While there is a discrepancy as to Exhibits, that was a nightmare I'd rather not go into now and will Lodge a Notice of clarification Friday, but overall that argument is there, tailored to the Judge's last Minute Order.
JOHN DE HERRERA
PO Box 5888
Santa Barbara, California, 93150
805-708-1965
john@cc2.org
Petitioner In Pro Per
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
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JOHN DE HERRERA, Petitioner vs. INTERINSURANCE EXCHANGE OF THE AUTOMOBILE CLUB Respondent. |
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Case No. 26STCP00952 Judge: Hon. Curtis A. Kin Department: 836 VERIFIED SECOND AMENDED PETITION FOR PEREMPTORY WRIT OF MANDATE AND COMPLAINT |
“For every wrong there is a remedy.” (Cal. Civ. Code § 3523.)
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner brings this Verified Second Amended Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandate to compel the Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (Respondent) to (1) provide the written notice and reconsideration decision required by 10 CCR § 2632.13(e) with respect to Respondent’s principally-at-fault and bodily injury determinations, and (2) furnish a “complete response” under 10 CCR § 2695.5(b), each associated with Claim No. 017439398 (Claim). Respondent’s principally-at-fault determination is the same determination reported, or caused to be reported, to the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) as the negligent operator point at issue throughout this Petition.
Petitioner filed the original Petition in this action on March 10, 2026. Respondent subsequently demurred. This Court’s June 16, 2026 Minute Order sustained that demurrer, with leave to amend, but the complete order was not timely served on Petitioner. Pursuant to the leave granted by that order, Petitioner filed a First Amended Petition on July 29, 2026. Respondent did not demur to that pleading; instead, on August 18, 2026, Respondent’s counsel sent a meet-and-confer letter previewing an anticipated demurrer. At the August 20, 2026 Trial Setting Conference, upon determining that the complete June 16, 2026 Minute Order had not been timely served on Petitioner, this Court renewed leave to amend, this time into this Second Amended Petition.
That order held that 10 CCR § 2695.7(d)’s general duty to conduct a thorough, fair, and objective investigation involves significant discretion and is accordingly not independently enforceable by traditional mandamus. Petitioner does not ask this Court to revisit that holding. This Second Amended Petition instead rests on duties this Court has not yet addressed: the specific, non-discretionary notice and reconsideration-response duties imposed by 10 CCR § 2632.13(e), and the specific, non-discretionary duty to furnish a complete response based on the facts as then known, under 10 CCR § 2695.5(b).
Since this action was first filed, Petitioner has obtained a certified copy of the Report of Traffic Accident Occurring in California (Form SR-1) associated with this incident, attached hereto as Exhibit GG. That certified filing, made by an entity within Respondent’s own corporate family, directly contradicts material premises underlying Respondent’s January 26, 2026 purported “complete response” to Petitioner. This evidence is addressed throughout this Second Amended Petition.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. October 14th, 2025: Petitioner entered a parking space at a business mall located near the northwest corner of Agoura and Kanan Roads, City of Agoura Hills, County of Los Angeles. In doing so, there was no vehicle parked on Petitioner’s driver’s side. Upon returning to the vehicle from the business, there was then another vehicle, the third party, parked on Petitioner’s driver’s side with its front passenger wheel on the line separating the two parking spaces. Petitioner put his vehicle in reverse and upon vacating the space Petitioner’s driver side front bumper made slight and subtle contact with the third party’s passenger door. Not sure if contact had been made, Petitioner pulled back into the space and looked left to find the third party angrily glaring from their driver’s seat. Petitioner and the third party both immediately exited their vehicles with Petitioner vocally and profusely apologetic. Petitioner inspected where the contact had occurred to find a parallel paint transfer. It was raining and Petitioner brushed his fingers over the point of contact, assuring the third party of no structural damage, and that the damage was cosmetic in nature. Petitioner and the third party then stood under the mall overhang directly in front of the third party’s vehicle while the third party took photos of Petitioner’s driver’s license and insurance card. Petitioner looked into the third party’s vehicle during this time, through the vehicle’s untinted windshield, and witnessed no one else in the vehicle, nor did the third party indicate at any time in any way there was another occupant. Petitioner thought to note the third party’s front passenger wheel on the line between the parking spaces, but not wanting to make an unfortunate situation worse, apologized again and vacated the parking lot believing the third party would report the paint transfer.
2. October 15th, 2025: Petitioner received a call from Respondent’s agent informing Petitioner that the third party from the day before was claiming bodily injury for themself and also a four-year-old child. Petitioner declared to the agent that there was no other individual in the third party’s vehicle at the time of the incident and that the nature of the contact between the vehicles was physically impossible to have caused bodily injury. Petitioner was distressed though assured by the agent, who stated an investigation of the allegations would commence and that Petitioner would be updated in the near future.
3. October 22, 2025: Petitioner received what Respondent characterizes as a status update call from an injury adjuster, though at no time during this call was Petitioner informed of any specific elements of an investigation, a possible Special Investigative Unit (SIU) launch, or the critical 30-day window to obtain security camera content, nor was it mentioned that Petitioner could personally identify cameras for Petitioner’s benefit and exoneration (Exhibit A).
4. October 22, 2025: This same day, Respondent mailed to Petitioner, in a single envelope, three separate written communications, collectively attached hereto as Exhibit A. The first communication states that “an injury claim has been presented under the policy,” identifies the stated basis of that determination as “our investigation, which included a statement from the injured party,” and advises Petitioner of a right to request reconsideration within 30 days of receipt. The second communication advises Petitioner that a Claims Service Representative has been assigned to review any potential injury claim, and separately warns Petitioner of fraudulent third-party inquiries seeking policy information. The third communication states that Respondent has determined Petitioner was “at least 51%” the legal cause of the accident, describes the basis for that determination only by general reference to the requirement that a driver not back a vehicle into contact with a stationary object, and likewise advises Petitioner of a right to request reconsideration within 30 days of receipt. As Petitioner’s PO Box is located over eighty miles from Petitioner’s residence and is visited by Petitioner approximately once monthly, Petitioner did not retrieve or become aware of the contents of Exhibit A until after the November 24, 2025 telephone call described in Paragraph 5, by which date Respondent had already resolved and settled the claims described therein.
5. November 24, 2025: Petitioner called the initial agent to inquire about an update on the investigation and was informed that the Claim had been settled and that Petitioner was to receive a negligent operator point reflecting an at-fault bodily injury determination on his DMV record. The call lasted 30 minutes, during which Petitioner immediately and vigorously disputed the factual validity of the settlement. Although Petitioner did not utilize the explicit word “reconsideration” during this conversation, the substance of the communication constituted a direct request for review and reversal of Respondent’s determinations, an administrative reality Respondent’s agent explicitly recognized by agreeing to escalate the dispute and have a Supervisor contact Petitioner.
6. November 26, 2025: Petitioner called the initial agent to inquire about the promised supervisor call-back and was notified via text message that the Supervisor was out of the office and would contact Petitioner on December 1 (Exhibit C).
7. December 3, 2025: Petitioner again called the initial agent to inquire about the supervisor call-back and was notified via text message that the Supervisor had been notified and would contact Petitioner upon returning to the office (Exhibit D).
8. December 5, 2025: Petitioner again texted the initial agent to inquire about the supervisor call-back and was notified via text message that the Supervisor would return to the office on December 8 (Exhibit E).
9. December 8, 2025: Supervisor No. 1 called Petitioner for a conversation lasting 10 minutes, during which Petitioner expressed dismay over the third party’s claims that another occupant was in the vehicle at the time of the incident and that bodily injury resulted from a sub-5mph parallel paint transfer (Exhibit F). Petitioner requested to speak with the supervisor above Supervisor No. 1, and later that day, Supervisor No. 2 called Petitioner for an 18-minute discussion, during which Petitioner was informed that Respondent’s Unit Manager would be in contact shortly (Exhibit G).
10. December 9, 2025: Petitioner established a true and correct email exchange with the Unit Manager, who sent a photograph via email showing the third party’s passenger door and parallel paint transfer. The door was photographed uncleaned since the day of the incident and rain, showing marks where Petitioner had brushed his fingers over the paint transfer while assuring the third party the damage was cosmetic, making the paint transfer appear more substantial (Exhibit H). Petitioner subsequently sought out and took comparative photographs of the same door type to document the contour of the door, which did not read well in the Unit Manager's photograph (Exhibit I). Petitioner also took a photograph from in front of the same type of vehicle, approximating where Petitioner was standing while the third party obtained Petitioner’s identification and insurance information on the date of the incident, demonstrating the clear view into the interior of the vehicle (Exhibit J).
11. December 16, 2025: Petitioner received a voicemail from the initial agent of October 15, stating that they were “going to close out the claim” (Exhibit K).
12. December 17, 2025: Petitioner returned to the site of the incident and discovered two separately owned and operated security cameras with equidistant and unobstructed views to the site where the incident occurred, with Camera 1 owned and operated by Kanan Properties and Camera 2 owned and operated by a local jewelry store (Exhibit L). This Exhibit demonstrates the actual site, the cameras, and the corresponding camera locations and sight-lines. Petitioner also searched for and obtained the phone number of the property manager for Kanan Properties and called to inquire about the security camera content from October 14.
13. December 18, 2025: The property manager of Kanan Properties notified Petitioner via text message that the security camera content was overwritten after 30 days and was no longer available, to which Petitioner replied: “Do you have recollection of any insurance investigators contacting you between 10/14 and 11/15 this year?” The property manager responded: “No, they did not contact me. I would have absolutely responded had I received a telephone call or something in writing” (Exhibit M). Petitioner subsequently requested and received email confirmations from the owners of both security cameras, confirming that neither had been contacted by any insurance agent between October 15 and November 15 (Exhibit N).
