MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
I. INTRODUCTION
Petitioner has brought this Petition seeking to have this Court compel IEAC to issue a
“complete response” pursuant to 10 CCR § 2695.5(b). This action arises out of an automobile
accident in which Petitioner was determined to be at fault. At the time the automobile accident
occurred, IEAC provided automobile insurance for Petitioner.
On October 14, 2025, Petitioner hit another vehicle parked next to him while reversing
out of a parking space. Pet. ¶ 1. The driver of the other vehicle was present in the vehicle at the
time the accident occurred, and Petitioner exchanged information with him. Id. The following
day, Petitioner was informed by IEAC that the driver of the other vehicle was claiming that he
and his four-year old daughter, who was also present in the vehicle at the time of the accident,
were injured in the accident. Id. ¶ 2. Thereafter, IEAC conducted an internal investigation to
determine the accuracy of these claims and decided to settle the bodily injury claims with the
driver of the other vehicle and his minor daughter. Id. ¶ 5. As a result of this, Petitioner received
two points on his Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) record. Id. Petitioner does not dispute
that he was at fault for the accident, rather, Petitioner disputes that the four-year old child was
present in the other vehicle at the time of the accident. Further, Petitioner disputes that the other
driver and his minor daughter were injured in the accident. Petitioner now seeks to obtain the
full claim file related to this automobile accident from IEAC. Petitioner contends that without
the full claim file, he will be “empty-handed” at an administrative hearing to contest the
negligent operator points added to his DMV record.
As set forth in greater detail below, the Petition for Writ of Mandate and Causes of
Action therein fail for multiple reasons. First, Petitioner has not established that the
circumstances alleged herein entitle him to relief via a Petition for Writ of Mandate, which is an
extraordinary remedy. The entire Petition for Writ of Mandate is therefore subject to attack by a
general demurrer.
Second, Petitioner’s First Cause of Action in the Petition alleges that IEAC Violated
Ministerial Duties. Petitioner has not set forth any facts that establish IEAC violated a5
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ministerial duty, therefore this Cause of Action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
Finally, Petitioner’s Second Cause of Action in the Petition alleges that IEAC Breached
the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. Petitioner has not alleged any facts demonstrating
IEAC breached this implied covenant, therefore Petitioner’s Second Cause of Action fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Accordingly, this court should sustain this demurrer without leave to amend.
II. RELEVANT ALLEGATIONS
As set forth above, Petitioner has concerns regarding whether the driver of the other
vehicle or his four-year old daughter sustained bodily injuries as a result of the accident.
Moreover, Petitioner asserts that the other driver’s four-year old daughter was not present in the
vehicle at the time of the accident. Petitioner alleges that he needs the entire claim file related to
this accident from IEAC to contest the points added to his DMV record because he asserts the
added points may preclude him from teaching abroad. As a result, Petitioner alleges that a
petition for writ of mandate is the only remedy available to him at this time. He alleges causes of
action against IEAC for violation of ministerial duties and breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
III. LEGAL ARGUMENT
A. Standard on Demurrer
“A respondent may test the legal sufficiency of a petition for writ of mandate by
demurrer.” Water Audit California v. Merced Irrigation Dist. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1147,
1180. “The rules governing demurrers to civil complaints also apply to mandamus actions.” Id.
A demurrer may be used to attack a complaint if the pleading fails to state sufficient facts
to constitute a cause of action. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e).
“The demurrer is treated as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but does not
admit the truth of the contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.” Martinez v. City of Clovis
(2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 193, 253. A demurrer will be properly sustained when “ ‘[t]he pleading6
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does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.’ ” Thomas v. Regents of University
of California (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 587, 605.
B. The Petition for Writ of Mandate is Improper
Petitioner has filed this Petition for Writ of Mandate seeking to compel IEAC to issue a
complete response. This Petition for Writ of Mandate is not properly before this Court for the
reasons set forth below.
“Code of Civil Procedure § 1085, providing for [traditional] writs of mandate, is
available to compel public agencies to perform acts required by law. To obtain relief, a
petitioner must demonstrate (1) no ‘plain, speedy, and adequate’ alternative remedy exists; (2) ‘a
clear, present, ... ministerial duty on the part of the respondent’; and (3) a correlative ‘clear,
present, and beneficial right in the petitioner to the performance of that duty.’” Siskiyou Hospital,
Inc. v. County of Siskiyou (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 14, 36-37. Code Civ. Proc. § 1085. (internal
cit. omit.).
