Introduction
Petitioner John De Herrera (Petitioner) here comes before the Court and brings this Verified Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandate to compel Respondent Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (IEAC) to perform its ministerial duty to produce a “complete response” under 10 CCR § 2695.5(b) associated with claim number 017439398 (Claim). Petitioner is a beneficially interested party whose driving record was and is presently harmed with professional opportunities in limbo by Respondent’s failure to investigate and Petitioner files this action within the statutory timeframe following a final denial of request dated January 28, 2026.
Since October 15, 2025, Petitioner has diligently attempted to mitigate an extreme information asymmetry regarding a fraudulent third-party claim settled against Petitioner. While Petitioner initially and erroneously requested the Claim file under California Insurance Code § 2071—a statute governing fire insurance—this error does not absolve Respondent of its independent and ministerial duty under 10 CCR § 2695.5(b) mandating an insurer to furnish a “complete response” to an insured’s inquiry within fifteen (15) calendar days. Despite receiving Petitioner’s formal, certified inquiries starting in December 2025, Respondent failed to provide any justification for its settlement until January 26, 2026—well past the statutory deadline—and even then, provided a response that was evasive, logically flawed, and wholly incomplete.
Respondent has insulated its arbitrary decision-making from review by withholding evidence Petitioner needs for Petitioner’s right to an administrative hearing under Vehicle Code § 14101 to contest a “negligent operator” point and refute responsibility. Without this Writ, Petitioner’s right to an administrative hearing is hollow due to evidence hidden by Respondent. Petitioner should not be forced to endure a multi-year civil lawsuit to exercise a right the law states Petitioner is entitled to today. Because the law leaves Respondent with no discretion but to provide a complete response, a Writ of Mandate is the only adequate remedy to prevent further irreparable harm to Petitioner’s professional output and career opportunities. If the law leaves Respondent with only one single option—a ministerial act—a lawsuit and full trial would be a waste of judicial resources.
Petitioner: John De Herrera, accomplished artist and credentialed educator for the State of California.
Respondent: Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club
Jurisdiction: Incident occurred in Los Angeles County where Petitioner resides.
Statement of Facts
1. October 14th, 2025: Petitioner entered parking space at business mall located near northwest corner of Agoura and Kanan Roads, City of Agoura Hills, County of Los Angeles. In doing so there was no vehicle parked on Petitioner’s driver’s side. Upon returning to vehicle from business there was then another vehicle, the third party, parked on Petitioner’s driver’s side with front passenger wheel on line separating the two parking spaces. Petitioner put vehicle in reverse and upon vacating space Petitioner’s driver side front bumper made slight and subtle contact with third party’s passenger door. Not sure if contact had been made Petitioner pulled back into space and looked left to find third party angrily glaring from their driver’s seat. Petitioner and third party both immediately exited vehicles with Petitioner vocally and profusely apologetic. Petitioner inspected where contact had occurred to find a parallel paint transfer. It was raining and Petitioner brushed fingers over point of contact, assuring third party of no structural damage, that damage was cosmetic in nature. Petitioner and third party then stood under mall overhang directly in front of third party’s vehicle while third party took photos of Petitioner’s driver’s license and insurance card. Petitioner looked into third party’s vehicle during this time and witnessed no one else in vehicle, nor did third party indicate at any time in any way there was another occupant. Petitioner thought to note third party’s front passenger wheel on line between parking spaces, but not wanting to make an unfortunate accident worse, apologized again and vacated parking lot believing third party would report the paint transfer.
2. October 15th, 2025: Petitioner receives call from IEAC agent informing Petitioner the third party from day before was claiming bodily injury for themself and also a four-year old daughter. Petitioner stated to IEAC agent there was not another individual in third party’s vehicle at time of incident and contact between vehicles was physically impossible to have created energy transfer enough to cause bodily injury. Petitioner was distressed though assured by IEAC agent stating an investigation of the Claim would commence and Petitioner would be updated in near future.
3. October 22, 2025: Petitioner receives call from IEAC supervisor. At no time during this discussion was Petitioner informed of Respondent’s duty under the California Department of Insurance (CDI) to maintain a Special Investigation Unit (SIU) and its critical 30-day window to preserve third-party security camera content, nor was Petitioner informed of any details about an IEAC investigation of the Claim. Discussion was centered on Petitioner’s dismay of a point for bodily injury on Petitioner’s Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) record.
4. October 22, 2025: On this date IEAC agents completed and sent Petitioner a hard copy letter dated October 22, stating they had determined Petitioner was at fault for bodily injury. (Exhibit A).