14. December 19, 2025: Petitioner received an email from the Unit Manager stating, in full: “I apologize for the confusion, I am currently reviewing your case and will get back to you as soon as possible. I appreciate your patience as I conduct my review” (Exhibit O).
15. December 26, 2025: The Unit Manager called Petitioner for a 14-minute discussion during which Petitioner pleaded for Respondent to recognize that the third party was the bad actor, and to work with Petitioner to make the situation whole (Exhibit P). Later this day, the Unit Manager sent Petitioner a letter memorializing this discussion, attached hereto as Exhibit Q, which stated, among other things, that Respondent agreed the accident “was relatively minor,” described Respondent’s investigation of the third party’s claim as consisting of a recorded statement and documentation of the third party’s occupation and lost work time, did not describe any investigation specific to the child’s claimed injury beyond the third party’s own statement, stated that the child’s claimed injury consisted of having “stayed home for the day and missed normal activities due to discomfort,” and stated that Respondent had “the right to settle the claim as [it] saw appropriate.”
16. December 30, 2025: Petitioner sent a formal certified letter via the United States Postal Service regarding the investigatory basis for Respondent’s settlement of the Claim, addressed to AAA. This letter was styled as a request for the Claim file, but constituting, in substance and regulatory effect, a formal request for a “complete response” under 10 CCR § 2695.5(b). On December 31, 2025, Petitioner emailed the Unit Manager notifying him that this letter had been mailed the previous day (Exhibit R).
17. January 5, 2026: Petitioner filed a Consumer Insurance Fraud Reporting Form with the California Department of Insurance (CDI) and received Case Number 8695364 (Exhibit S). That same day, the Unit Manager replied to Petitioner’s December 31, 2025 email, stating: “We will await your communication” (Exhibit KK).
18. January 6, 2026: Petitioner emails Unit Manager a screenshot confirming the December 30, 2025 letter was delivered on January 2, 2026. (Exhibit LL.) Petitioner receives no reply to this email.
19. January 9, 2026: Petitioner sends a second certified letter via United States Postal Service for information on investigation and settlement, this time addressed to Automobile Club of Southern California rather than AAA, and subsequently receives confirmation of its delivery. (Exhibit T.)
20. January 12, 2026: Petitioner receives PDF email from Senior Insurance Compliance Officer of CDI stating they would forward case to Respondent, ask for detailed response, review information obtained for compliance with statutes, regulations, and policy provisions, determine if Respondent handled claim appropriately, and notify Petitioner upon completion of review. (Exhibit U.)
21. January 13, 2026: Petitioner visits local American Automobile Association office and requests complete copy of Petitioner’s auto policy CAA202768907. (Exhibit V.)
22. January 21, 2026: At 8:11 p.m., the Unit Manager emailed Petitioner stating he had not received a letter. At 8:18 p.m., seven minutes later, the Unit Manager emailed Petitioner a second time, stating: “I have now located your formal request. We will review your request and respond to you at our earliest opportunity” (Exhibit W).
23. January 26, 2026: Petitioner retrieved a hard copy letter via the United States Postal Service from Respondent’s Group Manager, dated January 26, 2026, attached hereto as Exhibit X. Exhibit X stated, among other things: (a) that on October 24, 2025, the third party gave a recorded statement claiming pain and an inability to work “that day or the next,” and that Respondent obtained documentation of the third party’s occupation as a stunt performer and confirmed his lost-earnings figure; (b) that on October 30, 2025, an estimate of $2,259.44 was written for replacement of the third party’s front passenger door, which Respondent’s letter stated “indicates the impact had force”; (c) that Respondent decided to resolve the claims on November 20, 2025, and that the claims were settled on November 21, 2025; (d) that the other vehicle “had tinted windows” which “could explain why you did not see the minor in the back”; and (e) three further statements which were completely untrue, namely, that Respondent had explained the investigation process to Petitioner, that Petitioner had made a demand for compensation due to the handling of the claim, and that Petitioner had mentioned recording conversations with representatives without their awareness or consent. The investigation process was never explained, demands for compensation were never made, and conversations were never recorded. The same letter, while declining to produce investigative notes on privacy grounds, disclosed that the third party was employed as a professional stunt performer.
24. February 4, 2026: Petitioner emails Unit Manager requesting confirmation Group Manager’s January 26 letter is Respondent’s final and complete response regarding the Claim.
25. February 5, 2026: The Unit Manager replied to the email from the day before: “We have reviewed the claim, and [the Group Manager] has issued our response” (Exhibit Y).
26. March 10, 2026: Petitioner filed the original Peremptory Writ of Mandate in this action. Petitioner maintained an art studio and gallery for almost fifteen years, has been accepted to numerous open calls for art, and has hundreds of works in homes around the world. Petitioner is also a literary artist with poems published by college journals and online literary establishments; as a playwright, Petitioner has one play produced to date and recently had a staged reading of another; and as an author, Petitioner has published three books (two novels and a translation) and was steadfastly working to complete a fourth book up until October 15, 2025, and the subsequent notification of the Claim (Exhibit Z). This multi-page exhibit contains the acceptance for his teaching credential for the State, acceptance letters to various open calls for the literary and visual arts, published poems, and photographs of Petitioner’s art in residential homes.
27. April 15, 2026: CDI Senior Insurance Compliance Officer issues formal written response stating the Department is unable to resolve the dispute; that the ultimate decision is left to a court of law, and only a court of law has the authority to weigh the evidence and merits of each party’s position to arrive at a formal binding decision on the dispute. (Exhibit AA.)
28. April 24, 2026: Petitioner called Respondent’s Thousand Oaks, California office by telephone to inquire and confirm resultant premium hikes post-settlement. Petitioner’s call log showed a seventeen-minute outgoing call during which Respondent’s representative informed Petitioner the Claim in question was not closed. Petitioner verified the Claim’s open status via Respondent’s internet portal, where it previously had been shown as closed on January 16, 2026. The link to the reopened Claim on Respondent’s portal remained inaccessible to Petitioner as of April 27, 2026 (Exhibit BB [1-4]).
29. April 27, 2026: After the aforementioned telephone communication, Petitioner emailed the Unit Manager seeking confirmation of the Claim’s status. The Unit Manager responded on May 15, 2026—eighteen days later—and did not deny the Claim had been reopened, nor provided any statement of the Claim’s status, nor affirmed that the January 26, 2026 letter constituted a final or complete response. Instead, Petitioner was directed to communicate exclusively through Respondent’s litigation counsel (Exhibit CC).
30. Petitioner’s DMV driver record reflected the October 14, 2025 accident and a Financial Responsibility Case Number 25-14-24873, with the “Report No.” field showing “DMV” rather than any law enforcement agency designation, confirming no police or CHP report existed for this incident. The record reflected this FR Case was updated December 26, 2025—the identical date on which Respondent’s Unit Manager sent Petitioner the letter described in Paragraph 15 (Exhibit DD).
31. July 17, 2026: Petitioner submitted to the DMV, via certified mail, a completed Financial Responsibility Information Request (Form SR-19C) seeking a copy of the SR-1 report underlying FR Case Number 25-14-24873 (Exhibit EE-1). That same day, Petitioner telephoned the Department’s Financial Responsibility Unit and, during an eleven-minute call, spoke with a representative who confirmed that the SR-1 had been filed by the Automobile Club of Southern California (ACSC). Petitioner was informed the requested certified copy of the SR-1 would require approximately 30 to 60 days to produce (Exhibit EE-2).
32. July 21, 2026: Petitioner again checked Respondent’s claims portal and found Claim No. 017439398 still open, now reflecting a newly assigned Claims Service Representative not previously identified in this record. As of the date of this filing, Petitioner has received no communication of any kind from this newly assigned representative. (Exhibit FF.)
33. Petitioner has since obtained a certified copy of the Report of Traffic Accident Occurring in California (Form SR-1) associated with this incident, attached hereto as Exhibit GG, pursuant to the request described in Paragraph 32. Exhibit GG bore a certification date of December 16, 2025—sixty-three days after the accident, and fifty-three days beyond the ten-day deadline imposed by Vehicle Code Section 16000—and identified the certifying party as “ACSC,” an entity within Respondent’s own corporate family. Exhibit GG reflected: (a) that damages from the incident did not exceed $1,000, a figure irreconcilable with the $2,259.44 door-replacement estimate described in Paragraph 24; (b) that the child whom the third party described, and whom Respondent’s own letters describe as a passenger injured inside the vehicle, was designated as a “Bicyclist”; and (c) the middle portion—“Other Party’s Information”—was entirely blank.
34. Petitioner is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that Respondent’s principally-at-fault determination described in Exhibit A is the same determination reported, or caused to be reported, to the DMV as the negligent operator point at issue throughout this Petition.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Breach of Mandatory Ministerial Duties Under 10 CCR § 2632.13(e)
(Against Respondent)
35. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 34 of this Petition as though fully set forth herein.
36. 10 CCR § 2632.13(e) requires that an insurer providing coverage at the time of an accident shall not determine a driver to be principally at fault unless it first conducts an investigation, shall provide written notice specifying the basis of any such determination, including the basis of any determination that the accident resulted in bodily injury or death, and shall advise the insured of the right, within thirty days of receipt of that notice, to request reconsideration of that determination, whereupon the insurer shall, within thirty days of receipt of that request, provide the insured with a written decision stating the reasons for its decision upon reconsideration. Petitioner does not ask this Court to adjudicate the qualitative sufficiency of Respondent’s underlying investigation, a matter this Court has held involves discretionary judgment. Petitioner’s claim rests exclusively on the separate, specific, and non-discretionary notice and reconsideration-response duties imposed by subsections (e)(1) and (e)(2).