“Extraordinary writ review by way of a petition for writ of mandate is ordinarily
available only if the petitioner has no adequate legal remedy.” California Privacy Protection
Agency v. Superior Court (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 705, 719. “[I]t has long been established as a
general rule that the writ will not be issued if another such remedy [is] available to the
petitioner.” CV Amalgamated LLC v. City of Chula Vista (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 265, 286. “The
burden, of course, is on the petitioner to show that he did not have such a remedy.” Flores v.
Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 199, 205.
Petitioner has not demonstrated that no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy exists. The
Petition alleges, “Petitioner should not be forced to endure a multi-year civil lawsuit to exercise a
right the law states Petitioner is entitled to today.” Pet. p. 2. The Petition further states “... a
lawsuit and full trial would be a waste of judicial resources.” Id. Thus, Petitioner evidently
admits that he seeks this writ because he believes filing a traditional Complaint will result in a
“multi-year” lawsuit. Petitioner's perception that a lawsuit will take several years does not
constitute an extraordinary circumstance.
Further, Petitioner alleges in his Petition and Complaint that IEAC violated several7
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ministerial duties. The primary point of contention in the Petition appears to be the fact that
IEAC did not produce its entire claim file related to Petitioner’s automobile accident when
Petitioner requested. In alleging IEAC violated a ministerial duty by failing to produce the claim
file, Petitioner relies on 10 CCR § 2695.5(b). This code section states:
“Upon receiving any communication from a claimant, regarding a claim, that reasonably
suggests that a response is expected, every licensee shall immediately, but in no event
more than fifteen (15) calendar days after receipt of that communication, furnish the
claimant with a complete response based on the facts as then known by the licensee.
California courts have held that, “[a] duty is ministerial when it is the doing of a thing
unqualifiedly required.” Galzinski v. Somers (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1170. This code
section does not unqualifiedly require a licensee to produce a claim file as Petitioner contends.
This code section does not dictate the manner the response should be made, or the information
included in the response. Rather, the only requirement is that the response must be complete,
based on facts then known, and made within the specified time period. Thus, Petitioner cannot
validly assert that IEAC violated an alleged ministerial duty by failing to produce the claim file.
Furthermore, as set forth in greater detail below, the exhibits attached to the Petition reveal that
IEAC did provide Petitioner with a complete response within the specified timeframe in
accordance with 10 CCR § 2695.5(b).
Petitioner also contends that IEAC violated its alleged ministerial duty to conduct a
thorough and fair investigation under 10 CCR § 2695.7(d). As discussed in greater detail below,
Petitioner has not established that IEAC failed to conduct a thorough and fair investigation as is
required under that code. Petitioner’s allegations of unfairness are based on Petitioner’s opinion
of what is fair and thorough, which is not the standard IEAC is held to under the code. Thus,
Petitioner cannot validly assert that IEAC violated an alleged ministerial duty to conduct a
thorough and fair investigation under 10 CCR § 2695.7(d).
Finally, “‘[t]he requirement that a petitioner be “beneficially interested” has been
generally interpreted to mean that one may obtain the writ only if the person has some special
interest to be served or some particular right to be preserved or protected over and above the
interest held in common with the public at large.’” Loeber v. Lakeside Joint School Dist. (2024)8
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103 Cal.App.5th 552, 567-568. “The beneficial interest standard “is equivalent to the federal
‘injury in fact’ test, which requires a party to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it
has suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest that is “(a) concrete and particularized,
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”’” Id. at 568. “Thus, ‘the writ must
be denied if the petitioner will gain no direct benefit from its issuance and suffer no direct
detriment if it is denied.’” Id.
Petitioner has asserted that without the “complete response” that he desires from IEAC,
he will be “empty handed for an administrative hearing under Vehicle Code § 14101.” Pet. ¶ 5,
p. 9. However, the Petition does not establish that Petitioner has been subjected to an invasion of
a legally protected interest. Petitioner does not allege in his Petition that one has a legally
protected interest to be free from points added to a DMV record. Furthermore, Petitioner has
cited no California law that unequivocally requires the immediate disclosure of a claim file upon
request. Petitioner does not even allege that with the entire claim file the bodily injury point is
certain to be removed via an administrative hearing. Thus, Petitioner cannot establish that he has
suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and actual or imminent.
