Mailed today

 Here is Opposition to Demurrer, an intense amount of work, but think I nailed it; down to Stanley Mosk Monday or Tuesday to file.

TO THE COURT, RESPONDENT, AND ITS ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

    John De Herrera (Petitioner) opposes the Demurrer of the Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (Respondent) to the Verified Second Amended Petition (SAP), regarding Claim No. 017439398 (Claim), set for hearing January 14, 2027, at 1:30 p.m.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION……….4

II. THE STANDARD……….4

III. FACTS AS PLEADED……….5

IV. THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION STATES A CLAIM UNDER § 2632.13(e)……….7

     A. Bodily Injury Is the Predicate Respondent Itself Relies On……….7

     B. No Notice Ever Stated the Basis of the Bodily-Injury Determination……….8

     C. Petitioner Requested Reconsideration……….9

     D. No Written Decision Has Issued……….10

     E. The Parked-Vehicle Presumption Is Beside the Point……….10

V. THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION STATES A CLAIM UNDER § 2695.5(b)……….10

     A. Petitioner Is a First Party Claimant……….10

     B. The Response Was Late……….12

     C. The Response Was Not Based on the Facts Then Known……….13

VI. REMAINING ARGUMENTS……….13

VII. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, LEAVE TO AMEND SHOULD BE GRANTED……….14

VIII. CONCLUSION……….14

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311 ……….5

California Assn. for Health Services at Home v. State Dept. of Health Services (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 696 ……….5

Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432 ……….5

Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335 ……….14

Martinez v. City of Clovis (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 193 ……….4

McMahon v. Craig (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1502 ……….9

PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680 ……….13

Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074 ……….14

Statutes:

Civil Code § 2332 ……….13

Civil Code § 3517 ……….12

Code of Civil Procedure § 580, subd. (a) ……….13

Code of Civil Procedure § 1085 ……….5

Code of Civil Procedure § 1858 ……….11

Regulations:

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, § 2632.13 ……….4, 7, 8, 10, 14

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, § 2632.13.1 ……….8

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, § 2695.2 ……….10, 11, 12, 14

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, § 2695.5 ……….4, 10, 11, 12, 13

Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, § 2695.7 ……….12

Other Authorities:

Cal. Dept. of Insurance, Bulletin 2002-06 (Nov. 1, 2002) ……….7

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I. INTRODUCTION

    Respondent’s Demurrer repeatedly asks this Court to accept Respondent’s characterization of the record in place of facts pleaded: that Petitioner only “believed” no one else was in the vehicle (Dem. 7), that Respondent “has already addressed Petitioner’s concerns” (Dem. 12), and that Petitioner’s communications were “different and distinct” from what the regulation addresses (Dem. 11). These and others are contentions about what the evidence means, not defects appearing on the face of the pleading.

    The SAP pleads two causes of action under two regulations, each protecting Petitioner in a different capacity. 10 CCR § 2632.13(e) runs to “the insured”; 10 CCR § 2695.5(b) runs to a “claimant.” Each duty has its own trigger and its own clock, and Respondent’s claimant argument (Dem. 13–14) is directed only to the second. Petitioner does not ask this Court to review Respondent’s investigative judgment, which the Court’s June 16, 2026 ruling held discretionary. Petitioner asks this Court to compel specific acts the regulations require: a notice specifying the basis of a bodily-injury determination and a written reconsideration decision under § 2632.13(e)(1) and (e)(2), and a response based on the facts then known under § 2695.5(b).

II. THE STANDARD

    Petitioner accepts the standard Respondent states: a demurrer admits all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions or conclusions of law. (Dem. 8, quoting Martinez v. City of Clovis (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 193, 253.) The Court gives the pleading a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) Where the petition and its exhibits support the reading Petitioner alleges, Respondent’s competing reading is an argument for the merits, not a ground for demurrer. A verified allegation of what Petitioner saw through a windshield is an allegation of fact, and the Demurrer admits it. (SAP ¶¶ 1, 51; Dem. 7.)

    Mandamus lies to compel performance of an act the law specially enjoins, where the petitioner has a clear, present, and beneficial right to its performance. (CCP § 1085; California Assn. for Health Services at Home v. State Dept. of Health Services (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 696, 704.) Respondent notes that mandamus may not compel a duty to be performed “in a particular manner.” (Dem. 9.) Nonetheless, mandamus may issue “to compel an official both to exercise his discretion (if he is required by law to do so) and to exercise it under a proper interpretation of the applicable law.” (Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 442.)