37. 10 CCR § 2632.13(b) permits a determination that a driver was principally at-fault only where the accident resulted in bodily injury or death, or where the accident resulted only in property damage exceeding $1,000. Exhibit GG, a certified filing by an entity within Respondent’s own corporate family, reflects that damages from this incident did not exceed $1,000. If this certification is accurate, Respondent’s authority to make any principally-at-fault determination with respect to this incident rested entirely on the bodily injury basis described in Exhibit A and Exhibit X.
38. Respondent purported to discharge its notice duty under subsection (e)(1) through the three written communications described in Paragraph 4 of the Statement of Facts, mailed together on October 22, 2025 and attached hereto as Exhibit A. The stated basis for the bodily injury determination was, in its entirety, an uncorroborated statement from the party asserting the claim. The stated basis for the fault determination was a general recitation of the legal standard governing contact with stationary objects, without reference to any facts specific to this incident.
39. As alleged in Paragraph 4 of the Statement of Facts, Petitioner did not retrieve or become aware of the contents of Exhibit A until after the November 24, 2025 telephone call described in Paragraph 5 of the Statement of Facts, by which date Respondent had already decided to resolve the claims described in Exhibit A (November 20, 2025) and had already settled them (November 21, 2025), as stated by Respondent’s own Group Manager in Exhibit X. Respondent settled these claims before Petitioner could reasonably have received the notices required by subsection (e)(1), and therefore before Petitioner could reasonably have exercised the right to request reconsideration those notices were required to preserve.
40. The right to reconsideration afforded by 10 CCR § 2632.13(e)(1) and (e)(2) was rendered a nullity by this sequence. A regulatory notice mailed to an insured, describing a right to seek reconsideration within thirty days of receipt, cannot serve its intended purpose where the insurer finalizes the underlying determination before the insured can reasonably be expected to have received or acted upon that notice.
41. Petitioner’s subsequent, repeated communications to Respondent beginning November 24, 2025—including the calls and correspondence described in Paragraphs 5 through 23 of the Statement of Facts—constituted, in substance, requests that Respondent reconsider determinations Petitioner had by then learned had already been made and acted upon. Respondent has never furnished Petitioner a written decision, stating the reasons for its decision, in response to those communications, within thirty days of any of them or at all, as required by 10 CCR § 2632.13(e)(2).
42. Respondent’s breach of these ministerial duties has directly resulted in an unreviewed, uncontested adverse fault and bodily injury determination being reported to the DMV, causing an ongoing premium increase, an active precursor to suspension of Petitioner’s driving privileges, and an ongoing barrier to Petitioner’s professional opportunities and creative output, as reflected in the record.
43. Petitioner has no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the reasons set forth in the Memorandum of Points and Authorities filed herewith. Mandamus lies to compel Respondent to perform its ministerial duties under 10 CCR § 2632.13(e)(1) and (e)(2).
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Breach of Mandatory Ministerial Duty to Furnish a Complete Response Under 10 CCR § 2695.5(b)
(Against Respondent)
44. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 43 of this Petition as though fully set forth herein.
45. 10 CCR § 2695.2(c) defines “Claimant” to mean “a first or third party claimant as defined in these regulations, any person who asserts a right of recovery under a surety bond, an attorney, [or] any person authorized by operation of law to represent the claimant.” This is a list of independent, alternative categories, and a named insured asserting rights as a first party claimant under 10 CCR § 2695.2(f) satisfies the first category in this list without regard to whether the same person separately qualifies under the surety bond category. Petitioner is, and at all relevant times has been, the named insured under automobile insurance policy number CAA202768907 issued by Respondent and covering the vehicle Petitioner operated on October 14, 2025, under which Claim No. 017439398 was opened, and accordingly satisfies 10 CCR § 2695.2(f)’s definition of “first party claimant” on its own terms.
46. 10 CCR § 2695.5(b) requires that upon receiving any communication from a claimant, regarding a claim, that reasonably suggests a response is expected, every licensee shall, within fifteen calendar days, furnish the claimant with a complete response based on the facts as then known by the licensee. This duty is triggered by a defined, objective state of facts and requires performance of a specific act within a fixed statutory period, “without regard to any personal judgment as to the propriety of the act.” (Center for Biological Diversity v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 931, 952.)
47. Petitioner’s December 30, 2025 certified letter was delivered to Respondent on January 2, 2026, as reflected in Paragraph 17 of the Statement of Facts. This delivery reasonably suggested a response was expected within the meaning of 10 CCR § 2695.5(b), triggering Respondent’s fifteen-day duty to furnish a complete response as of that date. Respondent did not furnish any substantive response until January 26, 2026—twenty-four days later, well beyond the fifteen-day period the regulation allows. Respondent’s own subsequent correspondence confirms its awareness of, and shifting position regarding this communication: on January 5, 2026, Respondent’s Unit Manager stated he would “await” Petitioner’s communication; on January 6, 2026, Petitioner provided documentary proof of delivery, to which Respondent did not reply; and on January 21, 2026, Respondent’s Unit Manager sent two emails seven minutes apart, the first stating he had not received a letter, the second stating he had “now located” Petitioner’s formal request. This sequence is itself further evidence that Respondent’s own contemporaneous account of what it knew and when cannot be reconciled with a response asserting completeness “based on the facts as then known.”
48. Exhibit X states that an October 30, 2025 estimate for replacement of the third party’s vehicle door was written in the amount of $2,259.44, and that this estimate “indicates the impact had force.” As set forth in Paragraph 34 of the Statement of Facts, Petitioner has since obtained a certified copy of the Report of Traffic Accident Occurring in California (Form SR-1) associated with this incident, attached hereto as Exhibit GG, certified December 16, 2025 by an entity within Respondent’s own corporate family, which reflects that damages from the incident did not exceed $1,000—a figure directly irreconcilable with the $2,259.44 estimate underlying Respondent’s own stated basis for its force determination. This profound discrepancy directly aligns with the written admission of Respondent’s own Unit Manager in Exhibit Q, who explicitly conceded that the underlying accident “was relatively minor.”
49. Exhibit Q further reflects that the investigation Respondent describes as supporting its determination consisted of a recorded statement from the third party and documentation of the third party’s occupation and lost work time. Exhibit Q describes no medical documentation, no independent verification that any injury actually occurred, and no investigation whatsoever specific to the third-party child’s claimed injury, which Exhibit Q describes only as the child having “stayed home for the day and missed her normal activities due to discomfort.”
50. Exhibit X states that Respondent declines to produce its investigative notes on the ground that they contain “Personally Identifiable Information” of the third party. The same letter, in the same communication, discloses that the third party is employed as a professional stunt performer. Respondent’s asserted privacy basis for withholding its investigative basis is undermined by its own simultaneous disclosure of the third party’s occupation in that same letter.
51. Exhibit X further attributes Petitioner’s failure to observe the third-party child occupant to the presence of tinted windows on the third party’s vehicle. Petitioner is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that only the side windows of the third party’s vehicle were tinted, and that the windshield, through which Petitioner had a direct and unobstructed view into the vehicle’s interior for approximately three minutes, was not tinted.
52. Exhibit GG additionally designates the child whom the third party described, and whom Respondent’s own records describe as a passenger injured inside the vehicle, as a “Bicyclist” rather than a vehicle occupant.
53. These are direct, documentary inconsistencies between certified filings made by Respondent’s own corporate affiliate to a government agency, Respondent’s own internal written admissions, and the substantive account Respondent gave Petitioner in the same letter this Court has previously found complete in form. A response cannot be “based on the facts as then known by the licensee,” within the meaning of 10 CCR § 2695.5(b), where the licensee’s own contemporaneous records and admissions contradict the factual premises the response relies upon. Under Civil Code § 3528, the law respects form less than substance; the form of a response does not satisfy the substance of the duty where its stated premises are contradicted by the responding party’s own records.
54. Petitioner is informed, believes, and alleges, that subsequent to filing of the original Petition in this action Respondent reopened the Claim in dispute. This is corroborated by the matters set forth in Paragraphs 29 and 30 of the Statement of Facts.
55. Petitioner has no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the reasons set forth in the Memorandum of Points and Authorities filed herewith. Mandamus lies to compel Respondent to perform its ministerial duty under 10 CCR § 2695.5(b).
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
(Pled to State a Legally Sufficient Claim; Adjudication of the Merits Reserved for Trial in Whatever Forum This Court Directs)
(Against Respondent)
56. Petitioner incorporates by reference the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through 55 of this Petition as though fully set forth herein.
57. This cause of action was stayed by this Court’s Minute Order dated June 16, 2026, pending further order of the Court. Petitioner pleads it here to preserve the claim and its relationship to the common nucleus of operative fact, and respectfully submits to this Court’s continued stay, or to its discretion as to severance, bifurcation, or transfer. Nothing in this cause of action is intended to affect, delay, or condition the First or Second Causes of Action. Petitioner includes legal argument in this cause of action solely to demonstrate its sufficiency against any renewed demurrer, and not as an invitation for this Court to adjudicate its merits at this stage.
58. In every insurance policy, including policy CAA202768907 issued by Respondent to Petitioner, there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that neither party do anything to injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement. (Cates Construction, Inc. v. Talbot Partners (1999) 21 Cal.4th 28, 44; Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 809, 818-819.)