5. November 24, 2025: Not having been contacted by IEAC for over a month Petitioner calls IEAC to inquire about update on Claim investigation and is informed it was settled and Petitioner was to receive bodily injury point on DMV record. The call lasted 30 minutes where discussion centered on veracity of the Claim. IEAC agent expressed doubts about the Claim and agrees to have an IEAC supervisor contact Petitioner. (Exhibit B).
6. November 26, 2025: Petitioner calls IEAC agent asking about supervisor call-back and is texted back that supervisor is out of office and will contact Petitioner December 1. (Exhibit C).
7. December 3, 2025: Petitioner again calls IEAC agent asking about supervisor call-back and is texted back that supervisor has been notified and will contact Petitioner upon return to office. (Exhibit D).
8. December 5, 2025: Petitioner texts IEAC agent asking again about supervisor call-back and is texted back supervisor will return December 8. (Exhibit E).
9. December 8, 2025: IEAC supervisor No. 1 calls Petitioner for conversation lasting 10 minutes where situation is discussed and Petitioner’s dismay over third party’s claim that another occupant was in vehicle at time of incident and how settlement for bodily injury from a parallel paint transfer seemed outrageous. (Exhibit F). Petitioner requests to speak with supervisor above Supervisor No. 1, and later this day IEAC Supervisor No. 2 calls Petitioner for 18 minute discussion to point Petitioner is informed Petitioner will be contacted by IEAC Unit Manager. (Exhibit G).
10. December 9, 2025: Petitioner establishes a true and correct email exchange with IEAC Unit Manager who sends a photo showing third party’s passenger door and parallel paint transfer. Door is photographed uncleaned since day of incident and rain, showing marks where Petitioner had brushed fingers over paint transfer when he was assuring third party on day of incident that damage was cosmetic. This photo of the uncleaned door and paint transfer makes the point of contact appear much more substantial than it was. (Exhibit H). Petitioner subsequently sought out and took photos of same door type to note contour of door which does not read well in IEAC photo. (Exhibit I). Petitioner also took photo from in front of same type of vehicle approximating where Petitioner was standing while third party obtained Petitioner’s ID and insurance information on date of incident. (Exhibit J).
11. December 16, 2025: Petitioner receives voicemail from initial IEAC agent from October 15, stating they were “going to close out the claim.” (Exhibit K).
12. December 17, 2025: Petitioner returns to site of incident and discovers two separately owned and operated security cameras with unobstructed views to parking spaces where incident occurred: camera 1 owned and operated by Kanan Properties and camera 2 by a jewelry store (Exhibits L 1-4 multiple page exhibit showing photos of 1) the actual site (i. the site of incident, ii. camera 1, iii, camera two) 2) the two separately owned and operated cameras, and 3) camera locations in relation to site and sight lines to it). Also on this day Petitioner searches for and obtains phone number of property manager for Kanan Properties and calls to inquire about security camera content from October 14.
13. December 18, 2025: Property manager of Kanan Properties texts Petitioner stating security camera content is overwritten after 30 days and no longer available, to which Petitioner text replies: “Do you have recollection of any insurance investigators contacting you between 10/14 and 11/15 this year?” To which property manager responds: “No, they did not contact me. I would have absolutely responded had I received a telephone call or something in writing.” (Exhibit M). Petitioner subsequently requests and receives email confirmation from owners of security cameras confirming neither were contacted by any insurance agent between October 15 and November 15. (Exhibits N).
14. December 19, 2025: Petitioner receives email from IEAC Unit Manager stating they are reviewing Claim and for Petitioner to please allow them more time. (Exhibit O).
15. December 26, 2025: IEAC Unit Manager calls Petitioner for 14 minute discussion where Petitioner pleads with IEAC to recognize third party is the bad actor costing IEAC an insurance indemnification and Petitioner a bodily injury point on DMV record, and to work with Petitioner to make situation whole. (Exhibit P). Later this day IEAC Unit Manager emails Petitioner a PDF of IEAC disposition on Claim. (Exhibit Q).
16. December 31, 2025: Petitioner notifies IEAC Unit Manager via email that Petitioner has sent formal request for Claim file via certified mail through the United States Postal Service. (Exhibit R).
17. January 5, 2026: Petitioner files Consumer Insurance Fraud Reporting Form with CDI and receives Case Number 8695634. (Exhibit S).
18. January 9, 2026: Petitioner sends another certified letter and formal request for Claim file via United States Postal Service, this time addressed to the Automobile Club of Southern California rather than AAA, and subsequently receives confirmation of its delivery. (Exhibit T).
19. January 12, 2026: Petitioner receives PDF email from Senior Insurance Compliance Officer of CDI stating they would forward case to IEAC, ask for detailed response, review information obtained for compliance with statutes, regulations, and policy provisions, determine if IEAC handled claim appropriately and notify Petitioner upon completion of review. (Exhibit U).