    Each duty at issue here is defined by a regulation: a notice with specified content, a written decision stating reasons within 30 days of a request, and a complete response based on the facts then known within 15 days. Petitioner does not ask this Court to dictate the result of Respondent’s reconsideration or response; Respondent remains free to reach whatever conclusion the facts support.

III. FACTS AS PLEADED

    The Incident: October 14, 2025, while backing out of a parking space, Petitioner’s vehicle made slight contact with the passenger door of a vehicle whose front wheel sat on the line between spaces. While exchanging information directly in front of that vehicle, Petitioner looked through its untinted windshield and saw no other occupant. (SAP ¶¶ 1, 51.)

    The Initial Call: October 15, Respondent’s agent told Petitioner that the other driver was claiming bodily injury for themself and a four-year-old minor. Petitioner disputed both claims and was told an investigation would commence and Petitioner would be updated. (SAP ¶ 2.)

    The Notices: October 22, Respondent mailed three notices in one envelope. (SAP ¶ 4; Exhibit A.) One stated “an injury claim has been presented under the policy,” that the Claim “has been open on the basis of our investigation, which included a statement from the injured party,” and that Petitioner could request reconsideration “within 30 days of receipt of this notice.” Another stated that Petitioner was “at least 51%” the legal cause of the accident, that the determination “may be used for rating and underwriting purposes if the accident resulted in bodily injury,” and promised: “We will notify you separately of the basis of any determination that the accident resulted in bodily injury or death.” It invited Petitioner to “contact us so we may review your reasons for seeking reconsideration.” (Exhibit A.) Petitioner did not see these notices until after November 24. (SAP ¶ 4.)

    The Investigation and Settlement: By Respondent’s own account, it took a recorded statement on October 24, obtained an estimate on October 30, resolved the claims on November 20, and settled them on November 21, on the thirtieth day after the notices were mailed. (SAP ¶¶ 23, 39; Exhibit X.)

    The November 24 Call: Having received no update, Petitioner called on November 24 and learned that the Claim had been settled and that Petitioner would receive a negligent operator point reflecting an at-fault bodily-injury determination. During this thirty-minute call Petitioner immediately and vigorously disputed the factual validity of the settlement, and the agent agreed to escalate the dispute to a supervisor. (SAP ¶ 5.)

    Escalation: After repeated follow-ups (SAP ¶¶ 6–8; Exhibits C–E), Petitioner spoke with two supervisors on December 8 and began corresponding with Respondent’s Unit Manager on December 9. (SAP ¶¶ 9–10.) On December 19, the Unit Manager wrote, “I am currently reviewing your case.” (SAP ¶ 14; Exhibit O.) Then, on December 26 the Unit Manager wrote of having “reviewed your concerns regarding the claim,” that the accident “was relatively minor,” and that Respondent had “the right to settle the claim as we see appropriate.” (SAP ¶ 15; Exhibit Q.)

    Exhibit GG: An SR-1 report for this accident, certified December 16, 2025 by “ACSC,” identifies the “Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club of Southern California” as Petitioner’s insurer and lists Petitioner’s policy number. It reports “1” vehicle, leaves the Other Party’s Information section blank, and lists the minor as a “Bicyclist.” (SAP ¶ 33; Exhibit GG.)

    The Request for a Complete Response: Petitioner’s certified letter of December 30, 2025 was delivered January 2, 2026. (SAP ¶¶ 16, 18.) On January 5 the Unit Manager wrote: “We will await your communication.” (SAP ¶ 17; Exhibit KK.) On January 21 the Unit Manager wrote that the letter had not been received, and seven minutes later, “I have now located your formal request.” (SAP ¶ 22; Exhibit W.) Respondent’s Group Manager responded by letter dated January 26. (SAP ¶ 23; Exhibit X.)