59. Respondent breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by, among other things: (i) crediting the third party’s unverified allegations of bodily injury to two people while disregarding the physical implausibility of those allegations given the nature of the contact; (ii) failing to identify or preserve readily available, independent security camera evidence during the 30-day window before it was overwritten, despite Petitioner’s immediate report of suspected fraud; (iii) allowing Respondent’s Supervisor to remain unreachable for 47 days during the most critical phase of the Claim; and (iv) settling the claims described in Exhibit A before Petitioner could reasonably be expected to have received notice of the determinations underlying them.
60. An insurer may not selectively rely on facts that support its position while ignoring facts that support its insured. (Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 713, 720-721; Mazik v. Geico General Ins. Co. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 455, 462.) Respondent bears the primary duty of inquiry and may not shift that burden onto Petitioner. (Mariscal v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1617, 1625.)
61. Respondent’s anticipated reliance on Baldwin v. AAA Northern California, Nevada & Utah Ins. Exchange (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 545 and Love v. Fire Ins. Exchange (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1136 for the proposition that an act specifically authorized by policy cannot as a matter of law constitute bad faith is misplaced, for the reasons previously briefed. A core benefit of Petitioner’s policy is Respondent’s diligent and objective investigation before an adverse determination is finalized and reported to a government record-keeping system — a benefit wholly independent of, and not discharged by, Respondent’s exercise of discretion to settle the third party’s monetary claim.
62. As a direct and proximate result of Respondent’s breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Petitioner has suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial. Petitioner reserves the right to plead these damages with further specificity and to seek leave to amend this cause of action as appropriate.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for judgment against Respondent as follows:
1. For a Peremptory Writ of Mandate: That this Court exercise its original jurisdiction and issue a Peremptory Writ of Mandate under CCP § 1085 commanding Respondent to: (a) Provide Petitioner with a written decision, stating the reasons for its decision, addressing Petitioner’s requests for reconsideration of the fault and bodily injury determinations described in Exhibit A—whether measured from Petitioner’s November 24, 2025 communications, for which the statutory window expired December 24, 2025, or from Petitioner’s December 30, 2025 certified letter, for which the statutory window expired on or about February 1, 2026—as required by 10 CCR § 2632.13(e)(2); (b) Furnish a “complete response” under 10 CCR § 2695.5(b) based on the facts as then known, free of any material misstatement and/or premise contradicted by Respondent’s own records, including production of the factual basis, records, and materials Respondent relied upon in reaching its determination regarding Claim No. 017439398; and (c) To the extent, and only to the extent, the Court deems it warranted based on the results of Respondent’s compliance with subparts (a) and (b), notify the DMV of a corrected determination through Respondent’s existing reporting channel. Petitioner requests each subpart of this relief independently and severally; the Court’s granting of subparts (a) and (b) is not contingent upon, nor does it require, a grant of subpart (c). In the alternative, and only to the extent this Court determines that correction of a public record exceeds the scope of relief available through mandamus, Petitioner requests the Court at minimum compel production of the materials described in subpart (b);
2. For Declaratory Relief: For a judicial declaration under CCP § 1060 that (a) Petitioner is entitled to the notice and reconsideration-response protections of 10 CCR § 2632.13(e)(1) and (e)(2) as the insured driver to whom the determinations described in Exhibit A were directed; and (b) Petitioner is a “claimant” and “first party claimant” within the meaning of 10 CCR § 2695.2(c) and (f) with respect to Claim No. 017439398, and accordingly has a beneficial interest and vested right to a “complete response” under 10 CCR § 2695.5(b) with respect to that claim;
3. For Damages: On the Third Cause of Action, which remains stayed by prior order of this Court pending resolution of the First and Second Causes of Action, for compensatory and consequential damages in an amount to be proven at trial in whatever forum this Court directs;
4. For a Future Order: Petitioner reserves the right, should this Court grant the Peremptory Writ of Mandate requested herein, to seek by separate, timely, post-judgment motion an order under Code of Civil Procedure § 1110b that an appeal of the Judgment not stay operation of the writ;
5. For Costs: For costs of suit incurred herein; and
6. For General Relief: For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
VERIFICATION
I, John De Herrera, declare as follows:
1. I am the Petitioner in the above-entitled action.
2. I have read the foregoing Second Amended Petition for Peremptory Writ of Mandate and know the contents thereof.
3. The matters stated in the foregoing document are true of my own personal knowledge, except as to those matters which are stated upon information and belief, and as to those matters, I reasonably believe them to be true. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed this ___ day of September, 2026, at Agoura Hills, California.
_________________________
John De Herrera, Petitioner in Pro
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Alejo v. Torlakson (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 768
Allen v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters (1959) 51 Cal.2d 805
Baldwin v. AAA Northern California, Nevada & Utah Ins. Exchange (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 545
Berlinghieri v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1983) 33 Cal.3d 392
Betty v. Superior Court (1941) 18 Cal.2d 619
California School Employees Assn. v. Governing Board (1994) 8 Cal.4th 333
Cates Construction, Inc. v. Talbot Partners (1999) 21 Cal.4th 28
Center for Biological Diversity v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 931
Chateau Chamberay Homeowners Assn. v. Associated International Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 335
City of Huntington Beach v. Board of Administration (1992) 4 Cal.4th 462
Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379
Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 809
Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536
Jurcoane v. Superior Court (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 886
Loeber v. Lakeside Joint School Dist. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 552
Love v. Fire Ins. Exchange (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1136
Marin County Board of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson (1976) 16 Cal.3d 920
Mariscal v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1617
Mazik v. Geico General Ins. Co. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 455
Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287
Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266
People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1
People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002
Rappaport-Scott v. Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto. Club (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 831
Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1325
Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 713
Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364
STATUTES
California Civil Code § 1641
California Civil Code § 3512
California Civil Code § 3517
California Civil Code § 3523
California Civil Code § 3528
California Civil Code § 3532
California Civil Code § 3535
California Civil Code § 3541
Code of Civil Procedure § 1060
Code of Civil Procedure § 1069
Code of Civil Procedure § 1085
Code of Civil Procedure § 1086
Code of Civil Procedure § 1110b
Code of Civil Procedure § 1858
California Insurance Code § 790.03
California Penal Code § 11115
California Penal Code § 11126
California Penal Code § 13150
California Penal Code § 13151
California Vehicle Code § 14101
California Vehicle Code § 16000
REGULATIONS
10 Cal. Code Regs. § 2632.13
10 Cal. Code Regs. § 2695.2
10 Cal. Code Regs. § 2695.5
10 Cal. Code Regs. § 2695.7
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Cal. Dept. of Insurance, Bulletin 2002-06, “Requirements for Notification of Determination of Principally At-Fault Accidents” (Nov. 1, 2002)
Memorandum and Points of Authorities’ Table of Contents
INTRODUCTION: Page 22
A. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN DISCRETIONARY AND MINISTERIAL DUTIES GOVERNS THIS PETITION: Page 24
B. RESPONDENT BREACHED ITS MINISTERIAL NOTICE DUTY UNDER 10 CCR § 2632.13(e)(1): Page 27
C. RESPONDENT’S OWN TIMELINE RENDERED THE RECONSIDERATION RIGHT REQUIRED BY 10 CCR § 2632.13(e) A NULLITY: Page 27
D. RESPONDENT BREACHED ITS MINISTERIAL DUTY TO PROVIDE A WRITTEN RECONSIDERATION DECISION UNDER 10 CCR § 2632.13(e)(2): Page 29
E. THE ANTI-SURPLUSAGE DOCTRINE & 10 CCR § 2695.2(c): Page 30
F. THE § 2695.5(b) DUTY IS SEPARATE FROM RESPONDENT’S INVESTIGATIVE DISCRETION: Page 32
G. RESPONDENT’S JANUARY 26, 2026 RESPONSE WAS NOT BASED ON THE FACTS AS THEN KNOWN: Page 33
H. THE TEXTUAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN 10 CCR § 2695.5(a) AND (b): Page 35
I. RESPONDENT’S POST-FILING CONDUCT CONFIRMS THE JANUARY 26 RESPONSE WAS NOT BASED ON FACTS AS THEN KNOWN: Page 36
J. THE CDI ADMISSION & NO PLAIN, SPEEDY, AND ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW: Page 37
K. AVAILABLE WRIT RELIEF & THE DOCTRINE OF ABSURDITY: Page 38
CONCLUSION: Page 39
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
INTRODUCTION
This Second Amended Petition is filed pursuant to leave granted by this Court on August 20, 2026, after this Court determined that its June 16, 2026 Minute Order sustaining Respondent’s Demurrer to the original Petition had not been timely served upon Petitioner. That order held that 10 CCR § 2695.7(d)’s general duty to conduct a thorough, fair, and objective investigation involves significant discretion and is accordingly not independently enforceable by traditional mandamus. Petitioner does not ask this Court to revisit that holding. This Second Amended Petition instead rests on duties this Court has not yet addressed: the specific, non-discretionary notice and reconsideration-response duties imposed by 10 CCR § 2632.13(e), and the specific, non-discretionary duty to furnish a complete response based on the facts as then known under 10 CCR § 2695.5(b) — reframed in light of documentary evidence obtained since this action was first filed, most significantly a certified copy of the Report of Traffic Accident Occurring in California (Form SR-1) associated with this incident, attached hereto as Exhibit GG.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
A. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN DISCRETIONARY AND MINISTERIAL DUTIES GOVERNS THIS PETITION
A writ of mandate must be issued where: (1) there is a clear, present, and ministerial duty on the part of respondent; (2) petitioner has a clear, present, and beneficial right to the performance of that duty; and (3) there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. (CCP §§ 1085, 1086.) “A ministerial duty is an obligation to perform a specific act in a manner prescribed by law whenever a given state of facts exists, without regard to any personal judgment as to the propriety of the act.” (Center for Biological Diversity v. Department of Forestry & Fire Protection (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 931, 952.) By contrast, “[e]ven if mandatory language appears in the statute creating a duty, the duty is discretionary if the entity must exercise significant discretion to perform the duty.” (Alejo v. Torlakson (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 768, 780.)