20. January 13, 2026: Petitioner visits American Automobile Association office and requests complete copy of Petitioner’s auto policy. (Exhibit V).
21. January 21, 2026: IEAC Unit Manager replies via email, stating “I have now located your formal request. We will review your request and respond to you at our earliest opportunity.” (Exhibit W).
22. January 28, 2026: Petitioner retrieves hard copy letter via United States Postal Service from IEAC Group Manager, dated January 26, 2026, in part stating: 1) “We explained the investigation process to you.” This is false, at no time did IEAC personnel ever explain anything about the investigation process; 2) “You have also made a demand for compensation due to our handling of this claim.” This is false, Petitioner has never made any demands in this matter, only pleaded with IEAC to work with Petitioner to make situation whole; 3) “You also mentioned that on several occasions you recorded conversations with our representatives that they were not aware of and did not consent.” This is false, Petitioner did not record conversations nor ever claimed to, Petitioner simply stated voicemail recordings left on Petitioner’s cellular device had been saved. (Exhibit X).
23. February 4, 2026: Petitioner emails IEAC Unit Manager requesting confirmation IEAC Group Manager January 26 letter is IEAC final and complete response on matter.
24. February 5th, 2026: Unit Manager replies to email from day before: “We have reviewed the claim, and [IEAC Group Manager] has issued our response.” (Exhibit Y).
25. Petitioner maintained an art studio and gallery for almost fifteen years and has been accepted to numerous open calls for art and has hundreds of works in homes around the world. Petitioner is also a literary artist with poems published by college journals and on-line literary establishments, as playwright has one play to date produced, and as an author has published three books (two novels and a translation) and was steadfastly working on a fourth book up until October 15, 2025 and notification of Claim. (Exhibit Z). Note: this exhibit is multi-paged containing Petitioner’s DMV record, acceptance for teaching credential for the State, acceptance letters to various open calls for literary and visual arts, and photos of Petitioner’s art in homes).
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Violation of Ministerial Duty – CCP § 1085)
(Against Respondent)
1. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 25 as though fully set forth herein;
2. Respondent is an insurer licensed to do business in California and had a clear, present, and ministerial duty under 10 CCR § 2695.7(d) to “diligently pursue a thorough, fair and objective investigation” of all claims.
3. Respondent breached these duties by failing to secure exculpatory security camera evidence after being notified of fraud by Petitioner on October 15, 2025, while two independently owned and operated security cameras contained evidence available to Respondent for 30 days thereafter, either of which could and would have exonerated Petitioner.
4. Respondent has a ministerial duty under 10 CCR § 2695.5(b) to provide a “complete response” to an insured’s inquiry within 15 calendar days.
5. Respondent’s final denial on January 26, 2026, long after statutory deadline, constitutes an arbitrary and capricious refusal to perform a ministerial duty under 10 CCR § 2695.5(b), leaving Petitioner empty handed for an administrative hearing under Vehicle Code § 14101, and which a Writ of Mandate is now the only adequate remedy.
6. Therefore, Petitioner is entitled to a Writ of Mandate commanding Respondent to produce the “complete response” justifying a settlement which resulted in bodily injury point on Petitioner’s driving record.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing)
(Against Respondent)
7. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations contained in this petition as though fully set forth herein;
8. Respondent breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by favoring the interests of a third-party over the interests of its own insured, and by ignoring third party’s profession alongside physical evidence rendering third-party’s claim highly unlikely if not impossible.
10. Therefore, as a direct result of Respondent’s bad faith, Petitioner has suffered substantial damages, including irreparable harm and financial loss to artistic output and productivity as professional artist, and a foregoing 36 month penalty precluding Petitioner from professional teaching opportunity abroad due to a bodily injury point on Petitioner’s driving record, and resultant severe emotional distress.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for judgment against Respondent as follows:
For a Peremptory Writ of Mandate: That this Court exercise its original jurisdiction and issue a Peremptory Writ of Mandate under CCP § 1085 commanding Respondent to provide a “complete response” under 10 CCR § 2695.5(b) justifying settlement of bodily injury resulting in such a point on Petitioner’s driving record.
For Declaratory Relief: For a judicial declaration under CCP § 1060 that Petitioner has a beneficial interest and vested right to a complete response with redacted investigative reports associated with a suspect claim justifying Respondent’s settlement of it, and that Respondent breached its ministerial duty to “diligently pursue a thorough, fair and objective investigation” under 10 CCR § 2695.7(d);
For Injunctive Relief: For a permanent injunction restraining Respondent from further withholding a complete response with redacted investigative reports associated with claim 017439398.