Therefore, the writ must be denied because Petitioner cannot establish that he will gain a direct
benefit from its issuance or suffer a direct detriment if it is denied.
Petitioner further asserts that the “bodily injury point on Petitioner’s driving record
creat[es] an immediate barrier to employment teaching English as a second language in countries
like Japan and Oman and other high-end paying countries which have strict character and
conduct regulations for teaching visas.” Pet. p. 19.
Again, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he has suffered a concrete and
particularized injury. Petitioner does not allege that he actually lost an employment opportunity
abroad. Rather, he alleges the DMV points are a “barrier” to obtaining employment. Without
additional evidence proving that Petitioner has actually had a teaching visa denied for this
reason, his allegation is pure conjecture. Thus, Petitioner simply cannot establish an actual,
concrete invasion of a legally protected interest.
For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner is not entitled to bring this extraordinary writ in9
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this Court. Thus, this Court should sustain this demurrer without leave to amend on this basis.
C. Petitioner Cannot Establish IEAC Violated Ministerial Duties
As indicated above, Petitioner alleges in his First Cause of Action that IEAC violated two
ministerial duties. Petitioner states that IEAC violated its alleged ministerial duty to furnish “a
complete response within 15 calendar days” pursuant to 10 CCR § 2695.5(b). Pet. ¶ 4, p. 9.
Petitioner further alleges that IEAC violated its alleged ministerial duty to “diligently pursue a
thorough, fair and objective investigation” of claims, pursuant to 10 CCR § 2695.7(d). Pet. ¶ 2,
p. 9. For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner cannot prevail on these allegations.
“A ministerial duty is an act that a public agency or officer is required to perform in a
prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority without regard to any personal
judgment concerning the propriety of the act.” Siskiyou Hospital Inc. v. County of Siskiyou,
supra, at 37. ‘‘In order to construe a statute as imposing a mandatory duty, the mandatory nature
of the duty must be phrased in explicit and forceful language.’” Id. “ ‘[I]t is not enough that
some statute [or constitutional provision] contains mandatory language. In order to recover
plaintiffs have to show that there is some specific statutory mandate that was violated by the
[public entity.]’ ” In re Dohner (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 590, 598-599. “Even if mandatory
language appears in the statute creating a duty, the duty is discretionary if the [entity] must
exercise significant discretion to perform the duty.” Mooney v. Garcia (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th
229, 233.
As discussed above, 10 CCR § 2695.5(b) does not expressly require IEAC to furnish their
entire claim file to Petitioner upon request. Moreover, Petitioner has failed to establish that
IEAC has not issued a complete response. “While a writ of mandate may issue to compel
compliance with a ministerial duty—an act the law specifically requires—it may not issue to
compel an agency to perform that legal duty in a particular manner, or control its exercise of
discretion by forcing it to meet its legal obligations in a specific way.” Marquez v. State Dept. Of
Health Care Services (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 87, 118-119.
Petitioner attached to his Petition a copy of the letter sent on January 26, 2026, from
Donna Romero, Group Manager at IEAC. Pet. Exh. X. The letter details the investigation that10
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IEAC conducted regarding the automobile accident claim and the ultimate determination that
Petitioner was at fault. Id. Further, the letter details the settlement of the bodily injury claims of
the third party and his minor daughter. Id. Thus, Petitioner cannot request this Court to compel
IEAC to respond in a specific manner just because he is unhappy with the response they
previously gave.
Finally, it is of importance to note that Petitioner also alleges that IEAC failed to provide
its response within 15 calendar days as is required under 10 CCR § 2695.5(b). However, the
exhibits attached to the Petition and Complaint tell a different story. Jaime Rodriguez, Claims
Unit Manager at IEAC, informed Petitioner via email on January 21, 2026, that IEAC had
received Petitioner’s formal request for the claim file and would respond at their earliest
opportunity. Pet. Exh. W. Thereafter, Donna Romero issued a complete response via letter on
January 26, 2026. Pet. Exh. X. Thus, Petitioner’s contention that IEAC failed to respond within
15 calendar days is inaccurate.
Petitioner also states that IEAC violated its alleged ministerial duty to conduct a thorough
and fair investigation under 10 CCR § 2695.7(d). This code states:
“Every insurer shall conduct and diligently pursue a thorough, fair and objective
investigation and shall not persist in seeking information not reasonably required for
or material to the resolution of a claim dispute.”