Applying this framework, this Court has already held that 10 CCR § 2695.7(d)’s general duty to conduct a thorough, fair, and objective investigation involves the exercise of significant discretion, because it requires judgment as to method. Petitioner accepts this holding and does not seek to re-litigate it. But the same framework compels the opposite conclusion for the duties at issue in this Second Amended Petition. Each duty pled herein — the duty to provide written notice specifying the basis of a fault or bodily injury determination (10 CCR § 2632.13(e)(1)); the duty to provide a written decision stating the reasons for a determination upon reconsideration, within thirty days of a request (10 CCR § 2632.13(e)(2)); and the duty to furnish a complete response, based on the facts as then known, within fifteen days of a qualifying communication (10 CCR § 2695.5(b)) — is triggered by a defined, objective state of facts, requires performance of a specific act within a fixed statutory period, and does not require the exercise of judgment as to how the underlying investigation should be conducted. An insurer’s discretion in how it reaches a determination is analytically distinct from, and does not enlarge into, discretion in whether, when, or how completely it must report that determination once reached. This distinction is not a matter of characterization by Petitioner; it is compelled by this Court’s own authority.
Respondent may note that subsection (e) opens with language requiring an insurer to “diligently pursue a thorough, fair and objective investigation” before making a principally-at-fault determination — language this Court has already held requires significant discretion in the context of 10 CCR § 2695.7(d). Petitioner does not dispute that this specific clause, standing alone, is discretionary for the same reasons this Court has already articulated. But subsections (e)(1) and (e)(2) impose separate and independent obligations, triggered only after an investigation has concluded and a determination has already been made: to provide written notice of defined, enumerated content, and to respond to a timely request for reconsideration within a fixed thirty-day period. Applying the same test this Court applied to the investigation clause itself, neither obligation requires “the exercise of significant discretion to perform the duty.” (Alejo v. Torlakson (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 768, 780.) The California Department of Insurance has itself confirmed the fixed, non-discretionary content such notices must contain. (Cal. Dept. of Ins., Bulletin 2002-06, “Requirements for Notification of Determination of Principally At-Fault Accidents” (Nov. 1, 2002).) That bulletin states that a compliant notice must specify: (1) any determination that the insured was principally at-fault; (2) the percentage of fault ascribed to the insured; (3) the percentage of fault ascribed to any other driver or cause; (4) the basis of that determination; and (5) the insured’s right to seek reconsideration — and that “[a]t fault determination notifications that simply state that an investigation was conducted and the insured has been determined to be more than 51 percent at-fault do not satisfy the requirements of Section 2632.13.” Determining whether a notice contains these five enumerated items, and whether a written decision issued within thirty days of a request for reconsideration, requires no exercise of judgment as to the propriety of any act; it requires only a comparison between a fixed checklist and Respondent’s own correspondence. The discretionary character of the investigation preceding these duties does not convert compliance with them into a discretionary act.
These thresholds are relaxed where, as here, a matter of public interest is at issue. (Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266.) Independent of Petitioner’s status as a first party claimant, a citizen possesses standing to compel enforcement of a public duty even absent a personal beneficial interest where the object is to vindicate a right in which the public has a material interest. (Loeber v. Lakeside Joint School Dist. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 552, 567-568.) The writ proceeding is equitable, and, as the beneficially interested party under CCP § 1069, Petitioner seeks this Court’s “wide discretion” (Allen v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters (1959) 51 Cal.2d 805) to “promote justice” (Betty v. Superior Court (1941) 18 Cal.2d 619).
Nor does Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287 bar this proceeding. Moradi-Shalal held that Insurance Code § 790.03 creates no private right of action for damages, out of concern that private suits would proliferate litigation. Petitioner brings no damages action under § 790.03 here; this Petition seeks a Peremptory Writ to compel Respondent’s performance of ministerial duties, relief that is equitable rather than compensatory and does not implicate the concerns Moradi-Shalal addressed. The Supreme Court has since confirmed Moradi-Shalal’s bar does not extend to every claim touching UIPA-related conduct, limiting its holding to relief that does not carry Moradi-Shalal’s proliferating-litigation concern. (Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364.) Mandamus does not adjudicate liability for a violation of § 790.03; it compels performance of ministerial duties independently set forth in 10 CCR §§ 2632.13(e) and 2695.5(b).
B. RESPONDENT BREACHED ITS MINISTERIAL NOTICE DUTY UNDER 10 CCR § 2632.13(e)(1)
10 CCR § 2632.13(e)(1) requires that the written notice an insurer provides upon determining a driver to be principally at fault specify the basis of that determination. As set forth in Section A above, Bulletin 2002-06 identifies five required elements of a compliant notice.
Respondent’s three October 22, 2025 letters, mailed together and attached hereto as Exhibit A, satisfy at most elements (1), (2), and (5) of this checklist. They fail element (3) entirely: at no point does Exhibit A state what percentage of fault, if any, was ascribed to the third party whose vehicle was directly involved in the incident. They fail element (4) in substance: the stated basis for the bodily injury determination was, in its entirety, that the claim “has been open on the basis of our investigation, which included a statement from the injured party”— a circular formulation that identifies no investigation beyond the assertion of the party making the claim. The stated basis for the fault determination was a bare recitation of the legal standard governing contact with stationary objects, with no reference to any fact specific to this incident. As the Department of Insurance has confirmed, a notice which “simply state[s] that an investigation was conducted and the insured has been determined to be more than 51 percent at-fault” does not satisfy Section 2632.13. Exhibit A does precisely that, and nothing more.
Independently, 10 CCR § 2632.13(b) permits a principally-at-fault determination only where the accident resulted in bodily injury or death, or where property damage exceeded $1,000. Exhibit GG, Respondent’s own corporate affiliate’s certified filing, states that damages did not exceed $1,000. If that certification is accurate, Respondent’s regulatory authority to make any principally-at-fault determination in this matter rested entirely on the bodily injury basis Exhibit A and Exhibit X describe — the same basis Section G below establishes was not grounded in any documented investigation.
C. RESPONDENT’S OWN TIMELINE RENDERED THE RECONSIDERATION RIGHT REQUIRED BY 10 CCR § 2632.13(e) A NULLITY
10 CCR § 2632.13(e)(1) requires that the insurer’s notice advise the insured of the right to reconsideration of the determination of fault. Subsection (e)(2) provides that within thirty days of receipt of that notice, the insured may request reconsideration, and that within a further thirty days of receipt of that request, the insurer shall provide a written decision stating the reasons for its decision upon reconsideration. Here, Respondent’s own account of its conduct, set forth in its January 26, 2026 letter (Exhibit X), establishes that this right could not have been meaningfully exercised by any insured, regardless of when notice was received. Exhibit A was mailed October 22, 2025. Exhibit X states that Respondent decided to resolve the underlying claims on November 20, 2025, and settled them on November 21, 2025 — thirty days after Exhibit A was mailed. But the regulation’s thirty-day period does not run from mailing; it runs from the insured’s receipt of that notice, which necessarily occurs later still. Respondent therefore settled the claims before its own insured’s reconsideration window, properly measured from receipt, had even fully run — let alone before any further thirty-day period in which Respondent itself would be required to act on a timely request. No insured, however promptly notice was received and acted upon, could have requested reconsideration and obtained the written decision subsection (e)(2) requires before Respondent had already settled the claims in full. Here, this sequence is confirmed, and independently corroborated, by Petitioner’s own circumstances. Petitioner’s post office box is located more than eighty miles from Petitioner’s residence and is visited approximately once monthly; Petitioner did not retrieve or become aware of the contents of Exhibit A until after the November 24, 2025 telephone call described in Paragraph 5 of the Statement of Facts, by which date Respondent’s own representative confirmed the claims had already been settled. A regulatory right to seek reconsideration within thirty days of receipt of a notice is rendered illusory where the insurer’s own timeline forecloses the possibility of any insured completing that process before the underlying determination becomes final. Civil Code § 3528 declares that the law respects form less than substance. Respondent’s issuance of notices formally advising of a reconsideration right, while its own conduct foreclosed any opportunity to exercise that right within the time the regulation provides, satisfies the form of 10 CCR § 2632.13(e) while defeating its substance. California Civil Code § 3532, itself among the codified maxims of jurisprudence this Petition invokes throughout, declares that “[t]he law neither does nor requires idle acts.” A reconsideration right offered in form, after the determination it would reconsider has already been finalized and settled, is the kind of formal gesture § 3532 does not credit as satisfying a substantive regulatory duty. Respondent’s own conduct cannot transform a right rendered idle by Respondent’s own timeline into meaningful compliance with 10 CCR § 2632.13(e)(2) simply because the words “right to reconsideration” appeared in a notice sent before the practical opportunity to exercise that right had already passed.
D. RESPONDENT BREACHED ITS MINISTERIAL DUTY TO PROVIDE A WRITTEN RECONSIDERATION DECISION UNDER 10 CCR § 2632.13(e)(2)
10 CCR § 2632.13(e)(2) provides that “[w]ithin 30 days of receipt of the insured’s request for reconsideration, the insurer shall provide the insured with a written decision, stating the reasons for its decision upon reconsideration.” Respondent breached this duty independently under two separate and sufficient bases.