For Damages: For compensatory and consequential damages for the professional harm and severe emotional distress sustained by Petitioner in this matter; and should the Court deem it warranted, for punitive damages pursuant to Civil Code § 3294 for Respondent’s oppressive and reckless conduct it has been cited for previously;
For an Order: For an order pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1110b that an appeal of the Judgement shall not stay the operation of this writ, preventing further damage to Petitioner’s professional output, career opportunities and due process rights;
For Costs: For costs of suit incurred herein;
For General Relief: For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
VERIFICATION
I, John De Herrera, declare as follows:
I am the Petitioner in the above-entitled action. I have read the foregoing Petition for Writ of Mandate and know the contents thereof. The same is true of my own personal knowledge, except as to those matters which are therein stated on information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe them to be true.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Petitioner John De Herrera:
Executed this____ day of__________, 2026,
at Los Angeles, California.
MEMORANDUM
MASTER TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Allen v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters (1959) 51 Cal.2d 805
Betty v. Superior Court (1941) 18 Cal.2d 619
Bosetti v. United States Life Ins. Co. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1208
Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868
Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 809
Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1062
Mariscal v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1617
Mazik v. Geico General Ins. Co. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 455
Neto v. Consuelho Amor da Sociedade (1912) 18 Cal.App. 234
Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266
Rappaport-Scott v. Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto. Club (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 831
Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 713
Statutes:
California Civil Code § 3294 (Punitive Damages)
California Code of Civil Procedure § 100
California Code of Civil Procedure § 1060 (Declaratory Relief)
California Code of Civil Procedure § 1069
California Code of Civil Procedure § 1085 (Writ of Mandate)
California Code of Civil Procedure § 1086
California Code of Civil Procedure § 1110b (Stay-Killer)
California Insurance Code § 1871
California Insurance Code § 1875.20
California Vehicle Code § 14101 (Right to Administrative Hearing)
California Vehicle Code § 16000 (Accident Reporting)
Regulations:
10 CCR § 2695.5(b) (Ministerial Duty to Respond)
10 CCR § 2695.7(d) (Duty to Investigate)
10 CCR §§ 2698.30–2698.43
10 CCR § 2698.45
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I. INTRODUCTION
Petitioner believes Respondent has attempted to trick Petitioner into waiting too long to file this civil action and the Statement of Facts in this petition indicate Respondent is intentionally withholding a complete response specifically to prevent Petitioner’s ability to prove anything in an DMV administration hearing aimed towards exoneration.
II. LEGAL ARGUMENT
A. Standards for Issuance of Writ
A writ of mandate must be issued where: (1) there is a clear, present, and ministerial duty on the part of the respondent; (2) the petitioner has a clear, present, and beneficial right to the performance of that duty; and (3) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. (CCP §§ 1085, 1086). While the ordinary course of law might suggest a standard civil suit, the writ proceeding is an equitable proceeding in which this Court is vested with “wide discretion.” Allen v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters (1959) 51 Cal.2d 805. The core design of the writ is to “do substantial justice and to prevent substantial injury.” Neto v. Consuelho Amor da Sociedade (1912) 18 Cal.App. 234. Under Bosetti v. United States Life Ins. Co. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1208, 1236, the fact that Respondent’s conduct was “objectively unreasonable” is sufficient for this Court to exercise its equitable discretion. As the “beneficially interested party” under CCP § 1069, Petitioner seeks the exercise of this Court’s discretion to reach a conclusion which will “promote justice.” Betty v. Superior Court (1941) 18 Cal.2d 619).
B. Legal Duty to Investigate
First, regarding Petitioner’s auto insurance policy (Exhibit V) which is not much more than what insurer will offer for payment of a third-party claim, it does instruct policyholders that if involved in a collision to take photos. Petitioner had not been in a collision for over forty years, was shocked in the moment, and failed to take photos of third party’s front wheel on line between parking spaces, passenger door, interior of third party’s vehicle, and perhaps here Respondent would argue this writ be denied on that basis, however that same portion of the policy does not state that failing to take photos of a collision forfeits policyholder’s right to a proper investigation, nor right to a complete response should a dispute arise required for an administrative hearing before the DMV should a negligent operator point be in dispute.
Under California Insurance Code § 1875.20 and 10 CCR §§ 2698.30–2698.43 Respondent is mandated to maintain a Special Investigation Unit to identify and investigate fraudulent claims. While Respondent asserts a right to settle it is not absolute, but tethered to a duty to perform an investigation utilizing independent and available sources of information.