IV. THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION STATES A CLAIM UNDER § 2632.13(e)

    Subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2) speak throughout of “the insured.” Subdivision (e)(1) provides: “The insurer shall provide written notice to the insured of the result of such investigation, including any determination that the driver was principally at-fault. The notice shall specify the basis of any determination that a driver was principally at-fault, including the basis of any determination that the accident resulted in bodily injury or death. The notice shall advise the insured of the right to reconsideration of the determination of fault, as set forth in Subsection (e)(2).” (10 CCR § 2632.13(e)(1); see Dem. 9.) Under subdivision (e)(2), the insured may request reconsideration within 30 days of receipt of that notice, and the insurer must then “provide the insured with a written decision, stating the reasons for its decision upon reconsideration.” (Dem. 10.) Petitioner is the named insured (SAP ¶ 45), and the Demurrer does not dispute that these duties run to Petitioner. The Insurance Commissioner’s 2002 Bulletin is consistent: “At fault determination notifications that simply state that an investigation was conducted and the insured has been determined to be more than 51 percent at-fault do not satisfy the requirements of Section 2632.13.” (Cal. Dept. of Insurance, Bulletin 2002-06 (Nov. 1, 2002).) Petitioner cites it only as consistent with the current text’s requirement that the notice “specify the basis” of the determination.

    A. Bodily Injury Is the Predicate Respondent Itself Relies On

    A principally-at-fault determination requires that “the accident resulted in bodily injury or death or, for an accident that resulted only in damage to property, the total loss or damage caused by the accident exceeded $1000.” (10 CCR § 2632.13(b).) Respondent’s own fault notice recites the same threshold. (Exhibit A.) Respondent argues that Petitioner disputed only “that a minor child was in the vehicle and that the third parties were injured,” which it calls “different and distinct” from the fault determination. (Dem. 11.) But Respondent also insists that “the bodily injury determination still remains.” (Dem. 12.) If bodily injury supports the determination, then disputing the injury is disputing the basis of the determination, what subdivision (e)(1) requires Respondent to specify.

    Nor does the $2,259.44 door estimate (SAP ¶ 23) make the bodily-injury determination immaterial. Subdivision (e)(1) separately requires the notice to specify “the basis of any determination that the accident resulted in bodily injury or death,” whether or not property damage alone could support a finding of fault. The distinction carries its own consequence: a principally-at-fault accident resulting only in property damage is assigned one violation point, while one resulting in bodily injury makes the driver ineligible for a Good Driver Discount policy. (10 CCR § 2632.13.1, subd. (b)(3)(A), (B).) Respondent told Petitioner the determination was an at-fault bodily-injury determination. (SAP ¶ 5.)

    B. No Notice Ever Stated the Basis of the Bodily-Injury Determination 

    Respondent announced its fault determination on October 22, the date of the notices, before the recorded statement of October 24, the estimate of October 30, or any decision about injury. (Exhibits A, X.) The fault notice stated its basis only as “the investigation” and the general rule that a driver may not back into a parked vehicle, and expressly deferred the injury basis: “We will notify you separately of the basis of any determination that the accident resulted in bodily injury or death.” (Exhibit A.) The injury notice stated only that a claim “has been presented” and “has been open” on the basis of an investigation that included a statement from the injured party, which explains why a claim was opened, not the basis of any determination that injury resulted. As the SAP alleges, the only stated basis was the claimant’s own statement. (SAP ¶ 38.) Respondent then resolved the injury claims November 20, settled them November 21 (Exhibit X), and advised Petitioner on November 24 that Petitioner would receive a negligent operator point reflecting an at-fault bodily-injury determination (SAP ¶ 5). SAP ¶ 38 alleges Respondent purported to discharge its (e)(1) duty through Exhibit A; the Demurrer identifies no other notice besides Exhibits Q and X.

    Respondent now points to Exhibit Q as “articulating the outcome of Respondent’s investigation and the basis thereof” and to Exhibit X as “describing the investigation and determination of fault.” (Dem. 12.) Those letters are not the notice subdivision (e)(1) requires. Neither advises Petitioner of a right to reconsideration of the determination of fault, which subdivision (e)(1) makes a required element of the notice. Exhibit Q describes no basis for the minor’s claimed injury beyond the claimant’s own account, and Exhibit X adds only that the minor “stayed home for the day and missed her normal activities due to discomfort,” which describes the claimed loss but does not state a basis for finding the incident caused bodily injury. If those later letters are where the basis first appears, the October 22 notices did not contain it. Because the 30-day reconsideration period runs from “receipt by the insured of a written notice required by Subsection (e)(1)” (Dem. 10, quoting § 2632.13(e)(2)), a notice that does not meet subdivision (e)(1) does not start that clock.