Petitioner alleges that “Respondent breached these duties by failing to secure
exculpatory security camera evidence after being notified of fraud by Petitioner on October 15,
2025.” Pet. ¶ 2, p. 9. The code does not require an insurer to obtain security camera footage
pursuant to a claim investigation. Furthermore, Petitioner admits in his Petition that, “California
Insurance Code § 1875.20 and 10 CCR §§ 2698.30-2698.43 do not use the words “security
camera” explicitly[.]” Pet. p. 16. Thus, Petitioner cannot claim that Respondent had any duty to
obtain security footage as part of their investigation of the claim.
Finally, Petitioner states in his Petition that the security footage he believes would be
“exculpatory” is no longer available. Pet. ¶ 3, p. 9. “As a general proposition courts will not
issue a writ of mandate to enforce an abstract right of no practical benefit to petitioner, or where
to issue the writ would be useless, unenforceable, or unavailing.” County of San Diego v. State of11
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California (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580, 595-596. Thus, Petitioner admits that the relief he seeks
is not available. As a result, this writ petition is not properly before this court.
Therefore, Petitioner’s allegation that IEAC violated two ministerial duties fails, and this
demurrer should be sustained without leave to amend as to Petitioner’s First Cause of Action.
D. Petitioner Has Failed to State Sufficient Facts to Constitute a Cause of Action
for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
For the reasons set forth below, Petitioner has failed to allege sufficient facts to support a
cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against IEAC.
“In every contract, including policies of insurance, there is an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing that neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other to
receive the benefits of the agreement.” Archdale v. American Internat. Specialty Lines Ins. Co.
(2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 449, 463.
“[T]here are at least two separate requirements to establish breach of the implied
covenant: (1) benefits due under the policy must have been withheld; and (2) the reason for
withholding benefits must have been unreasonable or without proper cause.” Love v. Fire Ins.
Exchange (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1136, 1151.
Petitioner alleges in his Petition that “Respondent breached the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing by favoring the interests of a third-party over the interests of its own
insured, and by ignoring third party’s profession alongside physical evidence rendering third-
party's claim highly unlikely if not impossible.” Pet. ¶ 8, p. 10.
The dispute at issue is not over benefits withheld, rather, Petitioner contests the benefits
paid and the bodily injury assessment for the third party and his minor daughter. As Petitioner
cannot establish that benefits were unreasonably withheld under the policy, he cannot now sue
IEAC for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Additionally, the
response issued by IEAC Group Manager, Donna Romero, on January 26, 2026, revealed that
IEAC did not act unreasonably toward Petitioner in any way. First, Petitioner did not dispute
that he was at fault for the accident. Pet. Exh. X. Second, IEAC received repair estimates for the
third-party's vehicle which indicated the passenger door needed to be replaced due to the force of12
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the accident. Id. Third, IEAC received proof of lost income from the third-party due to the
accident. Id. Thus, the facts reveal that IEAC acted reasonably and based on evidence.
Furthermore, California Courts have previously held that the “ ‘performance of an act
specifically authorized by the policy cannot, as a matter of law, constitute bad faith.’ ” Baldwin
v. AAA Northern California, Nevada & Utah Ins. Exchange (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 545, 557-558.
“[I]n the insurance context... “ ‘courts are not at liberty to imply a covenant directly at odds with
a contract’s express grant of discretionary power...’ ” Id. The policy language as quoted in a
letter from Jaime Rodriguez at IEAC, dated December 26, 2025, expressly states “[w]e may
make settlement of any claim or lawsuit as we think appropriate.” Pet. Exh. Q. Thus, in this
case, IEAC performed an act that was expressly authorized under the policy terms. As a matter
of law, this cannot constitute bad faith.
Petitioner has not set forth sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing against IEAC. This demurrer should be
sustained without leave to amend as to Petitioner’s Second Cause of Action.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Petition for Writ of Mandate is not properly before this Court. None of the facts
alleged by Petitioner entitle him to this extraordinary relief. Moreover, Petitioner has not stated
any facts that establish violation of a ministerial duty or breach of the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. Thus, Petitioner has not stated sufficient facts to constitute a cause of
action. For these reasons, IEAC respectfully requests that this Court would sustain this demurrer
in its entirety without leave to amend.
DATED: April 13, 2026
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