As demonstrated in the Statement of Facts, Respondent was alerted to fraud against Petitioner by Petitioner on October 15, 2025 when Respondent’s agent called with allegations by third party. Petitioner declared them false and despite this, Respondent failed to perform basic investigative tasks: determining if a security camera captured the incident and contacting owner/operator. Respondent’s Group Manager admits Respondent “did not have proof” a minor was in the vehicle (Exhibit Y), yet Respondent ignored two existing security cameras which would have provided that proof (Exhibit L).
While California Insurance Code § 1875.20 and 10 CCR §§ 2698.30–2698.43 do not use the words “security camera” explicitly, security cameras can, have, and do provide information via “discreet surveillance” to determine if what a client or third party is alleging is true. Indeed, security camera content today is a primary tool used by insurance companies to identify fraud. While businesses are not required to keep security camera content for a specific period most retain it for 7-30 days and it is widely known within the insurance industries that if security camera content can disprove an assertion it is critical to act within this window before data is overwritten. Respondent’s failure to act within that critical 30-day window before data was overwritten on Kanan Properties and a jewelry store’s security cameras having clear views to site of incident constitutes an unreasonable, reckless, if not outrageous failure. An insurer acts “unreasonably and without proper cause” if it fails to conduct a full, fair, and thorough investigation. Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1066. The Respondent bears the “primary duty of inquiry” and cannot shift that burden onto Petitioner. Mariscal v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1617, 1625. Respondent would have us believe its SIU is still getting up to speed on use of security cameras in fraudulent claims. Respondent ignored Petitioner’s immediate alerts of fraud, failed to investigate, and in Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 809, 818 this can be the “sole” basis for bad faith.
Respondent’s claim that the impact “had force” because an estimate called for a door replacement (Exhibit Y) seems a paper-only investigation relying on an inflated estimate to justify a bodily injury settlement. It appears Respondent’s investigation consisted of nothing more than accepting unverified statements of a third party contradicted by its own photo of the evidence (Exhibit H).
Unit Manager’s Letter (Exhibit O) states “On October 22nd the injury adjuster was assigned to the claim, and updated you on the status,” and similarly Group Manager’s letter (Exhibit Y) states “On 10/22/2025…the injury adjuster contacted you about the injury claims.” This call of October 22 has vexed Petitioner. In Petitioner’s mind there was the initial call of October 15 where Petitioner was informed of the Claim and assured an investigation would commence, followed by the November 24 inquiry over a month later when Petitioner inquired about the investigation. In fact, while Petitioner was working on this petition that call was viewed as fabrication because it was not on Petitioner’s cellular device, yet upon learning the call could be proven definitively by logging onto Petitioner’s cell provider’s site, indeed it was there. Petitioner believes this misremembering occurred because this October 22 call was simply being informed a second time that two points on Petitioner’s driving record were imminent. However, at no time during this call, or any communications throughout this entire matter was Petitioner informed of a formal Special Investigation Unit launch, specific elements of an investigation, the critical 30-day window to obtain security camera content, nor suggestion Petitioner could help Respondent investigate by identifying independently owned and operated cameras on site. Had Respondent’s adjuster suggested October 22 that Petitioner could help by confirming existence of security cameras, Petitioner would have immediately driven to incident site. Respondent withheld information vital for Petitioner to protect Petitioner. The October 22 call was a procedural sham, or worse an illegal practice and Respondent’s adjuster was then incommunicado and unreachable for 47 days (October 22 – December 8) during the most critical phase of the claim, allowing the window for obtaining exonerating evidence to expire, ensuring it would be destroyed. This is the definition of an investigation process that is neither “thorough” nor “fair” under 10 CCR § 2695.7(d).
C. Respondent’s Denial Letter Information Is 1) Arbitrary 2) Favoring Respondent’s Interests Over Petitioner’s Interests 3) Fails Logically
1) Respondent’s excuse for withholding information on investigation of Claim—“Personally Identifiable Information” (PII)—seems facile justification, transparent pretext, a diversionary tactic, and subterfuge all rolled into one. Petitioner does not seek nor has ever indicated seeking or caring to know third party’s personal details. Petitioner assumed such would be redacted by law to begin with. Yet in January 26, 2026 (Exhibit Y) Respondent discloses third party’s professional status as professional stunt person while simultaneously and contradictorily claiming investigative notes cannot be shared due to privacy concerns.
The key provisions of California Insurance Code § 1871 resulted when the State Legislature found that insurance fraud is a “particular problem for automobile policyholders” because fraudulent activities account for 15% to 20% of all auto insurance payments and contribute substantially to higher premiums. The chapter is designed to allow the Insurance Commissioner and law enforcement to investigate and “halt fraudulent activities” effectively. Most fraudulent activities involving insurance policies are due to a party perpetuating fraud against an insurer but here we see the inverse, by withholding a complete response containing reasonable information justifying a settlement for bodily injury Respondent obstructs public policy insulating itself from review, liability, and punishment.