    

    C. Petitioner Requested Reconsideration

    Respondent argues Petitioner “failed to request reconsideration, at any point.” (Dem. 6.) Even if the October 22 notices had started the clock, the regulation prescribes no form of words, and Respondent’s own notice asked only that Petitioner “contact us so we may review your reasons for seeking reconsideration.” (Exhibit A.) Petitioner contacted Respondent on November 24 and disputed the factual validity of the settlement for thirty minutes. (SAP ¶ 5.) Petitioner renewed the dispute on December 8 with two supervisors, on December 9 with the Unit Manager, and on December 26 in a call with the Unit Manager, which Exhibit Q memorializes. (SAP ¶¶ 9–10, 15.) The SAP alleges Petitioner did not retrieve the October 22 notices or learn their contents until after November 24. (SAP ¶ 4.) Subdivision (e)(2) runs the insured’s thirty days from “receipt by the insured,” not from the date on the notices or their mailing. Read in Petitioner’s favor, the December 8 and December 9 contacts fell within that period even if those notices had satisfied subdivision (e)(1). The Unit Manager wrote, “I am currently reviewing your case” (Exhibit O), and later wrote of having “reviewed your concerns regarding the claim” (Exhibit Q). The Demurrer itself states Respondent had supervisors review “the claim and Petitioner’s requests” and “has already addressed Petitioner’s concerns.” (Dem. 12.) Respondent cannot have reviewed requests never made. At minimum, the inference these communications were requests for reconsideration is one this Court draws in Petitioner’s favor at this stage. (SAP ¶ 41; McMahon v. Craig (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1502, 1509.)

    Further, Respondent faults the SAP for citing no authority that settling within the reconsideration window voids the notice. (Dem. 11.) Petitioner does not ask this Court to set aside the settlement and does not need that holding. The timing matters for a narrower reason. Respondent settled on November 21, thirty days after mailing the notices. That was before an insured’s thirty days from receipt could have run, and before any written decision on a timely request could have issued. (SAP ¶¶ 39–40; Exhibit X.) When Petitioner learned of the determinations on November 24, Respondent had already acted on them. So Petitioner’s requests for review necessarily took the form of disputes over a completed settlement, and that is how the SAP pleads them. (SAP ¶¶ 5, 41.) Subdivision (e)(2) does not make the insurer’s duty depend on whether it has already paid the claim. Settling first does not excuse the written decision a request requires.

    

    D. No Written Decision Has Issued

    Neither Exhibit Q nor Exhibit X is the written decision subdivision (e)(2) requires. Exhibit Q defends the settlement under the policy’s settlement clause, stating “We have the right to settle the claim as we see appropriate,” and Exhibit X does not answer the grounds Petitioner had repeatedly raised. It attributes Petitioner’s failure to see the minor to tinted windows, but Petitioner looked through the untinted windshield (SAP ¶¶ 1, 51). On the implausibility of injury from the contact, Exhibit X offers a door-repair estimate, which says nothing about whether anyone was injured. (SAP ¶¶ 2, 9, 23.) Neither identifies itself as a decision upon reconsideration of the determination of fault, and Respondent’s statement that it “did not have proof that the minor was not in the vehicle” (Exhibit X) is not a stated reason the accident caused injury. Exhibit Q also predates Petitioner’s December 30 letter by four days, so it cannot be a decision on any request that letter made. Whether either letter functions as a decision under § 2632.13(e)(2) cannot be resolved against Petitioner on demurrer. (SAP ¶ 41.)

    E. The Parked-Vehicle Presumption Is Beside the Point

    Respondent argues that § 2632.13(c)(1) “presumes that Petitioner was at fault.” (Dem. 12.) It does not. It rebuttably presumes that the driver of a lawfully parked vehicle is not principally at fault. Nor does a presumption about a parked car supply § 2632.13(b)’s separate threshold of bodily injury or damage over $1,000, or excuse subdivision (e)’s notice and decision duties.

V. THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION STATES A CLAIM UNDER § 2695.5(b)

    A. Petitioner Is a First Party Claimant

    This Court’s June 16, 2026 ruling concluded, on the original petition’s allegations, that Petitioner was “not a claimant seeking recovery from IEAC as the insurer,” noting Petitioner “disavows seeking any compensation from IEAC through the claim.” It quoted the surety-bond clause of § 2695.2(c) “in pertinent part” and observed “it seems clear” from the plain language of §§ 2695.2(c) and 2695.5(b) that the “claimant” entitled to a complete response was “the other driver.” (Minute Order, June 16, 2026, at pp. 1–2.) The ruling did not address the first category of § 2695.2(c), “a first or third party claimant as defined in these regulations,” or the definition of “first party claimant” in § 2695.2(f), and invited Petitioner to allege “additional facts or a cognizable legal theory.” The SAP now pleads Petitioner is the named insured asserting rights under Petitioner’s policy. (SAP ¶ 45.)

    Section 2695.2(c) defines “claimant” as “a first or third party claimant as defined in these regulations, any person who asserts a right of recovery under a surety bond, an attorney,” and others. Each item in that list is an independent category, and a person need not assert a surety-bond right to qualify under the first. Respondent’s contention that the absence of a surety-bond claim “alone disqualifies Petitioner” (Dem. 14) does not engage this structure.

    Section 2695.2(f) provides: “‘First party claimant’ means any person asserting a right under an insurance policy as a named insured, other insured or beneficiary under the terms of that insurance policy, and including any person seeking recovery of uninsured motorist benefits.” First party status turns on the right a person asserts, not on whether the person seeks payment. Where the drafters meant benefits, they said so in the same sentence. Petitioner’s disavowal of compensation therefore does not take Petitioner outside the definition. Respondent’s answer (Dem. 14), that Petitioner is not “asserting a right or making a claim for first party benefits under the terms of the insurance policy,” pairs “a right” with “a claim for first party benefits,” but § 2695.2(f) asks only whether the person asserts “a right under an insurance policy.”

    The other driver is a third party claimant, a person “asserting a claim against any person or the interests insured under an insurance policy.” (§ 2695.2(x); Dem. 14.) But nothing in § 2695.2(c) limits “claimant” to the person who presented the claim. One liability claim can involve two claimants: a third party claimant who seeks payment, and a first party claimant, the named insured who asserts rights under the policy the claim is made against. Section 2695.5(b) applies to “any communication from a claimant, regarding a claim.” It is not limited to communications from the person who submitted the claim. Reading “claimant” to mean only that person would insert a limit the regulation does not contain, which Code of Civil Procedure § 1858 forbids. And even if “under the terms of that insurance policy” also modified “named insured,” Petitioner asserts rights under the terms of the policy, as shown below.

    Petitioner is the named insured asserting rights under Petitioner’s policy, including Respondent’s promise to pay damages for which Petitioner is “legally liable” (Exhibit V; see Exhibit Q). Petitioner’s dispute here is whether Respondent paid, on Petitioner’s behalf and against Petitioner’s record, damages for which Petitioner was not legally liable. Respondent itself framed that dispute under the policy and the Fair Claims Settlement Practices Regulations: Exhibit Q states “I refer you to the policy,” declares “Our duty as your insurer is to protect you from liability in this case,” and closes with a notice, citing 10 CCR § 2695.7(b)(3), that if Petitioner believes “all or part of the claim has been wrongfully denied or rejected,” Petitioner may have the matter reviewed by the Department of Insurance; Exhibit X likewise states “Our duty as your insurer is to investigate claims to pay what is legally owed.” (Exhibits Q, X.)

    Respondent confuses the right that confers status with the right being enforced. Section 2695.2(f) asks whether the person asserts a right under the policy; once that status exists, the right to a complete response comes from § 2695.5(b), not from policy text. Respondent’s point that there is “no right to a complete response . . . under the terms of Petitioner’s insurance policy” (Dem. 14) would defeat every first party claimant, because no policy confers that right; the regulation does.

