and Unit Manager’s Non-Denial of Reopening and Redirection to Litigation Counsel.

DD     Petitioner’s DMV Driver Record: FR Case No. 25-14-24873, No Law Enforcement Report, Updated Dec. 26, 2025.

EE-1    Proof of certified mailing of Financial Responsibility Information Request (Form SR-19C) to the Department of Motor Vehicles on July 17, 2026.

EE-2    Screenshot of eleven-minute telephone call that same day with a representative of the Department of Motor Vehicles Financial Responsibility Unit.

FF     Claims Portal Screenshot Showing Claim Open with Newly Assigned Representative (July 21, 2026)