2) An insurer may not “selectively rely on facts that support its position and ignore those facts that support a claim.” Mazik v. Geico General Ins. Co. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 455, 462. By accepting a professional stunt person’s unverified injury claim while ignoring evidence of a parallel paint transfer, Respondent held its own interest above that of the Petitioner’s, a direct violation of the duty to “diligently search for evidence which supports its insured’s claim.” Mariscal, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at 1620.
Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 713, 720-21 held that “in order to perform a reasonable and proper investigation, insurance companies should neither selectively choose which facts to investigate nor should they ignore contrary information which may support the insured’s claim.” The contrary information in this matter is that a professional stunt person was supposedly injured by a parallel paint transfer—contact with less energy associated with it than energy transferred from driving over the average pot hole or road improvement in Los Angeles County. Respondent ignored that information which favored Respondent’s interests over Petitioner’s interests.
3) To conclude a professional trained in high-impact physical stunts suffered “discomfort” and “pain” from a parallel paint transfer with Respondent’s own photo showing damage was cosmetic in nature, fails logically. It is also illogical if not an impossibility to accept an injured four-year old child was in back seat of vehicle at time of incident without Petitioner noticing while standing before third party’s vehicle: the child would have had to have remained crouched behind seat, silent and motionless for over three minutes.
D. Petitioner Has No Plain, Speedy, And Adequate Remedy at Law
Petitioner has demonstrated plain, speedy, adequate remedies have been exhausted: In all exchanges with Respondent Petitioner has pleaded with Respondent to come to terms and make situation whole alongside Petitioner filing a formal complaint with CDI to which Petitioner has never heard a single word in reply (Exhibit S). While the “ordinary course of law” might suggest a civil lawsuit for bad faith, such a remedy is inadequate here for these reasons: 1. Professional Harm: Petitioner is an artist and educator and as direct result of Respondent’s conduct, Petitioner presently suffers psychic distress de-habilitating Petitioner’s professional artistic capability and productivity, in addition to a bodily injury point on Petitioner’s driving record creating an immediate barrier to employment teaching English as a second language in countries like Japan and Oman and other high-end paying countries which have strict character and conduct regulations for teaching visas. 2. Without a complete response from Respondent Petitioner’s right to due process under Vehicle Code § 14101 and a fair hearing to contest “negligent operator” points is unobtainable because in order to prevail in that hearing the burden is on Petitioner to provide “credible evidence.” By withholding the complete response under (10 CCR § 2695.5(b)), the Respondent is ensuring Petitioner enters that administrative hearing empty-handed and defenseless. 3. Present and ongoing Injury to Health: Under the standard set in Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, Respondent’s reckless disregard for the veracity of the Claim has caused Petitioner severe emotional distress impacting Petitioner’s focus and abilities: “The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, severe emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.” 4. Public Importance: This case in part questions whether an insurer can ignore evidence in a claim, settling it as it sees fit, then withhold information to prevent a policyholder from challenging that settlement. Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266 held that this Court can bypass the adequate remedy rule in a case involving an issue of public importance deserving an immediate answer. Petitioner believes issues tendered in this petition are of widespread interest affecting a broad class of citizens who purchase auto insurance in this State.
CONCLUSION
If California Insurance Code § 1875.20 requires Respondent to maintain a Special Investigative Unit providing for “continuous operation of a unit or division to investigate possible fraudulent claims” by clients or third parties making a false allegation against a client, and California Code of Regulations Title 10, § 2695.7(d) requires every insurer to conduct and “diligently pursue a thorough, fair and objective investigation” of all claims, and § 2698.45 requires a “thorough analysis of a claim file” including identifying sources of information providing accuracy of a claim, Respondent has failed.
While Code § 2071 is for fire insurance, not auto insurance, and there is no ministerial statute for an auto insurer to produce a complete Claim file, however California Code of Regulations (CCR) Title 10, § 2695.5(b) states: “Upon receiving any written or oral inquiry from the insured or a claimant which reasonably suggests that a response is expected, every insurer shall immediately, but in no event more than fifteen (15) calendar days after receipt of such inquiry, furnish the insured or the claimant with a complete response based on the facts as then known to the insurer.” Respondent has violated this ministerial duty. Despite Petitioner’s formal certified requests beginning in December 2025, Respondent failed to provide a complete response until January 26, 2026—long after the statutory deadline had expired—and it was wholly incomplete. A complete response would include a basis for Respondent’s decision, but in this case, the response thus far is clouded in vagary and illogic—a paint transfer injured a professional stunt person and required a new door which explains why you have a bodily injury point?