    B. The Response Was Late

    Section 2695.5(b) requires a response within fifteen calendar days “after receipt” of the communication. Petitioner’s letter was delivered January 2. (SAP ¶¶ 16, 18.) On January 5 the Unit Manager wrote, “We will await your communication.” On January 6 Petitioner sent proof of delivery, and no reply followed. On January 21 the Unit Manager wrote that the letter had not been received, then seven minutes later, “I have now located your formal request.” (SAP ¶¶ 17–18, 22, 47; Exhibits KK, W.) Respondent measures from January 21. (Dem. 15.) Locating a misplaced letter is not receiving it. Respondent’s reference to an inquiry “on or around January 9” (Dem. 13) concerns Petitioner’s second letter; the SAP pleads the first. (SAP ¶¶ 16, 19, 47.) The January 26 letter issued 24 days after delivery, and it would be late measured from any receipt on or before January 10.

    Nor does the final sentence of § 2695.5(b), which Respondent quotes (Dem. 13:10–11), bar relief. It provides that the subsection “shall not apply to require communication with a claimant subsequent to receipt by the licensee of a notice of legal action by that claimant.” Petitioner’s letter was delivered January 2, 2026; a response was due by January 17, 2026; and this action was filed March 10, 2026. (SAP ¶¶ 18, 26.) Both the duty and Respondent’s breach of it preceded any notice of legal action. The exception relieves a licensee of answering communications that follow notice of legal action; it does not reach a communication received, and a duty already owed, before that notice. A writ compelling performance enforces an obligation that matured in January, and Respondent may not take advantage of its own default to escape it. (Civ. Code, § 3517.)   

    C. The Response Was Not Based on the Facts Then Known

    The June 16 ruling held the January 26 letter was “complete” even if “unsatisfactory or untrue.” (Minute Order, June 16, 2026, at p. 2.) The SAP does not relitigate that holding. It pleads the separate requirement that the response be “based on the facts as then known by the licensee,” which Respondent acknowledges. (Dem. 15.) Exhibit X said the estimate “indicates the impact had force,” while Respondent’s Unit Manager had written a month earlier that the accident “was relatively minor.” (SAP ¶¶ 15, 23.) Exhibits Q and X both place the minor in the other vehicle, yet, ten days before Exhibit Q and forty-one days before Exhibit X, an SR-1 form certified by Respondent’s affiliate ACSC reported a single vehicle, left the other party blank, and listed the minor as a “Bicyclist.” (SAP ¶¶ 33, 52–53; Exhibit GG.) Respondent replies it “did not allege it based its January 26th response on the SR-1 Form.” (Dem. 15.) That is the point: the regulation looks to the facts known to the licensee, not the facts it chose to rely on. The Demurrer does not deny that Respondent or its affiliate prepared the form; it describes the form as one “allegedly filled out by Respondent” and disputes only what one entry means. (Dem. 11–12.) Respondent’s knowledge includes what its agents knew (Civ. Code, § 2332), and whether ACSC acted for Respondent in preparing the report is a question of fact.

VI. REMAINING ARGUMENTS

    Respondent twice says Petitioner seeks to “bypass the proper channels.” (Dem. 9, 12.) The Department of Insurance reviewed this matter and responded in writing that it could not resolve the dispute and that only a court of law has the authority to weigh the evidence and arrive at a binding decision. (SAP ¶ 27; Exhibit AA.) Even if some requested relief exceeds what mandamus can order, this Court may compel the notice subdivision (e)(1) requires, the written decision subdivision (e)(2) requires, and a response based on the facts then known under § 2695.5(b); a demurrer does not lie to a portion of a cause of action. (PH II, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682.) That the Prayer does not separately itemize a compliant (e)(1) notice is no ground for demurrer: the SAP seeks that relief (SAP 1:25–28; SAP 20:11 [Prayer ¶ 6]), and in a contested case the Court may grant any relief consistent with the case made by the pleading and embraced within the issue. (Code Civ. Proc., § 580, subd. (a).) The Third Cause of Action is stayed under the June 16, 2026 order (SAP ¶ 57) and is not before the Court.