First, Petitioner’s December 30, 2025 certified letter, delivered to Respondent on January 2, 2026 as reflected in Paragraph 17 of the Statement of Facts, was a formal, written communication requesting the investigatory basis for Respondent’s settlement of the Claim. That letter, already established elsewhere in this Petition as sufficient to trigger Respondent’s separate fifteen-day duty under 10 CCR § 2695.5(b), independently constituted a request for reconsideration within the meaning of 10 CCR § 2632.13(e)(2), triggering a thirty-day deadline that expired on or about February 1, 2026. While Respondent’s January 26, 2026 letter (Exhibit X) issued within that thirty-day window, it did not satisfy the duty that window imposed. Exhibit X nowhere identifies itself as a reconsideration decision under § 2632.13(e)(2), nowhere references the fault or bodily injury determinations described in Exhibit A, and does not address the specific bases—including the absence of any occupant visible through the vehicle’s untinted windshield, and the implausibility of the claimed injuries given the nature of the contact—that Petitioner had by then repeatedly raised. As established in Section G below, Exhibit X’s substantive content, rather than resolving those bases, was itself contradicted by Respondent’s own contemporaneous and subsequent records. A letter that neither identifies itself as, nor in substance functions as, a reasoned decision on reconsideration does not satisfy § 2632.13(e)(2) merely because it arrived within the regulatory window.
Second, and independently, the communications between Petitioner and Respondent’s agents and supervisors beginning November 24, 2025—described in Paragraphs 5 through 16 of the Statement of Facts, in which Petitioner disputed the presence of a child and bodily injury determinations—themselves constituted a request for reconsideration within the meaning of 10 CCR § 2632.13(e)(2), triggering a thirty-day deadline that expired December 24, 2025. Respondent furnished no written decision of any kind, stating reasons or otherwise, by that date. Petitioner’s subsequent communications, continuing through the calls and correspondence described in Paragraphs 17 through 23 of the Statement of Facts, were made with escalating urgency to secure compliance with this already-expired obligation.
Consistent with the principle codified at Civil Code § 3528, that the law respects form less than substance, a communication’s substance — not the presence or absence of a specific term such as “reconsideration” — determines whether it constitutes a request within the meaning of 10 CCR § 2632.13(e)(2). Petitioner’s November 24, 2025 communication disputed the factual basis of Respondent’s determinations and sought their reversal; that it may not have employed the specific word “reconsideration” does not deprive it of the legal effect the regulation attaches to a request bearing that substance.
Under either basis, Respondent furnished no compliant written reconsideration decision within thirty days of initial request, within thirty days of any subsequent communications, or at all.
E. THE ANTI-SURPLUSAGE DOCTRINE & 10 CCR § 2695.2(c)
This Section is presented to address an unexamined dimension of the regulatory text referenced in this Court’s June 16, 2026 Minute Order, where reading the “surety bond” category within 10 CCR § 2695.2(c) as an exclusive gatekeeper to “claimant” status would introduce a fatal error of textual construction, violating the doctrine against surplusage.
10 CCR § 2695.2(c) defines “Claimant” to mean “a first or third party claimant as defined in these regulations, any person who asserts a right of recovery under a surety bond, an attorney, [or] any person authorized by operation of law to represent the claimant.” This is a list of independent, alternative categories; by separating these categories with commas and concluding with the disjunctive coordinating conjunction ‘[or],’ the regulation’s syntax establishes a series of strict grammatical alternatives. A named insured asserting rights as a first-party claimant under 10 CCR § 2695.2(f) satisfies the first category without regard to whether the same person also satisfies the separately listed surety bond category. The surety bond category cannot be read as a prerequisite for every other kind of claimant. If it were, the first category listed in the same sentence — “a first or third party claimant as defined in these regulations” — would have no independent purpose at all, since no one could ever qualify under it without also separately qualifying under the surety bond category, and it is a bedrock principle of California law that courts must interpret legal texts to give effect to every word, phrase, and clause, ensuring no part is rendered useless, redundant, or meaningless. (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387; People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1010 [“It is a settled axiom of statutory construction that significance should be attributed to every word and phrase of a statute, and a construction making some words surplusage should be avoided”].)
This rule of statutory construction is explicitly codified in California statute. Code of Civil Procedure § 1858 requires that “where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.” Furthermore, California Civil Code § 3541, itself among the codified maxims of jurisprudence this Petition invokes throughout, declares that “[a]n interpretation which gives effect is preferred to one which makes void.” Reading the first-party claimant category out of 10 CCR § 2695.2(c) is precisely the construction both provisions forbid. California courts construe legislation and regulations as a whole, “avoiding an interpretation which renders any of its language surplusage.” (City of Huntington Beach v. Board of Administration (1992) 4 Cal.4th 462, 468; Jurcoane v. Superior Court (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 886, 893.) This structural mandate for unified textual cohesion mirrors California’s rules for private agreements under Civil Code § 1641, which similarly commands that the “whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other.” Whether evaluating a public regulation or a private covenant, California law uniformly rejects any isolated reading that voids adjacent text.
This Court’s June 16, 2026 Minute Order quoted 10 CCR § 2695.2(c) as defining a claimant “in pertinent part, as ‘any person who asserts a right of recovery under a surety bond,’” and, on that basis, found Petitioner was “not a claimant seeking recovery from Respondent as the insurer.” Petitioner raises no argument for reconsideration and respectfully submits this construction for full briefing because the surety bond clause quoted is only one of several independent categories in the same sentence, and the full text of 10 CCR § 2695.2(c) — including the “first or third party claimant as defined in these regulations” category addressed above — was not before this Court for consideration at that stage of the proceedings.
Applied to the full text of the regulation, and to 10 CCR § 2695.2(f)’s independent definition of “first party claimant,” the surplusage doctrine set forth above confirms that Petitioner’s status as the named insured is alone sufficient to establish claimant status, without regard to the isolated surety bond category this Court’s prior order addressed.
F. THE § 2695.5(b) DUTY IS SEPARATE FROM RESPONDENT’S INVESTIGATIVE DISCRETION
10 CCR § 2695.5(b) requires that upon receiving any communication from a claimant reasonably suggesting a response is expected, a licensee shall, within fifteen days, furnish “a complete response based on the facts as then known by the licensee.” Petitioner’s certified communications, described in Paragraphs 16 through 23 of the Statement of Facts, satisfy this trigger on their own terms, regardless of whether a third party separately received a response regarding a distinct inquiry. As with the duties addressed in Sections B through D above, the question whether a response is “based on the facts as then known” does not require this Court to evaluate the manner or method of Respondent’s investigation; it requires only a comparison between what Respondent’s response represented and what the facts, as reflected in Respondent’s own contemporaneous and subsequent records, actually were.
Petitioner’s December 30, 2025 certified letter was delivered to Respondent on January 2, 2026, as reflected in the Statement of Facts. This delivery reasonably suggested a response was expected within the meaning of 10 CCR § 2695.5(b), triggering Respondent’s fifteen-day duty to furnish a complete response as of that date. Respondent did not furnish any substantive response until January 26, 2026 — twenty-four days later, well beyond the fifteen-day period the regulation allows. Respondent’s own subsequent correspondence confirms its shifting position regarding this communication: on January 5, 2026, Respondent’s Unit Manager stated he would “await” Petitioner’s communication; on January 6, 2026, Petitioner provided documentary proof of delivery, to which Respondent did not reply; and on January 21, 2026, Respondent’s Unit Manager sent two emails seven minutes apart, the first stating he had not received a letter, the second stating he had “now located” Petitioner’s formal request. This sequence establishes, independent of the content deficiencies addressed in Section G below, that Respondent’s response was untimely as a matter of the regulation’s own fifteen-day standard.
G. RESPONDENT’S JANUARY 26, 2026 RESPONSE WAS NOT BASED ON THE FACTS AS THEN KNOWN
This Court’s June 16, 2026 Minute Order held that “even if the response was unsatisfactory or untrue, respondent’s response to petitioner’s inquiry and complaint was ‘complete’” within the meaning of 10 CCR § 2695.5(b). Petitioner does not ask this Court to revisit that holding, and does not contend the January 26, 2026 response was incomplete because Petitioner disagreed with it or found it unsatisfying. The question the order decided—whether the response was complete in form—is distinct from the question this Petition presents: whether the response was “based on the facts as then known by the licensee,” a separate textual requirement of the same regulation. A response can be complete in form, addressing every subject it purports to address, while still failing this separate requirement if the facts it recites are contradicted by the licensee’s own contemporaneous and subsequent records. The two inquiries do not overlap; the order resolved only the first. Moreover, the evidence establishing this separate deficiency was not before this Court when the order issued. Exhibit GG—the certified SR-1 report reflecting that damages did not exceed $1,000 against Respondent’s own $2,259.44 door-replacement estimate, and designating the child as a “Bicyclist” rather than a vehicle occupant—was obtained by Petitioner after the order issued and is addressed for the first time in this Second Amended Petition. Respondent’s January 26, 2026 letter (Exhibit X) fails the “based on the facts as then known” standard set forth in 10 CCR § 2695.5(b) for the following reasons:
1. Exhibit X states that an October 30, 2025 estimate for replacement of the third party’s vehicle door was written in the amount of $2,259.44, and that this estimate “indicates the impact had force.” Exhibit GG, a certified copy of the SR-1 report associated with this incident, certified December 16, 2025 by an entity within Respondent’s own corporate family, reflects that damages from the incident did not exceed $1,000 — a figure directly irreconcilable with the $2,259.44 estimate Exhibit X relies upon. This inconsistency is corroborated by Respondent’s own Unit Manager’s written statement, in Exhibit Q, that the accident “was relatively minor.”