Petitioner has not been given a complete response as to how and why Respondent settled the Claim. The law states “shall”—a ministerial duty where Respondent has no choice, and to this date Respondent has failed to furnish a complete response.
Further, Petitioner is not relying solely on a complete response justifying a bodily injury point on Petitioner’s driving record but also information related to Respondent’s duty to investigate under (10 CCR § 2695.7). Petitioner cannot know if Respondent performed a “thorough, fair, and objective investigation” unless Petitioner is provided with information showing that. By withholding information, Respondent cloaks suspected Bad Faith from review. The Second Cause of Action in this petition, demonstrable Bad Faith, transforms the request for a “complete response” into evidence of a crime which proves the negative—that a statutorily mandated investigation never took place while the chance at exoneration and Petitioner returning to normal life and productivity is lost due to the negligence and delay of Respondent.
As a professional artist, Petitioner maintains that the creative process is a disciplined application of the mind; the production of art of professional and aesthetic value is not a passive act, but one that requires focus and a stable cognitive state. Respondent’s conduct has effectively sabotaged the mental clarity and steady focus required for Petitioner to maintain his professional output and livelihood. If Petitioner were a construction worker this case would be tantamount to having Petitioner work with fractured bones. Since this matter began October 15, 2025 Petitioner estimates a 90% decrease in output of poetry/poems and a 30-40% decrease in output of visual art, and thus pursuant to CCP § 1110b, Petitioner further requests this Court order that an appeal of the Judgment shall not stay the operation of the Writ. As demonstrated in the Statement of Facts, the “bodily injury” point has already been applied to Petitioner’s DMV record, where it currently exists as a falsified public record and a present, active barrier to Petitioner’s teaching opportunities abroad. Each day this record remains uncorrected due to Respondent’s withholding of exculpatory evidence, Petitioner suffers ongoing and irreparable harm to his career and artistic productivity. A stay pending appeal would effectively allow this status to persist for years, allowing Respondent to continue its sabotage of Petitioner’s due process rights under Vehicle Code § 14101 and effectively de-habilitating Petitioner’s artistic output while simultaneously disabling Petitioner’s career opportunities until a higher court could hear the matter.
All insurers have a duty to be transparent with policyholders. The spirit of Insurance Code § 1871 is to disallow insurers from hiding evidence of fraud from the victim of it. An insurer cannot be judge, jury, and executioner of a policyholder’s record in total secrecy. Granting this writ helps protect a broad class of citizens who rely on their insurers to investigate rather than facilitate fraudulent claims.
The facts herein, Respondent’s failure to inquire whether security camera content was available, the delays and lack of communication, the illogic of the settlement, and the rational inferences derived from them, create a reasonable belief that Respondent has been and is currently is engaged in an undisclosed illegal practice of deciding which claims to investigate and which claims not to investigate. Rappaport-Scott v. Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto. Club (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 831, 837 [53 Cal.Rptr.3d 245] shows Respondent has already previously been charged with acting “unreasonably, that is, without proper cause, by failing to properly investigate [a] claim.”
Can an auto insurer in the State of California settle a claim however it decides without question and then withhold critical information for a client’s defense at an administrative hearing? Regarding a suspect claim must an auto insurer search for and obtain available security camera data? Petitioner believes these questions and others raised in this petition provide opportunity for the Court to exact justice and like a bolt of lightning in the name of the people under CCP § 100 have its thunder resound for all insurers to hear.
DECLARATION OF JOHN DE HERRERA
I, John De Herrera, declare as follows: I am the Petitioner in this action. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein and, if called as a witness, I could and would testify competently thereto.
Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the IEAC fault determination letter dated October 22, 2025.
Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of my cellular call logs from November 24, 2025, documenting a 30-minute discussion with an IEAC agent.
Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct screenshot of an IEAC text message dated November 26, 2025.
Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct screenshot of an IEAC text message dated December 3, 2025.
Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a true and correct screenshot of an IEAC text message dated December 5, 2025.
Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of my cellular call logs from December 8, 2025, documenting a 10-minute call with IEAC Supervisor No. 1.
Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of my cellular call logs from December 8, 2025, documenting an 18-minute call with IEAC Supervisor No. 2.
Attached hereto as Exhibit H is a true and correct copy of the photo provided by the IEAC Unit Manager on December 9, 2025, showing the uncleaned door and paint transfer.
Attached hereto as Exhibit I is a true and correct multi-page exhibit showing photos of a comparative door contour taken by me.
Attached hereto as Exhibit J is a true and correct photo taken by me re-enacting the witness perspective at the mall overhang.
Attached hereto as Exhibit K is a true and correct transcript/record of the IEAC voicemail dated December 16, 2025.