VII. IN THE ALTERNATIVE, LEAVE TO AMEND SHOULD BE GRANTED

    Respondent asks that leave be denied because this Court previously allowed amendment. (Dem. 6, 16.) But this is the first demurrer to test the theories the SAP pleads. Respondent did not demur to the First Amended Petition. (SAP p. 2.) The notice and reconsideration duties of § 2632.13(e)(1) and (e)(2) were not before this Court on June 16, the June 16 ruling did not address § 2695.2(f), and the Court renewed leave on August 20, 2026. If this Court finds either cause of action insufficiently pleaded, there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured, and Petitioner accepts the burden of showing how. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081; Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) Petitioner could allege: (1) the date and circumstances of Petitioner’s retrieval of the October 22 notices; (2) what was and was not said on the October 22 call (SAP ¶ 3); (3) that Respondent never sent the separate notice of the basis of its bodily-injury determination that Exhibit A promised, and has sent no notice that complies with § 2632.13(e)(1); (4) additional facts showing that Petitioner’s communications between November 24 and December 26, 2025 sought review of the fault and bodily-injury determinations; (5) the specific rights Petitioner asserts under policy CAA202768907, including the insuring agreement’s limitation of payment to damages for which the insured is legally liable (Exhibit V; see Exhibit Q); (6) on information and belief, Respondent’s relationship with ACSC and ACSC’s role in this Claim, including that Respondent acts through its attorney-in-fact, ACSC Management Services, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of ACSC; that ACSC is the ultimate controlling entity of the holding-company system that includes Respondent; that Exhibit GG identifies Respondent as Petitioner’s insurer by Petitioner’s policy number, CAA202768907; and that ACSC filed Exhibit GG for this accident (SAP ¶ 31); (7) an express prayer compelling a notice that complies with § 2632.13(e)(1), relief the SAP’s Introduction already seeks (SAP 1:25–28); and (8) corrected descriptions of Exhibit GG’s damage entries, of the SAP’s internal cross-references, and of the exhibit containing the “stayed home” quotation.

VIII. CONCLUSION

    Respondent settled the Claim before the 30-day reconsideration period could have run from Petitioner’s receipt of its notices, and promised a separate notice of the basis of its bodily-injury determination and never sent it. Its January 26 response conflicts with a certified report filed under Petitioner’s policy number.

    Petitioner does not ask this Court to dictate the outcome of Respondent’s reconsideration or response; Respondent remains free to reach whatever conclusion the facts support.

    What Petitioner seeks is modest: the separate notice promised, a written decision on reconsideration, and a response based on the facts then known. Petitioner has sought them since November 2025. Meanwhile, the bodily-injury determination remains on Petitioner’s DMV record, with an ongoing premium increase and risk to Petitioner’s license. (SAP ¶¶ 30, 42.)

    Petitioner appreciates this Court’s patience with a self-represented litigant and has worked to honor it. Because each cause of action is pleaded with the exhibits that support it, and the questions that remain are discrete, resolving the pleading now would spare this Court and the parties another round of pleading. Petitioner respectfully asks this Court to overrule the Demurrer in its entirety so this proceeding may reach the merits. In the alternative, Petitioner requests leave to amend.

    November      , 2026, at Agoura Hills, California

    Respectfully submitted,   

    ___________________

    JOHN DE HERRERA

    Petitioner in Pro Per

The footnote, at end of Introduction and does not read here:  Petitioner notes three matters in the SAP and would correct each in any amended pleading. First, the internal cross-references in ¶ 33 (to ¶¶ 24 and 32), ¶ 47 (to ¶ 17), ¶ 48 (to ¶ 34), and ¶ 54 (to ¶¶ 29–30) should read ¶¶ 23 and 31, ¶ 18, ¶ 33, and ¶¶ 28–29, respectively; likewise, the Memorandum’s reference to ¶ 17 in Section D should read ¶ 18, and the Declaration’s reference to ¶ 29 for Exhibit BB should read ¶ 28. Second, Petitioner acknowledges (Dem. 11–12) that the “Damages over $1,000” entries on Exhibit GG do not report damage to the other vehicle, and neither ¶¶ 33(a), 37, and 48 nor the Memorandum should be read to characterize those entries otherwise. The SAP’s remaining allegations concerning Exhibit GG, including that it reports one vehicle and lists the minor as a “Bicyclist,” are unaffected. Third, ¶¶ 15 and 49 and Section G.2 of the Memorandum attribute the statement that the minor “stayed home for the day and missed her normal activities due to discomfort” to Exhibit Q; it appears in Exhibit X. These corrections do not change the duties pleaded or the exhibits relied upon.