2. Exhibit Q, Respondent’s own account of its claims-handling, describes an investigation confined to a recorded statement from the third party and documentation of the third party’s occupation and lost work time. Exhibit X further discloses that this occupation was as a professional stunt performer. Despite Respondent’s own knowledge of this occupation, Exhibit Q describes no medical documentation, no independent verification that any injury actually occurred to either the third party or the child, and no investigation whatsoever specific to the child’s claimed injury, which Exhibit Q describes only as the child having “stayed home for the day and missed her normal activities due to discomfort.” A response asserting a bodily injury determination cannot be “based on the facts as then known” where the licensee’s own contemporaneous account of its process reflects no factual investigation into the injury asserted, notwithstanding its own disclosed knowledge of facts that would ordinarily warrant closer inquiry.
3. Exhibit X attributes Petitioner’s failure to observe the child inside the third party’s vehicle to the presence of tinted windows. Petitioner is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that only the side windows of the vehicle were tinted, and that the windshield, through which Petitioner had a direct and unobstructed view into the vehicle’s interior for approximately three minutes, was not tinted. Respondent’s proffered explanation does not address the specific vantage point Petitioner has consistently described, and no investigation of this specific discrepancy appears anywhere in Respondent’s records.
4. Exhibit GG designates the child whom the third party described, and whom Respondent’s own records describe, as a passenger injured inside the vehicle, as a “Bicyclist” rather than a vehicle occupant. This designation is consistent with, and corroborates, the physical account Petitioner has maintained throughout: that Petitioner had a direct, unobstructed view into the vehicle’s interior through its untinted windshield for approximately three minutes, during which no occupant was visible, and that the scenario Respondent’s letter credits — an injured child remaining silent and motionless, unseen, throughout that period — is irreconcilable with Exhibit GG’s own certified account of where the child actually was.
5. Exhibit X falsely alleged that Petitioner made illegal recordings and demanded compensation, and falsely claimed that Respondent had explained the investigation process — none of which occurred.
Nor does the Genuine Dispute Doctrine (Rappaport-Scott v. Interinsurance Exch. of the Auto. Club (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 831) shield Respondent’s determination, since that doctrine affords no protection where a position rests on premises the licensee’s own records contradict, rather than a good-faith weighing of evidence. (Chateau Chamberay Homeowners Assn. v. Associated International Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 335, 348-349.) Civil Code § 3528 forbids treating a response as complete where its form is facially responsive but its substance rests on premises the responding party’s own records contradict.
6. When Petitioner directly asked Respondent to confirm whether the January 26 letter constituted its final and complete response, Respondent’s Unit Manager replied only that “we have reviewed the claim, and [the Group Manager] has issued our response” (Exhibit Y) — a general statement that neither confirms nor denies the particular finality Petitioner’s inquiry sought. Civil Code § 3535 provides that particular expressions qualify those which are general. Petitioner’s February 4, 2026 inquiry was particular; Respondent’s February 5, 2026 reply was general; and a generality cannot substitute for the particular confirmation Petitioner’s inquiry required. Respondent’s own unwillingness to confirm finality when squarely asked is itself evidence that the January 26 letter was not, even in Respondent’s own contemporaneous estimation, a response complete and final based on the facts as then known.
H. THE TEXTUAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN 10 CCR § 2695.5(a) AND (b)
10 CCR § 2695.5(a), governing responses to the Department of Insurance, explicitly requires that a complete response “includes copies of any documentation and claim files requested.” That phrase is conspicuously absent from § 2695.5(b), governing responses to a claimant. Respondent has treated this omission as license to discharge its obligation through the bare form of a letter, without any substantive investigative disclosure. This reading fails on the plain text of subsection (b) itself, which imposes its own independent, non-discretionary standard: a “complete response based on the facts as then known by the licensee.” A response cannot be “based on the facts as then known” where, as established in Section I below, Respondent’s own subsequent conduct and its affiliate’s certified public filing confirm those facts remained fluid, unresolved, and in material respects contradicted by Respondent’s own records, months after the January 26 letter issued.
I. RESPONDENT’S POST-FILING CONDUCT CONFIRMS THE JANUARY 26 RESPONSE WAS NOT BASED ON FACTS AS THEN KNOWN
Respondent’s ministerial duties under 10 CCR §§ 2632.13(e) and 2695.5(b) matured, and were breached, when Respondent settled the underlying claims and issued its notices and response, months before this action was filed. Whether the Claim remains open today does not un-breach those earlier, completed failures to comply. While Respondent may characterize its reopening of the Claim as routine administrative maintenance, that characterization does not explain why confirming or denying its status took eighteen days and redirection to litigation counsel in the spring of 2026 (Exhibits BB, CC), nor why, as recently as July 21, 2026, the Claim remained open under a newly assigned representative from whom Petitioner has received no communication whatsoever (Exhibit FF). Under California Civil Code § 3512, one must not change purpose to the injury of another. Respondent’s litigation position rests on the premise that its determinations and responses were final and complete as of the facts then known, while Respondent’s own contemporaneous records and personnel, no later than eleven days after the April 13, 2026 date borne by Respondent’s Demurrer, established a Claim status inconsistent with that premise. The California Supreme Court has established that a mandate proceeding is not rendered moot by subsequent actions where a material portion of the requested relief remains unfulfilled, or where the public interest demands resolution. (Marin County Board of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson (1976) 16 Cal.3d 920, 929; Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541-542.) This Court retains jurisdiction to adjudicate this dispute.
J. THE CDI ADMISSION & NO PLAIN, SPEEDY, AND ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW
On January 5, 2026, Petitioner alerted the California Department of Insurance to the underlying claim by submitting a formal Consumer Insurance Fraud Reporting Form. (Exhibit S.) On April 15, 2026, the CDI Senior Insurance Compliance Officer issued a formal response (Exhibit AA) stating: “We are unable to resolve this particular dispute...the ultimate decision is left to a court of law…. Only a court of law has the authority to weigh the evidence and the merits of each party's position and arrive at a formal binding decision.” The State regulatory body tasked with overseeing insurance mandates has explicitly conceded it lacks the mechanism to compel Respondent’s compliance with the ministerial duties described herein. A civil action for damages would not compel performance of these duties and would not address the ongoing existence of an erroneous and adverse negligent operator point on Petitioner’s DMV record. California law explicitly recognizes a driver’s license as a vested, fundamental right (Berlinghieri v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1983) 33 Cal.3d 392), and Petitioner’s right to due process under Vehicle Code § 14101 in any hearing to contest a negligent operator point is unobtainable where Respondent has furnished Petitioner neither the reconsideration decision nor the complete response its ministerial duties required. This threat is not abstract. Petitioner is presently required to drive for an extended period with effectively no margin for error, one further minor incident away from a “negligent operator” license suspension. The erroneous determination has also produced a present, non-speculative increase of over $100 per month in Petitioner’s insurance premium since January 2026 — a concrete, recurring financial harm already sustained, not a prospective or conjectural one, and one a civil damages action, proceeding on its own timeline months or years from now, does nothing to stop from continuing to accrue. The erroneous determination has further functioned as an ongoing barrier to Petitioner’s professional opportunities and has measurably diminished Petitioner’s professional creative output since the Claim’s inception, harm no eventual damages award can retroactively restore. Omaha Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1266 confirms this Court may bypass the adequate remedy rule in a case involving an issue of public importance deserving an immediate answer, and the questions presented here — whether an insurer may settle a claim and report an adverse determination while its own notices and responses are contradicted by its own contemporaneous records — are of widespread interest to California auto insurance policyholders generally.
K. AVAILABLE WRIT RELIEF & THE DOCTRINE OF ABSURDITY
California law has long recognized that an entity reporting information to a government record-keeping system retains both the capacity and obligation to correct it once found erroneous. The Department of Justice’s maintenance of criminal history records provides an instructive analogy: under Penal Code §§ 11115, 13150, and 13151, the reporting entities — not the subject of the record, and not the reviewing court — bear primary responsibility for ensuring information is corrected when proven inaccurate. (See Penal Code § 11126.) Petitioner’s sought relief does not ask this Court to direct the DMV, a non-party, to take any action; it asks only that Respondent, having been compelled to perform the ministerial duties described herein, apply the results of that compelled performance to the records its own deficient notices and response affected.
Civil Code § 3517 provides that no one can take advantage of his own wrong. If Respondent’s own deficient notices and response produced the determinations now on Petitioner’s record, Respondent cannot invoke that same deficiency to argue the resulting entry is beyond correction. As set forth in Section D above, Respondent’s ministerial default under 10 CCR § 2632.13(e)(2) accrued no later than December 24, 2025, and independently no later than February 1, 2026; any subsequent or ongoing adverse reporting to the DMV rests upon an uncorrected statutory violation regardless of which date this Court finds controlling.
The Doctrine of Absurdity forbids an interpretation of law that produces an absurd, unreasonable, or unjust result. (Times Mirror Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1325, 1334; California School Employees Assn. v. Governing Board (1994) 8 Cal.4th 333, 340; People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 15.) An interpretation of 10 CCR § 2632.13(e) under which an insurer may settle the very claims a notice describes before the insured can reasonably receive that notice, while facing no obligation to ever provide the written reconsideration decision the regulation requires, would render the regulation’s central protection meaningless in precisely the circumstance it exists to address. Likewise, an interpretation of 10 CCR § 2695.5(b) under which a response need only be facially complete, regardless of whether the licensee’s own contemporaneous records contradict it, renders that standard meaningless where it matters most. This Court should not tolerate either interpretation.