Attached hereto as Exhibit L 1-4 is a true and correct multi-page exhibit containing site photos and maps showing security camera locations and sight lines.
Attached hereto as Exhibit M is a true and correct screenshot of the text exchange with the property manager of Kanan Properties dated December 18, 2025.
Attached hereto as Exhibit N is a true and correct copy of email confirmations from mall business owners regarding the lack of IEAC inquiry.
Attached hereto as Exhibit O is a true and correct copy of the email from the IEAC Unit Manager dated December 19, 2025, requesting more time.
Attached hereto as Exhibit P is a true and correct copy of my cellular call logs from December 26, 2025, documenting a 14-minute call with the Unit Manager.
Attached hereto as Exhibit Q is a true and correct copy of the IEAC PDF disposition and claim summary dated December 26, 2025.
Attached hereto as Exhibit R is a true and correct copy of the email sent to the Unit Manager on December 31, 2025, regarding the certified mail request.
Attached hereto as Exhibit S is a true and correct copy of the CDI Consumer Insurance Fraud Reporting confirmation for Case #8695634.
Attached hereto as Exhibit T is a true and correct multi-page exhibit containing USPS Certified Mail receipts and delivery confirmations for the Claim file requests.
Attached hereto as Exhibit U is a true and correct copy of the correspondence from the CDI Senior Insurance Compliance Officer dated January 12, 2026.
Attached hereto as Exhibit V is a true and correct copy of my complete auto policy provided by AAA on January 13, 2026.
Attached hereto as Exhibit W is a true and correct copy of the email from the Unit Manager acknowledging the formal request on January 21, 2026.
Attached hereto as Exhibit X is a true and correct copy of the letter from the IEAC Group Manager dated January 26, 2026.
Attached hereto as Exhibit Y is a true and correct copy of the email from the Unit Manager dated February 5, 2026, confirming the final response.
Attached hereto as Exhibit Z is a true and correct multi-page exhibit containing my DMV record, professional credential, emails of acceptance to literary and visual arts calls, and Petitioner’s art in homes.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on March __, 2026, at ________________, California.
Executed this ____ day of ________, 2026,
at Los Angeles, California.
Master Index of Exhibits (A-Z)
A IEAC Fault Determination Letter (Dated Oct 22, 2025)
B Petitioner’s Cellular Call Logs: 30-Minute Dispute with IEAC Agent (Nov 24, 2025)
C IEAC Text Message: “Supervisor out of office until Dec 1” (Nov 26, 2025)
D IEAC Text Message: Supervisor notification regarding return (Dec 3, 2025)
E IEAC Text Message: Delay of Supervisor return to Dec 8 (Dec 5, 2025)
F Petitioner’s Cellular Call Logs: 10-Minute Call with Supervisor No. 1 (Dec 8, 2025)
G Petitioner’s Cellular Call Logs: 18-Minute Call with Supervisor No. 2 (Dec 8, 2025)
H IEAC Photo: Uncleaned Door/Paint Transfer showing Petitioner’s fingerprints (Dec 9, 2025)
I Petitioner’s Photos: Comparative Door Contour (Physical Evidence)
J Petitioner’s Photo: Witness Perspective Re-enactment at Mall Overhang
K Transcript/Record of IEAC Voicemail: “Closing out the claim” (Dec 16, 2025)
L 1-4 Site/Camera Map: Photos of Site, Security Cameras, and Sight Lines
M Text Exchange with Property Manager: Confirmation of No IEAC Contact (Dec 18, 2025)
N Email Confirmations from Mall Business Owners regarding No IEAC Inquiry
O Email from Unit Manager: Request for “More Time” for Review (Dec 19, 2025)
P Petitioner’s Cellular Call Logs: 14-Minute “Make Whole” Plea (Dec 26, 2025)
Q IEAC PDF Disposition and Formal Claim Summary (Dec 26, 2025)
R Email to Unit Manager regarding First Certified Mail Request (Dec 31, 2025)
S CDI Fraud Reporting Confirmation: Case #8695634 (Jan 5, 2026)
T USPS Certified Mail Receipts and Delivery Confirmations (Claim File Requests)
U Correspondence from CDI Senior Insurance Compliance Officer (Jan 12, 2026)
V Petitioner’s Complete Auto Policy as provided by AAA (Jan 13, 2026)
W Email from Unit Manager acknowledging “located” formal request (Jan 21, 2026)
X Group Manager Denial Letter containing verified falsehoods (Jan 26, 2026)
Y Email from Unit Manager confirming “Final Response” (Feb 5, 2026)
Z Present DMV record, Valid teaching credential, and Art Pedigree.