CONCLUSION
The result here is compelled by the plain text of 10 CCR §§ 2632.13(e) and 2695.5(b); by the maxims of jurisprudence codified in Civil Code §§ 3512, 3517, 3523, 3528, 3532, 3535, and 3541; and by the doctrines against surplusage and absurdity this Court has long applied to prevent statutory text from being rendered meaningless or its purpose defeated.
Respondent settled the underlying claims before Petitioner could reasonably receive the notices required by law, never furnished the written reconsideration decision the law required, and furnished a response this Court has already found to be complete in form but which, examined under the facts now available through Exhibit GG and Respondent’s own internal admissions, was not based on the facts as then known.
For all the reasons set forth above, and because Petitioner seeks to vindicate a clear, present beneficial right to compliance, and possesses no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to correct an erroneous mark on the public record underlying Petitioner’s vested right to a driver’s license, equity requires that judicial intervention step in to prevent a substantial injury. Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court overrule any demurrer to this Second Amended Petition, grant the Petition, and issue a Peremptory Writ of Mandate directing Respondent to perform its mandatory duties as set forth in the Prayer for Relief above.
For every wrong there is a remedy. Petitioner submits that this Court is that remedy.
DECLARATION OF JOHN DE HERRERA
I, John De Herrera, declare as follows: I am the Petitioner in the above-entitled action. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein and, if called as a witness, I could and would testify competently thereto.
Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the three written communications mailed together by Respondent on October 22, 2025, comprising the fault determination notice, the Claims Service Representative assignment/fraud warning notice, and the 51%-fault determination notice.
Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of Petitioner’s cellular call log documenting a 30-minute call with Respondent’s agent on November 24, 2025.
Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct screenshot of a text message from Respondent’s agent dated November 26, 2025.
Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct screenshot of a text message from Respondent’s agent dated December 3, 2025.
Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a true and correct screenshot of a text message from Respondent’s agent dated December 5, 2025.
Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of Petitioner’s cellular call log documenting a 10-minute call with Respondent’s Supervisor No. 1 on December 8, 2025.
Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of Petitioner’s cellular call log documenting an 18-minute call with Respondent’s Supervisor No. 2 on December 8, 2025.
Attached hereto as Exhibit H is a true and correct copy of the photograph emailed by Respondent’s Unit Manager on December 9, 2025, showing the third party’s vehicle door and paint transfer.
Attached hereto as Exhibit I is a true and correct copy of Petitioner’s comparative photographs of the same door type, showing its contour.
Attached hereto as Exhibit J is a true and correct copy of Petitioner’s photograph re-enacting Petitioner’s vantage point at the mall overhang on the date of the incident.
Attached hereto as Exhibit K is a true and correct transcript/record of the voicemail left by Respondent’s initial agent on December 16, 2025.
Attached hereto as Exhibit L is a true and correct multi-page exhibit containing site photographs and a map showing the security camera locations and sight-lines described in Paragraph 12 of the Statement of Facts.
Attached hereto as Exhibit M is a true and correct screenshot of the text exchange with the property manager of Kanan Properties dated December 18, 2025.
Attached hereto as Exhibit N [1-2] is a true and correct copy of the email confirmations received from the mall business owners regarding the absence of any inquiry by Respondent.
Attached hereto as Exhibit O is a true and correct copy of the email from Respondent’s Unit Manager dated December 19, 2025.
Attached hereto as Exhibit P is a true and correct copy of Petitioner’s cellular call log documenting a 14-minute call with Respondent’s Unit Manager on December 26, 2025.
Attached hereto as Exhibit Q is a true and correct copy of the letter and disposition summary from Respondent’s Unit Manager dated December 26, 2025.
Attached hereto as Exhibit R [1-3] mailed request, certified delivery, and email to Respondent’s Unit Manager, regarding Petitioner’s certified mail request.
Attached hereto as Exhibit S is a true and correct copy of the Consumer Insurance Fraud Reporting confirmation issued by the California Department of Insurance, Case No. 8695364, dated January 5, 2026.
Attached hereto as Exhibit T is a true and correct copy of Petitioner’s second certified letter, addressed to Automobile Club of Southern California, and its delivery confirmation, dated January 9, 2026.
Attached hereto as Exhibit U is a true and correct copy of the email from the Senior Insurance Compliance Officer of the California Department of Insurance dated January 12, 2026, and follow-up emails.
Attached hereto as Exhibit V is a true and correct copy of Petitioner’s complete automobile insurance policy, No. CAA202768907, obtained January 13, 2026.
Attached hereto as Exhibit W is a true and correct copy of the two emails sent by Respondent’s Unit Manager on January 21, 2026.
Attached hereto as Exhibit X is a true and correct copy of the letter from Respondent’s Group Manager dated January 26, 2026.
Attached hereto as Exhibit Y is a true and correct copy of the email from Respondent’s Unit Manager dated February 5, 2026.
Attached hereto as Exhibit Z is a true and correct multi-page exhibit containing Petitioner’s professional and artistic credentials, acceptance letters, and work samples.
Attached hereto as Exhibit AA is a true and correct copy of the final written response from the Senior Insurance Compliance Officer of the California Department of Insurance dated April 15, 2026. Attached hereto as Exhibit BB (1-4) are true and correct copies of Petitioner’s call log and screenshots of Respondent’s claims portal reflecting the events described in Paragraph 29 of the Statement of Facts.
Attached hereto as Exhibit CC is a true and correct copy of the email exchange with Respondent’s Unit Manager regarding the status of the reopened Claim, dated April 27 through May 15, 2026. Attached hereto as Exhibit DD is a true and correct copy of Petitioner’s Department of Motor Vehicles driver record reflecting Financial Responsibility Case No. 25-14-24873.
Attached hereto as Exhibit EE (1-2) are true and correct copies of Petitioner’s certified Financial Responsibility Information Request (Form SR-19C) mailed to the Department of Motor Vehicles, and a screenshot documenting Petitioner’s July 17, 2026 telephone call with the Department’s Financial Responsibility Unit.
Attached hereto as Exhibit FF is a true and correct screenshot of Respondent’s claims portal, taken July 21, 2026, reflecting a newly assigned Claims Service Representative.
Attached hereto as Exhibit GG is a true and correct certified copy of the Report of Traffic Accident Occurring in California (Form SR-1) associated with this incident, certified December 16, 2025. Attached hereto as Exhibit KK is a true and correct copy of the email from Respondent’s Unit Manager dated January 5, 2026.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed this ___ day of September, 2026, at Agoura Hills, California.
_________________________
John De Herrera, Petitioner in Pro Per
MASTER EXHIBIT INDEX
A — Three written communications mailed together, October 22, 2025: fault determination notice, Claims Service Representative assignment/fraud warning notice, and 51%-fault determination notice.
B — Petitioner’s cellular call log, November 24, 2025, 30-minute call with Respondent’s agent.
C — Text message from Respondent’s agent, November 26, 2025 (“Supervisor out of office until Dec 1”).
D — Text message from Respondent’s agent, December 3, 2025 (Supervisor notified).
E — Text message from Respondent’s agent, December 5, 2025 (Supervisor return delayed to Dec 8).
F — Petitioner’s cellular call log, December 8, 2025, 10-minute call with Supervisor No. 1.
G — Petitioner’s cellular call log, December 8, 2025, 18-minute call with Supervisor No. 2.
H — Photo emailed by Unit Manager, December 9, 2025, showing third party’s door and paint transfer.
I — Petitioner’s comparative photos of same door type/contour.
J — Petitioner’s re-enactment photo from mall overhang vantage point.
K — Voicemail transcript/record from initial agent, December 16, 2025 (“going to close out the claim”).
L — Site/camera map: site photos, camera locations, and sight-lines (Cameras 1–2).
M — Text exchange with Kanan Properties property manager, December 18, 2025.
N [1-2] — Email confirmations from mall business owners re: no contact by Respondent.
O — Email from Unit Manager, December 19, 2025 (“reviewing your case”).
P — Petitioner’s cellular call log, December 26, 2025, 14-minute call with Unit Manager.
Q — Letter/disposition summary from Unit Manager, December 26, 2025.
R [1-3] — December 30, 2025, mailing of request, certified delivery, and follow-up email to Unit Manager.
S — CDI Consumer Insurance Fraud Reporting confirmation, Case No. 8695364, January 5, 2026.
T — Second certified letter (to ACSC) and delivery confirmation, January 9, 2026.
U — Email from CDI Senior Insurance Compliance Officer, January 12, 2026, and follow-up emails.
V — Petitioner’s complete auto policy, CAA 202768907, obtained January 13, 2026.
W — Two emails from Unit Manager, January 21, 2026 (“not received” / “now located”).
X — Letter from Respondent’s Group Manager, January 26, 2026.
Y — Email from Unit Manager, February 5, 2026 (“issued our response”).
Z — Petitioner’s professional/artistic credentials, acceptances, and work samples (multi-page).
AA — CDI Senior Compliance Officer’s final response, April 15, 2026.
BB [1–4] — Call log and claims-portal screenshots, April 24–27, 2026 (closed status, open status, inaccessible link).
CC — Email exchange with Unit Manager re: reopened Claim status, April 27–May 15, 2026.
DD — Petitioner’s DMV driver record, FR Case No. 25-14-24873.
EE [1–2] — Certified SR-19C mailing to DMV and screenshot of DMV Financial Responsibility Unit call, July 17, 2026.
FF — Claims portal screenshot, July 21, 2026, showing newly assigned representative.
GG — Certified SR-1 report, certified December 16, 2025, obtained by Petitioner in 2026.
KK — Email from Unit Manager, January 5, 2026 (“we will await your communication”). — tab sits after GG per alphabetical convention, though cited earlier in the proceeding.
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